Racialization, Agency, and the Law: Wendake First Nation Confronts the Canadian Criminal Justice System, 1918-1939 by Schofield, Dona Leigh
  
Racialization, Agency, and the Law: Wendake First Nation Confronts the Canadian Criminal 











The Department of History 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Master of Arts (History) 















School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:             Dona Leigh Schofield 
Entitled:     Racialization, Agency, and the Law: Wendake First Nation Confronts the  
                   Canadian Criminal Justice System, 1918-1939. 
 And submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts (History) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
______________________________________ Chair 
Dr. Andrew Ivaska  
 
______________________________________ Examiner 
Dr. Eric Reiter 
 
______________________________________ Examiner 
Dr. Peter Gossage 
 
______________________________________ Thesis Supervisor 
Dr. Gavin Taylor 
 
 
Approved by           
                                         Dr. Matthew Penney, Chair of Department  
July 17th 2020         














Racialization, Agency, and the Law: Wendake First Nation Confronts the Canadian Criminal 
Justice System, 1918-1939 
 
 
Dona Leigh Schofield 
 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Province of Canada enacted a series of laws in an effort 
to extend their jurisdiction over the lands and peoples residing in the territory. Even though, in 
theory, these laws applied equally to everyone, for Indigenous peoples, the impact of state 
expansion occurred alongside the Canadian government’s assimilationist policies. 
Conceptualized as an “Indian Problem”, the 1876 Indian Act sought to regulate Indigenous 
people by labelling them as a separate racial category; thereby creating two types of legal 
persons: “Indian” and “non-Indian”. Given that this racial distinction was deeply embedded into 
the colonial structure, it shaped Indigenous people’s interactions with state institutions, including 
the justice system. This thesis examines the implementation of Canadian criminal law vis-à-vis 
members of the Wendake First Nation and the different ways in which they navigated the legal 
system between 1918 and 1939. Drawing from a total of 34 court cases, I argue that the law 
operated as a tool of colonial control to uphold racial distinctions between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people. At the same time, this study also reinforces the notion that the Wendat were 
active historical agents who played a role in negotiating and renegotiating their role in the new 
colonial order. Although these two themes – racialization and agency – seem to contradict each 
other, this thesis demonstrates that not only can they be reconciled, but twentieth-century court 
cases provide important historical insights into the origins of today’s Indigenous 
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A Note on Methodology 
  
Wendake was – and still is – an Indigenous community with a long history of contact with Euro-
Canadians; as such, their experiences with colonialism provide an important contrast compared 
to those of the First Nations in the West, whose interactions with the law throughout the 
twentieth century has generally received more attention in the scholarship. Moreover, while there 
is an abundance of research on the Wendat’s relationship with the French during the seventeenth 
century, the existing literature pays less attention to them past this time period. This thesis brings 
the Wendat back to the forefront of the historical narrative by shedding light on their unique 
lived experiences between 1918 and 1939 at a time when the reach of federal and provincial 
jurisdiction in Québec – and elsewhere in Canada – was expanding. In essence, this thesis asks: 
how was Canadian criminal law implemented vis-à-vis members of the Wendake First Nation 
during the interwar period? 
 
In order to answer this question, I draw primarily from the court cases located at the 
Bibliothèque et Archives Nationale du Québec (BAnQ). During my first research trip to the 
BAnQ in February 2019, I spoke to the archivist about my project and he directed me to the 
plumitif, or the court docket, which is a compilation of court records that logs criminal and penal 
matters from 1923 to 1968 and from 1977 to 1978. While consulting the plumitif, I used two 
main approaches to identify Wendat men and women as either plaintiffs or defendants. First, I 
looked for common family surnames such as “Sioui”, “Groslouis”, “Bastien”, and “Picard”. 
Second, because the plumitif listed the area where the parties resided, I searched for references to 
Wendake by looking for terms that were used at the time to refer to the community, like “Village 
des Hurons”, “Réserve Huronne”, “Village Indien”, “Loretteville”, “Jeune-Lorette”, and 
“l’Ancienne-Lorette”. For the last three terms, I cross-referenced them with the family surnames 
to ensure the individuals were Wendat. By combining both approaches, I was able to pinpoint 
who was Indigenous and who was not, as well as where the person was residing at the time he or 
she encountered the legal system. However, one of the plumitif’s main limitation is that it does 
not include specific detail about how the judicial process unfolded. For instance, while the 
document outlines the procedures that were taken in a court case, there is often no mention of 








and women – from the date the complaint was file to the moment a judge’s decision was 
rendered – by examining the steps that were taken in the case. In addition to the plumitif, I also 
consulted the dossiers, which are the original case files that usually contained various supporting 
documents produced by judges, lawyers, witnesses, and others who were involved in the judicial 
process. For the dossiers, I consulted the “Thémis” database on site at the BAnQ, where, I 
applied the same approach I used for the plumitif: I searched for common surnames and 
references to Wendake using the terms I mention above. Due to the richness of these files, not 
only was I able to trace the Wendat’s legal journey, but I was also able to thoroughly examine 
their encounters with various state officials and institutions. In turn, this painted a much clearer 
picture of the judicial process and provided me with answers to my research question. 
 
By the time I finished consulting the plumitif and the dossiers, I had a significant number of 
cases, the majority of which were not relevant either because the person was not Indigenous or I 
was unable to confirm their Indigeneity; consequently, I did not include those cases in my thesis.  
The only exception to this is when I explicitly state that I am using a case involving a non-
Indigenous offender to compare and contrast with the experience of a Wendat defendant. For the 
cases that include Wendat plaintiffs and defendants that are relevant to my particular topic and 
provide enough information to analyze, I chose to examine those in-text. By contrast, those that 
are relevant but contain an insufficient amount of detail to analyze on their own are cited as 
supporting evidence in the footnotes to reinforce my argument and the pattern they illustrate. 
While I have tried my best to include all relevant court cases, I am not immune to human error, 
and thus, I do not claim to have found every case involving a Wendat plaintiff or defendant. 
 
Finally, a brief statement on terminology. In an effort to remain clear and transparent about my 
methodology, I use the terms “plumitif” or “court docket” throughout my thesis to refer to the 
court cases I found in the plumitif. Applying that same logic, when I employ the term “case file”, 







Introduction: Racialization, Agency, and the Law 
 
On August 26th, 1932, 70-year-old Albert Sioui of Loretteville was accused by Patrick 
O’Sullivan of “vol de bois”.1 After signing off on the plaintiff’s statement, the Honourable Judge 
Arthur Fitzpatrick issued a summons to the defendant requesting his presence in court for the 
preliminary hearing that was scheduled for three days later.2 However, Sioui did not show up 
and as a result, the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy issued a warrant for his arrest.3 By the time 
the case resumed on August 31st, Sioui and his lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, appeared before the 
court but no plea was entered, and the judge granted him a conditional release on a promise to 
appear.4 According to the plumitif, September 8th was supposed to be the first day of the hearing, 
but Sioui was absent and the case was rescheduled once again.5 Five days later, on the 13th, the 
case resumed and all parties were present, but the information regarding how this process 
unfolded is vague and unclear. Over the course of the next month, the court met on three separate 
occasions with each session similar to the last; the defendant was accompanied by his lawyer, the 
crown presented its evidence against the accused, the defence rebutted, and the case was 
adjourned.6 On September 27th, the plumitif indicates that Sioui and his counsel presented a 
formal motion requesting an expedited process, which was granted by the Honourable Judge 
Arthur Fitzpatrick.7 When the hearing resumed on October 4th, the case proceeded and although 
the plumitif indicates that a judgement was to be rendered eight days later, no decision was 
given, and the case continued. Finally, on October 19th, Judge Fitzpatrick delivered his verdict, 
acquitting Sioui of all charges and the matter was officially resolved.8  
Born in approximately 1862, five years before Confederation, Albert Sioui’s coming of 
age occurred alongside the expansion of the Canadian state. Throughout his lifetime, a series of 
political, economic, social, and cultural initiatives coupled with the creation of a legal system to 
uphold them laid the groundwork for state intrusion into the lives of Indigenous people. In turn, 
increasing their likelihood of encountering the state and its various institutions. For Sioui, this is 
                                                          














seen most clearly by the fact that he was charged for engaging in behaviour – gathering wood 
from the forest – that would not have necessarily fallen under the purview of a court of law 
during his parents’ or his grandparents’ lifetime. Thus, his experiences were significantly 
different from those of his ancestors. Even though Sioui was eventually acquitted of all charges, 
this case demonstrates a certain amount of continuity between the criminalization of Indigenous 
peoples in the twentieth century and their overrepresentation in the justice system today. Over 
the last few weeks, the shooting deaths of Chantel Moore and Rodney Levi during two separate 
wellness checks one week apart and the video of the violent arrest of Athabasca Chipewyan 
First Nation Chief Allan Adam reminds us that the ripple effects of the colonial system 
continue to be felt today. More specifically, these violent incidents reinforce the fact that these 
events are not isolated occurrences; rather, they are part of a troubling pattern in which 
Indigenous people continue to be disproportionately represented in the legal system. 
According to a research analysis conducted by CTV News, out of the 66 people who were 
shot and killed by police since 2017 and whose ethnicity could be identified, 25 were 
Indigenous.9 In other words, over the last two and a half years, Indigenous people accounted 
for nearly half of the shooting deaths attributed to police. Unfortunately, these disparities do 
not stop with policing practices. In fact, they also extend to the correctional system. Based on 
a 2019 report released by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, although Indigenous 
people make up approximately 4% of the total population, they represented 30% of 
admissions into provincial and territorial custody in 2017 and 2018.10 Thus, compared to 
their non-Indigenous counterparts, Indigenous people continue to be overrepresented in the 
justice system.11  
Throughout the years, a number of government commissions and inquiries have been 
tasked with analyzing the inequitable treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada. For 
example, in Québec, the Viens Commission examined the relationship between the 
province’s public sector and First Nations and Inuit peoples. During his investigation, the 
                                                          
9 Ryan Flanagan, “Why are Indigenous people in Canada so much more likely to be shot and killed by police?,” 
CTV News, June 19, 2020, https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/why-are-indigenous-people-in-canada-so-much-more-
likely-to-be-shot-and-killed-by-police-1.4989864 
10 Jamil Malakieh, “Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada, 2017/2018,” The Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, May 9, 2019, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.pdf  
11 To access the complete report see Jamil Malakieh, “Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada, 2017/2018,” 








head commissioner Jacques Viens heard from a total of 277 Indigenous people who 
described their personal experiences with police, hospital staff, youth protection agencies, 
and members of the justice system.12 After listening to a total of 1188 stories over the span of 
38 weeks, Viens published his final report in 2019 concluding that “systemic discrimination” 
against Indigenous peoples in the province was “impossible to deny”.13 Along with 
recommending that Québec issue a formal apology to Indigenous peoples for the physical, 
psychological, and emotional damage they suffered as a result of provincial laws, policies, 
and practices, the head commissioner also presented a list of 142 calls to action to improve 
policing, justice, social services, youth protection, and mental health programs.14 Even 
though the specific mandate of inquiries change, the common thread woven throughout each one 
is their overall conclusion: the systemic racism deeply embedded within state institutions has 
resulted in the differential treatment of Indigenous peoples. Therefore, the violent incidents that 
left Chief Allan Adam badly beaten and claimed the lives of Chantel Moore and Rodney Levi – 
as well as many others – illustrates the different ways in which the criminal justice system both 
reflects and reinforces a racial bias towards Indigenous peoples. Turning to the past can help us 
understand how and why this situation has developed the way it has. 
As with Indigenous peoples today, Albert Sioui’s experiences – within the reserve and 
society at large – were significantly different from those of his ancestors. Prior to the arrival of 
Europeans to the North American continent, the Wendat, which included the Bear, Cord, Deer, 
and Rock tribes were predominantly sedentary.15 United under the Wendat Confederacy, the 
villages of the Turtle, Bear, Wolf, Deer, Beaver, Hawk, Fox, and Sturgeon clans were located 
“along the northern shores of the Lower Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River”, and within 
each community, the Wendat lived in longhouses.16 These permanent dwellings were home to 
                                                          
12 Benjamin Shingler and Kamila Hinkson, “Provincial report finds treatment of Indigenous people falls short across 
a range of public services,” CBC News, September 30, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-
treatment-indigenous-viens-commission-report-1.5297888  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. To consult the complete report please see: Québec, Commission d’enquête sur les relations entre les 
Autochtones et certains services publics, Public Inquiry Commission on relations between Indigenous Peoples and 
certain public services in Québec: listening, reconciliation and progress, (Val d’Or: Gouvernement du Québec, 
2019) https://www.cerp.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_clients/Rapport/Final_report.pdf  
15 Kathryn Magee Labelle and Thomas Peace, introduction to From Huronia to Wendake: Adversity, Migration, and 
Resilience, 1650-1900, ed. Kathryn Magee Labelle and Thomas Peace (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2017), 3. 







multiple families, in turn making the longhouse “une unité de résidence multifamiliale”.17 As a 
result, the homes were easily adaptable to include large numbers of people. In addition to having 
a practical purpose, longhouses also had a symbolic meaning. In particular, they were a 
representation of Wendat occupation. Since erecting these structures involved community 
participation and many days of hard labor, the Wendat only built them in areas where they 
planned to live for a prolonged period of time.18 By contrast, temporary homes known as 
wigwams were used for short-term occupation such as hunting and fishing trips because they 
required less work, thus giving communities the freedom of movement.19 Moreover, at the heart 
of each community lay deeply spiritual peoples whose faith transcended all aspects of their daily 
lives.20 This belief was rooted in the notion that the Wendat “[…] vivaient dans un univers 
maintenu en équilibre par des esprits, qu’ils devaient solliciter, respecter, et apaiser, si 
nécessaire.”21 Oftentimes, the gratitude they owed to non-humans was displayed during seasonal 
hunting trips. For example, successful Wendat hunters were required to pay homage to the spirits 
of the animals they killed.22 Thus, soliciting, respecting, and appeasing human and non-human 
spirits was instrumental in maintaining a harmonious balance between them. 
A fundamental aspect of the Wendat’s mostly sedentary lifestyle centered around 
traditional modes of subsistence. In fact, a combination of agricultural production and hunting 
and fishing practices formed the foundation of both their diet and economy. For instance, along 
with producing corn, the Wendat also farmed “les courges, les fèves, les citrouilles, et les 
tournesols.”23 A central feature of this economic system was the gendered division of labour 
between Wendat men and women. While men cleared the fields, for example, women were 
responsible for preparing the soil and planting the seeds.24 As such, these shared responsibilities 
essentially created a mutually beneficial partnership for men and women since both were needed 
for the success of the harvest. In conjunction with agricultural production, the Wendat also 
engaged in seasonal hunting and fishing. Taking place during both the spring and fall months, 
                                                          
17 Alain Beaulieu, Stéphanie Béreau, and Jean Tanguay, Les Wendats du Québec: Territoire, Économie et Identité, 
1650-1930 (Québec: Les Éditions GID, 2013), 29.  
18 Ibid. 29. 
19 Ibid. 29. 
20 Ibid. 49. 
21 Ibid. 49. 
22 Ibid. 50. 
23 Ibid. 29. 







one group of men would go fishing while the other went hunting.25 Even though this mixed 
economy allowed the Wendat to supplement their diet with various forms of nutrition, these two 
activities remained far less important than agricultural production.26 Furthermore, aside from 
serving both an economic and subsistence purpose, hunting and fishing were also an important 
part of the Wendat’s traditional teaching. For instance, young boys who accompanied their 
fathers on these trips learned survival skills.27 Thus, these activities allowed fathers to pass down 
important knowledge to their sons in order to prepare them for their future role as providers. 
Finally, their alliances with neighbouring communities created invaluable friendships, that 
ensured the protection and success of the eight clans. One of the benefits that was provided to 
them by treaties and their geographic position was the ability to seamlessly integrate into various 
trading networks with other Indigenous nations. In turn, the four tribes were given the 
opportunity to exchange for items they did not have, such as Anishinaabe wild game.28 
The arrival of the French in North America during the middle of the sixteenth century 
significantly altered the lives of the Wendat. In fact, this encounter laid the foundation for an 
important French-Wendat alliance. For example, following their first meeting with Samuel de 
Champlain in 1609 through to the dispersal of 1649, the Wendat remained the primary trading 
partners and military allies of the French, oftentimes acting as middlemen in the latter’s 
encounters with other Indigenous groups to the west and the north.29 Moreover, a key feature of 
this partnership included the presence of Jesuit missionaries among the Wendat.30 Although the 
documentation produced from this alliance was written from a Eurocentric perspective, they 
provide researchers with an in-depth look into early seventeenth century Wendat culture. 
However, within the first few decades of the French presence on the continent, a series of 
devastating epidemics coupled with intense warfare between neighbouring Indigenous nations 
and Christianization missions gradually reduced the Wendat population.31 According to historian 
Alain Beaulieu, by 1648, the Wendat population decreased dramatically from 30 000 to 9000 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 41. 
26 Ibid. 35.  
27 Ibid. 48. 
28 Labelle and Peace, “Introduction,” 4. Among those who have written extensively about the Wendat is scholar 
Bruce Trigger. Trigger’s in-depth analysis of the Wendat remains the authoritative work on Wendat society at the 
time of European contact. To consult his work, see Bruce Trigger. Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron 
People to 1660 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1976).  
29 Beaulieu, et al., Les Wendats du Québec, 27-28. 
30 Ibid. 28. 







souls in the span of several years.32 Consequently, this depopulation rendered the Wendat 
vulnerable to both Christianizing missions and further attacks.33 As a response to political, 
economic, religious, and social pressures, the Wendat dismantled the Confederacy and left their 
homeland along the shores of the Saint Lawrence River for Gahoendoe Island in 1649.34 But, a 
combination of persistent Haudenosaunee attacks and severe droughts that led to starvation, 
forced the tribes to reconsider their future.35 Consequently, the Wendat employed different 
movement strategies in an effort to guarantee their survival; while some chose to join 
neighboring Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee villages, others made the decision to re-establish 
their communities elsewhere. In 1671, for example, one group moved west towards 
Michilimackinac where they lived until they relocated to Detroit three decades later and another 
faction moved to Ohio, Kansas City, and Oklahoma.36 A second group, a significant portion of 
whom were Christian converts seeking military protection from the French following the 
breakdown of their alliance, moved to l’Île d’Orléans (1651-1656), Québec (1656-1668), Sainte-
Foy (1669-1673), and Ancienne-Lorette (1673-1697) before permanently settling in Jeune-
Lorette, a town just outside of Québec City, in 1697.37   
Although the Wendat continued to exist following their move to Gahoendoe Island in 
1649, few scholars have examined them past the seventeenth century. According to historians 
Kathryn Magee Labelle and Thomas Peace, this gap in the scholarship is founded on the 
assumption of a Wendat demise following a series of relocations to the United States of America 
(USA) and within the province of Québec.38 As a result, these authors maintain that this trope 
essentially removed “[…] Indigenous peoples and cultures from North American life”, which in 
turn eliminated them from the historical narrative.39 There are a number of scholars, however, 
such as Denys Delâge, Jocelyn Tahatarongnantase Paul, Julie Rachel Savard, and Alain Beaulieu 
                                                          
32 Beaulieu, et al., Les Wendats du Québec, 55. 
33 Ibid. 55. 
34 Labelle and Peace, “Introduction,” 5. Today, Gahoendoe Island is known as Christian Island and this area is the 
home of the Beausoleil First Nation. For more information see “Establishment of Sainte Marie II on Gahoendoe 
(Christian Island),” Community Stories, last modified 2018, http://www.virtualmuseum.ca/community-
stories_histoires-de-chez-nous/story-of_histoire-de-ste-marie-ii/story/establishment-sainte-marie-ii-gahoendoe-
christian-island/  
35 Ibid. 5.  
36 Ibid. 5. 
37 Jocelyn Tahatarongnantase Paul, “Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette,” Recherches Amérindiennes du 
Québec 30, no. 3 (2000): 5. 
38 Labelle and Peace, “Introduction,” 7. 







who, alongside Labelle and Peace, argue against this assumption. While the particular focus of 
each author varies, their works maintain that a certain amount of continuity existed among the 
Wendat in Jeune-Lorette due to the community’s ability to adapt to the changing economic, 
political, and social circumstances of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. As the 
Seigneurial system expanded under the French Regime and the Canadien population continued to 
increase, the area underwent significant geographic changes. As a result, members of the Wendat 
community gradually shifted their primary mode of subsistence from agriculture to hunting.40 
For instance, Denys Delâge states that “au début du XVIIIe siècle la chasse occupait une place 
centrale dans la vie des Hurons de Lorette et selon un calendrier bien réglé.”41 This is significant 
because this illustrates the first major economic shift that occurred among the Wendat of Jeune-
Lorette and highlights the community’s ability to adapt to different circumstances.  
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of industrialization 
substantially altered the Wendat territory. More specifically, historian Jocelyn 
Tahatarongnantase Paul explores how the hunting territory of the Wendat changed following the 
1888 opening of the railway linking Québec City and Lac Saint Jean, thereby granting non-
Aboriginal people access to the land and increasing the number of people coming in and out of 
the area.42 Consequently, this method of transportation brought Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
hunters into conflict as they competed for limited resources. In turn, this augmented the number 
of confrontations between settlers and Wendat community members who came to rely on 
hunting for survival.43 Moreover, Paul argues that the combination of Québec game laws in the 
late nineteenth century coupled with the creation of private hunting clubs such as “le Triton 
(1886), le club Stadacona (1886) et le Tourili (1889)” further strained limited resources by 
adding additional competition.44 In 1895, the establishment of the Laurentian National Park 
added yet another obstacle for Wendat hunters by preventing them from accessing the area, 
while simultaneously reducing their land base.45 Even though provincial authorities initially 
tolerated the hunting practices of community members, by 1910, these actions were no longer 
                                                          
40 Paul, “Le territoire de chasse,” 6. 
41 Denys Delâge, “La tradition de commerce chez les Hurons de Lorette-Wendake,” Recherches Amérindiennes du 
Québec 30, no. 3 (2000): 35. 
42 Paul, “Le territoire de chasse,” 9.   
43 Julie Rachel Savard, “L’apport des Hurons-Wendat au développement de l’industrie du cuir dans le secteur de 
Loretteville aux XIXe et XXe siècles,” Les modernités amérindiennes et inuite 8, no. 1 (2005): 72. 
44 Paul, “Le territoire de chasse,” 9.   







accepted and as a result, a number of Wendat men were fined and imprisoned for hunting 
violations.46   
In response to industrialization, the Wendat gradually incorporated manufacturing into 
their economy. Although it was initially used to supplement subsistence hunting practices, it 
eventually formed a fundamental part of the community’s economy. In fact, historian Julie 
Rachel Savard argues that the Wendat survived this challenging time period because of the 
community’s capacity to adapt its economy to the changing reality.47 As a result, a number of 
local companies were founded on the reserve by community members looking to succeed in the 
new market. Focusing specifically on local businesses in Loretteville, the author demonstrates 
how the Wendat benefited from the booming leather industry by successfully blending together 
traditional artistic practices with European manufacturing.48 For example, Maurice E. Bastien 
founded his leather goods company, Bastien Bros, in 1826 and production focused primarily on 
moccasins, snowshoes, and canoes.49 Over the years, Bastien’s business remained successful and 
net profits continued to increase well into the twentieth century. For example, in 1882, the 
company made between $500 and $1000 net profit, and by 1930, Bastien’s company was 
generating a total net revenue between $10 000 and $20 000.50 This rise in profits was due in 
part to an increase in the non-Aboriginal population and their growing desire for Wendat 
products.51 In particular, customers were interested in moccasins, which intensified the demand 
for these goods. Consequently, this resulted in the community importing materials in order to 
meet the growing demands and fulfil consumer needs.52 Aside from moccasins, there was also a 
rising interest in leather gloves. Wendat community member P. B. Savard, a moccasin 
manufacturer, capitalized on this moment and joined the leather glove industry when he opened 
his business in 1896.53 Even though Savard was one of the few to take a chance on this new 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 9.   
47 Savard, “L’apport des Hurons-Wendat,” 84. 
48 Ibid. 74. 
49 Ibid. 74. Along with Savard, other scholars such as Catherine Cangany have also examined the importance of 
moccasin manufacturing for Indigenous communities. Although her research deals with an earlier time period, her 
focus on moccasin consumption by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous consumers in Detroit – and across the 
British Empire – reveals the important economic, political, and cultural context of this area. For more information 
see Catherine Cangany “Fashioning Moccasins: Detroit, the Manufacturing Frontier, and the Empire of 
Consumption, 1701-1835,” The William and Mary Quarterly 69, no. 2 (2012): 265-304. 
50 Savard, “L’apport des Hurons-Wendat,” 75. 
51 Ibid. 75. 
52 Ibid. 74.  







industry, it proved to be so successful that it came to dominate the manufacturing sector of 
Loretteville well into the 1980s.54 Thus, it is clear that members of the Wendake First Nation 
were not only actively engaging in this economy but their businesses were thriving in it as well.  
The territorial and economic changes brought on by industrialization had a direct impact 
on the lives of Wendat men and women. On the one hand, it altered the political and social 
structures of the reserve by providing community members with different economic 
opportunities. For instance, in addition to being a successful businessman, Ludger Bastien was 
also elected chief of Wendake in 1929, a position he held until 1935.55 In addition, Bastien also 
entered federal politics as an elected member of the Conservative party in 1924 before leaving 
three years later.56 Therefore, Bastien’s reputation as a successful business owner and member of 
the prominent Bastien family contributed to his social and political mobility both on the local 
and federal levels. By using this example, Savard illustrates that the economic prosperity that a 
number of Wendat families experienced throughout the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries opened up important political opportunities. However, the bourgeoning capitalist 
economy altered the power relations between community members. In fact, even though this 
system facilitated social and political mobility for some such as the Bastien, Savard, Sioui, and 
Picard families, others were not as fortunate. As such, the community’s wealth was concentrated 
in the hands of few families. Moreover, while a gradual decline in manufacturing initially began 
during the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, the socio-economic divide between 
families became even more apparent during the economic crisis of the 1930s. After the ripple 
effects of the Stock Market crash of 1929 made their way through the reserve, Bastien Bros was 
the only company to remain open, but it only employed a small number of community 
members.57 Evidently, the highs and lows of the reserve’s capitalist economy had a 
disproportionate impact on working-class Wendat men and women. 
While the experiences of the Wendat at Jeune-Lorette were unique to the community, the 
changes it underwent coincided with the legal and territorial expansion of the Canadian state in 
the nineteenth century, which marked a significant turning point in the relationship between 
European settlers and First Nations. In particular, the evolution of the nation state, the way 
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Aboriginal peoples were treated, and the creation of the legal framework was influenced by the 
economic, political, and ideological trends taking place at this time. As the lucrative fur trade 
slowly started to collapse, the colony in British North America underwent a dramatic economic 
shift, thus paving the way for the Province of Canada to shift its focus from hunting and trapping 
to agricultural production.58 That said, there was a greater emphasis on farming and resource 
development, which required the acquisition of Indigenous lands. To this end, the colony 
underwent a process of rapid expansion. As such, British officials engaged in extensive treaty 
negotiations with Indigenous nations to acquire land for settlement. For instance, as Paul 
McHugh and Lisa Ford have written, “between 1784 and 1804, the British Crown used treaties to 
obtain millions of acres for colonial occupation by British emigrants.”59 Not only did this 
strategy work to attract British settlers, but it simultaneously reduced Indigenous peoples’ land 
base by limiting their access to the resources located on ceded lands.   
 In conjunction with the economic shift from trade to agricultural production, there was a 
growing desire among colonial officials in the Province of Canada to establish permanent 
settlements that would be united under a homogenous British authority. As a result, prominent 
colonial officials began to rethink the colony’s relationship with First Nations, which in turn, led 
them to question the latter’s role in their newly imagined political reality. For instance, Herman 
Merivale (1806-74) argued that a combination of amalgamation and insulation should be used 
when dealing with Indigenous peoples.60 This example clearly demonstrates that, in British 
North America, First Nations would no longer be viewed as distinct nations but rather, as 
subjects. Moreover, the reallocation of control over the British Indian Department (BID) from 
Great Britain to the colony reaffirmed this shift in colonial attitude. From the time the BID was 
founded in 1755, the British Empire engaged in diplomatic relations with Indigenous peoples 
while the day-to-day operations lay in the hands of colonial officials on the ground.61 Thus, if 
men such as Herman Merivale adopted a change in attitude towards First Nations, it was 
reflected in the way the BID operated. According to historian Martha Elizabeth Walls, “the 1830 
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transfer of the British Indian Department from military to civil administration signaled the loss of 
Aboriginals’ military import and their definition as social and economic “problems” – expensive 
ones at that.”62 In other words, by the mid 1800s, it was clear that Indigenous peoples were no 
longer viewed as allies but rather as obstacles who stood in the way of colonial officials’ political 
aspirations for the Province of Canada. 
 Alongside the economic and political changes sweeping across the British North 
American colonies during the nineteenth century, there were also important ideological 
developments that shaped the way Indigenous peoples were treated. One of the most influential 
beliefs was the notion of a Christian duty. This belief was rooted in the idea that Christian 
Europeans had a responsibility to civilize Aboriginal peoples and incorporate them into broader 
society through a process of assimilation.63 This idea, however, was not specific to British North 
America. Rather, “it was an empire wide-task of heroic proportions and divine ordination 
encompassing the Maori, the Aborigine, the Hettentot, and many other indigenous peoples.”64 In 
other words, not only was the idea of a Christian duty assumed to be a God-given right but, it 
was prevalent throughout the British Empire, thereby affecting Native peoples on an 
international scale. In the Canadian context, this principle was understood as a paternal 
relationship between the government and Aboriginal peoples. More specifically, the state’s 
paternal role was a result of the economic and social changes taking place within Indigenous 
communities and the effects they had on its members. For example, a combination of an increase 
in settlement and a decrease in game populations caused significant hardship to Aboriginal 
peoples living in the southern part of Upper Canada.65 Consequently, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Sir George Murray, declared a change in policy in 1830, which highlighted the 
need to focus on ameliorating living conditions for Indigenous people through religion and 
education.66 Although this statement laid the seeds for future aggressive assimilation tactics, it 
was not until after Confederation that assimilation was officially adopted as part of the Canadian 
government’s policy. For example, in 1880, Alexander Morris, one of the government officials 
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who played a key role in negotiating the treaties on the prairies, stated “let us have Christianity 
and civilization among the Indian tribes; let us have a wise and paternal government … doing its 
utmost to help elevate the Indian population […]”67 This sentiment highlights the assumption on 
which the Canadian government was operating on; it portrayed the federal government as a 
father who was responsible for the Christianization and civilization of his Indigenous children in 
order to ensure their absorption into mainstream society. Therefore, as a result of the economic, 
political, and ideological changes that occurred throughout the early to mid-nineteenth century, 
Indigenous peoples were conceptualized as a problem that needed to be addressed. 
In order to solve the so-called “Indian Problem” and guarantee the success of the growing 
Canadian state, the Province of Canada committed itself to creating a legislative framework that 
would allow government officials to regulate Indigenous peoples.68 To this end, the state enacted 
various pieces of legislation in the lead up to Confederation in 1867. For example, in 1850, the 
government of the United Canadas created a legal definition for the term “Indian” for the first 
time when it passed an Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in 
Lower Canada.69 According to this law, as summarized by Ted Binnema, a legal “Indian” was 
defined in four ways:  
First, all persons of Indian blood reputed to belong to the particular Body or 
Tribe of Indians interested in such lands, and their descendants. Secondly, all 
persons intermarried with any such Indians and residing among them, and the 
descendants of such persons. Thirdly, all persons residing among such 
Indians, whose parents on either side were or are Indians of such Body or 
Tribe, or entitled to be considered as such. And fourthly, all persons adopted 
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in infancy by any such Indians, and residing in the Village or upon the lands 
of such Tribe or Body of Indians, and their descendants.70 
 
This law signals an important moment in the development of the Canadian state because it 
reflects the government’s growing political power and its ability to establish a legally defined 
group of people, which would then allow them to regulate their existence. Even though this act 
failed to include Upper Canada in its legal purview, it laid the groundwork for all future 
legislative initiatives. Seven years later, colonial officials reasserted their sovereignty when the 
government passed the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857. Not only did this law reaffirm the legal 
definition of “Indian” that was established in 1850, but it explicitly stated that its purpose was to 
“encourage the progress of Civilization among the Indian Tribes in this Province, and the gradual 
removal of all legal distinctions between them and Her Majesty’s other Canadian Subjects, and 
to facilitate the acquisition of property and of the rights accompanying it, by such Individual 
Members of the said Tribes […].”71 Under this law, any male “Indian”, as defined by the 1850 
legislation who was between the ages of twenty-one to forty, was sober, able to speak English or 
French, free from debt, and “sufficiently intelligent to be capable of managing his own affairs”, 
would be eligible to apply for the franchise.72 This law demonstrates the bureaucratic expansion 
of the state as the government sought to resolve the “Indian Problem” by defining a group of 
people and creating a series of legislation that would eliminate them as a distinct group.  
 The passage of the 1867 British North America Act (BNA) was a defining moment in the 
development of the Canadian state because it permanently enshrined Canadian sovereignty and 
affirmed the colony’s jurisdiction over the lands and peoples within its borders. One of the key 
features of this act was the division of powers between federal and provincial government levels. 
According to section 91, for instance, the federal government was legally responsible for 
“Indians, and lands reserved for Indians.”73 In other words, First Nations located within the 
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Dominion of Canada, which at the time of Confederation included the provinces of Québec, 
Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, were now under the jurisdiction of the Canadian 
federal government. The BNA Act (1867) confirmed that Indigenous peoples were, in fact, no 
longer viewed as allies but rather as subjects under the purview of the British Crown. Similar to 
previous legislation, the Gradual Enfranchisement Act (1869) represented another display of 
Euro-Canadian political power by imposing Western European patriarchal values. For example, 
according to this law, “any Indian woman marrying any other than an Indian, shall cease to be an 
Indian within the meaning of this Act, nor shall the children issue of such marriage be considered 
as Indians within the meaning of this Act […]”74 Thus, if an Indigenous woman married a non-
Indigenous man, she lost her Indian status as did all future children born from that union.75  
Finally, the Indian Act (1876) symbolizes the Canadian government’s most 
comprehensive attempt to both solve the “Indian Problem” and assert its sovereignty. By 
consolidating all previous legislation relating to Indigenous peoples, Canadian officials created a 
framework that oversaw the lives of legal “Indians” from the moment they were born until their 
death. As a result, this law essentially created the “Indian” as a separate legal category that was 
both defined and regulated by the Canadian government. Moreover, this law gave the 
government the power to regulate identity, families, property, reserves, lands, resources, band 
politics, money, religion, cultural ceremonies, criminal offences, and enfranchisement. For 
example, according to section 5, the “Superintendent-General may authorize surveys, plans, and 
reports to be made of any reserve for Indians, shewing and distinguishing the improved lands, 
the forests and lands fit for settlement, and such other information as may be required; and may 
authorize that the whole or any portion of the reserve be subdivided into lots.”76 In other words, 
government officials essentially controlled the reserve lands and were permitted to make 
decisions about its usage without consulting the community who lived on that piece of land, even 
though they would be directly affected by any change. This type of state intrusion into the lives 
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of ordinary people was unprecedented, and therefore, this act symbolizes the power of the 
Canadian state and its capacity to forcefully assert its jurisdiction.  
 In order to enforce Canada’s assimilationist policies, the federal government created 
various institutions such as the Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP) and the Department of 
Indian Affairs (DIA). To begin, An Act Respecting the Public Lands of the Dominion (1872) 
established the NWMP and listed their primary roles as “police, constables, judges, and courts 
and in the following year as stipendiary magistrates.”77 Prior to this, there was no central 
policing system and instead “the military was used to establish control; paramilitary forces that 
bridged military and civilian policing styles were employed to suppress violence and disorder; 
and when a settler society was achieved, civilian policing functioned to prevent crime.”78 
However, given the government’s desire to assert its sovereignty on the prairies, a visible 
Canadian presence was necessary. In particular, this act and the creation of the NWMP emerged 
because Prime Minister John A. Macdonald worried about the potential American threat to 
British Canadian sovereignty and possible conflicts between setters and Indigenous peoples.79 As 
a result, upon their arrival out West, the NWMP took on a variety of responsibilities. For 
example, officers “[…] fought prairie fires, controlled survey and railway construction crews, 
identified and controlled diseases, collected custom duties, brought news and veterinary sources, 
compiled meteorological and agricultural records, and assisted settlers in adjusting to prairie 
life.”80 Thus, NWMP members occupied various positions in the communities. 
In addition to these roles, an important part of the force’s mandate included regulating 
First Nations and Métis living out west. In the early years of its inception, the police force 
perceived itself as a mediator between Indigenous peoples and settlers at a time when the former 
still outnumbered the latter.81 As a result, the NWMP were limited in the amount of power they 
had, which in turn restricted the effect of their presence in people’s everyday lives. However, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, there was a significant shift in policing practices vis-à-vis 
Indigenous peoples on the prairies following the Northwest Resistance of 1885.82 More 
specifically, the federal government argued that “securing colonial authority was best served by a 
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policing strategy of Aboriginal containment, supported by the roles of the police force in 
facilitating treaty making […]”83 In other words, the government strongly believed that 
surveilling Aboriginal peoples would allow them to contain potential Indigenous uprisings, 
which in turn, also served to reassert their jurisdictional sovereignty over the area. As part of this 
new policing strategy, the NWMP began monitoring Aboriginal movement. For instance, the 
large Blood Reserve located close to the United States (US) border was the site of a strong 
NWMP presence where officers were instructed to use any means necessary while persuading 
community members against constantly moving around.84 Thus, by conceptualizing Indigenous 
peoples as potential threats to law and order, Canadian officials justified increased state 
intervention and surveillance.  
A critical part of this new policing strategy included curtailing the practice of cross-
border horse raids. According to legal historian Shelley Gavigan, horse raids were an important 
part of Indigenous warfare, where the main goal was to acquire as many animals as possible 
from the enemy.85 From the point of view of the Canadian government, this practice was 
particularly frustrating because communities who engaged in these activities did so with little 
regard to the Canada-US border.86 As such, in order to discourage this practice and deter others 
from engaging in it, the Canadian government reconceptualized horse raiding from the lesser 
offence of theft to the more serious crime of smuggling; essentially preventing Indigenous 
peoples on the prairies from retrieving stolen goods from the United States and bringing them 
back into Canada.87 Moreover, since young Indigenous men were the main participants in horse 
raids, they quickly came under the watchful eye of the NWMP. When they were caught by the 
police, the punishments they received were “particularly harsh, ranging from two to five years of 
incarceration with hard labour.”88 Given the severity of the sentence, it is clear that not only was 
this meant to be a deterrent but, it also worked to bolster Canadian sovereignty over Indigenous 
peoples. Thus, these examples illustrate the growing power of the state and its ability to insert 
itself into the lives of Aboriginal peoples. 
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 Along with the creation of the NWMP in 1873, the Canadian government also 
strengthened the role of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) after control of this institution 
was transferred to them by the British Crown in 1880. Overall, the main function of the DIA 
remained the same. In fact, this department continued to hold exclusive jurisdiction over issues 
relating to Indigenous peoples. However, there was a stronger emphasis on using department 
representatives as tools to enforce the provisions of the Indian Act (1876) and encourage the 
gradual assimilation of First Nations. As employees of the federal government, Indian agents 
“were expected to provide reliable data to facilitate informed decision-making, and then to carry 
out the policies and instructions of their superiors at headquarters.”89 In other words, Indian 
agents were expected to implement the policies they helped to create by collecting relevant 
information and passing it on to their superiors. On the surface, these tasks seem fairly straight 
forward, however, recent contributions to the scholarship have challenged this simplistic view of 
Indian agents by revealing that their roles were a lot more nuanced. Shifting the analytical focus 
to the Indian agents themselves, Robin Jarvis Brownlie explores this topic by examining how 
conditions on the ground influenced the way these government officials implemented the 
directives they received from Ottawa. Based on her analysis, she argues that, although Indian 
agents represented the colonial state, they also had to balance their responsibilities to the 
government with the demands of the First Nations under their jurisdiction.90 Thus, Brownlie 
concludes that Indian agents took on multiple roles because they “exercised direct control over 
the community while simultaneously acting as a social worker, credit and loan officer, and 
intermediary with non-Native society.”91 In other words, Indian agents, were responsible to both 
the government and the Indigenous peoples under their authority. Similar to Brownlie, Amanda 
Nettlebeck also sheds light on the multifaceted roles of Indian agents, including how the law was 
used to bolster the authority of these government employees. For instance, depending on the 
reserve’s location and its relative ease in accessing the judicial system, Indian agents were often 
granted magisterial powers that allowed them to adjudicate offences under the Indian Act 
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(1876).92 As such, even though Indian agents were not police officers, they were given law 
enforcement powers, in turn allowing them to enforce government policy. 
The repercussions of state expansion are reflected in the increased number of encounters 
between First Nations and the Canadian justice system. In fact, as behaviors that were once part 
of Indigenous peoples’ regular routine gradually came under the purview of colonial law, they 
often found themselves the subject of legal investigations. As a result, Indigenous people such as 
Albert Sioui, the 70-year-old Wendat man charged with stealing wood in 1932, were brought 
into the criminal justice system for engaging in practices that were now considered illegal. 
Although the power dynamics between Indigenous peoples and state institutions played out in 
various forums, the courtroom provides a unique lens to examine the application of colonial law 
vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples. More specifically, the documents that were produced during these 
encounters shed light on the complex power relations between Indigenous peoples and the state. 
The analytical value of these sources has been discussed by several scholars, including Franca 
Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson. According to both authors, the richness of these files “[…] 
reveal the vulnerability of many in the past, but also illustrate the resilience of individuals.”93 As 
such, they grant researchers a window into the nuanced relationship between state institutions 
and regular citizens. However, Iacovetta and Mitchinson caution against viewing these records at 
face value. Instead, they emphasize the importance of recognizing these documents as being the 
product of certain peoples and institutions with particular goals in mind.94 Nevertheless, court 
cases demonstrate how “certain populations became subject to the institutional power of […] the 
law […]”95 
This thesis draws on a total of thirty-four court cases, to explore the implementation of 
Canadian criminal law and the different ways in which Indigenous people navigated the judicial 
system during the interwar period.96 In particular, it argues that the law operated as a tool of 
colonial control that was used to reinforce the racial distinction created by the 1876 Indian Act 
when the “Indian” was defined as a separate legal category. For the Wendat, their racialization 
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manifested itself in the types of crimes they were charged with and their unequal treatment 
before the law. Thus, even though Canadian law was purported to be universal, the legal system 
justified and enforced the “Indian” as a separate and subordinate class. At the same time, this 
thesis reinforces the notion that the Wendat – like other Indigenous peoples – were not passive 
victims of colonialism. Rather, they engaged with the judicial system, especially when it came it 
negotiating and renegotiating their role within the colonial framework. As such, while this thesis 
contributes to the existing scholarship on colonialism and the law, it also fills the gap in the 
scholarship that fails to reconcile both themes of racialization and agency. 
Organized thematically, this thesis is divided into three chapters. The first section 
explores the impact of federal and provincial wildlife management strategies on the Wendat. 
More specifically, it focuses on how game laws, land leases, fishing permits, and protection 
clubs worked together to restrict the Wendat’s access to their traditional hunting territories. As 
such, I draw from a total of seven court cases to argue that the criminalization of their traditional 
economic, subsistence, and cultural practices contributed to their territorial dispossession and 
prevented them from engaging in activities that had sustained the community for generations. 
Continuing with the theme of racialization, in chapter two, I analyze the legal implications of the 
state’s social and moral regulations tactics on the Wendat. In particular, this section examines 
how the federal government’s assimilationist policies criminalized the Wendat for engaging in 
behaviours that were deemed inappropriate according to Euro-Canadian standard. Based on a 
total of seventeen court cases, I argue that the Indian Act was used as a pretext to bring the 
Wendat into the criminal justice system. In the final chapter, I move away from racialization to 
analyze the role of the Wendat as active historical agents who navigated the criminal justice 
system. Drawing from ten court cases, I maintain that the Wendat engaged with the legal system 
in three distinct ways: to mediate internal tensions, resolve intimate disputes between spouses, 
and to settle conflicts with non-community members. Finally, I conclude with a discussion on 







Chapter 1: Economic, Subsistence, and Cultural Practices 
 
 
Up until the turn of the nineteenth century, there was no centralized wildlife management 
strategy that spanned across Canada. In fact, conservation efforts were often governed by various 
local customs, and as such, approaches differed from one place to another.1 For example, lawyer 
and legal historian Douglas Harris maintains that along the Pacific Coast in British Columbia, a 
number of fisheries were regulated by local Aboriginal legal frameworks where existing 
customs, guidelines, and laws worked together to monitor fishing practices.2 Alongside their 
Indigenous counterparts, settler communities also developed their own conservation strategies. In 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, for instance, a group of urban sportsmen formed the Game and Inland 
Fishery Protection Society in 1852 with the goal of implementing conservation strategies.3 In 
turn, these community-led approaches effectively placed wildlife management into the hands of 
the local Indigenous and settler populations. Moreover, these strategies were a product of the 
ideological frameworks that shaped the relationship communities had with their surrounding 
environment. For settlers in North America, for instance, historian Tina Loo maintains they were 
influenced by William Blackstone’s notion that wildlife was considered “common property”, and 
therefore, all individuals, regardless of their social status, were entitled to harvest these resources 
subject only to limitations in the name of public interest.4 By contrast, given the diversity of 
Indigenous communities, there was no monolithic strategy that applied to each one. 
Nevertheless, notions of personal and communal property, and the ownership rights they entailed 
formed the basis of many Indigenous conservation approaches. Among the Nuu’Chah’Nulth in 
British Columbia, for example, a combination of ownership and management strategies allowed 
related kin living in the same village to allocate resources and regulate access to their shared 
fisheries.5 Thus, it is evident that both Indigenous and settler communities employed various 
conservation strategies. 
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By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the growing Canadian state gradually expanded 
its regulatory powers by bringing wildlife management under its jurisdiction. Fueled in part by 
an increasing concern in declining animal populations due to overhunting, colonial officials 
sought to establish a centralized system over wildlife conservation.6 An important aspect of this 
plan included enacting a series of legislation that would allow colonial authorities the ability to 
regulate hunting and fishing practices according to a specific set of rules. For example, in 1858, 
the Fishery Act implemented a lease and licence system in Lower Canada meant to monitor 
access to the colony’s salmon rivers.7 Therefore, this piece of legislation, and others like it, 
aimed to gradually transfer wildlife management from local communities to the state. Aside from 
dwindling animal populations, the federal and provincial governments were also influenced by 
the bourgeoning nature tourism industry in the United States and the desire to replicate the 
pristine and untouched natural spaces located south of the border.8 For example, the creation of 
national parks, such as the one established in Banff in 1887, was designed to attract middle and 
upper middle-class members of society wishing to both participate in recreational hunting and 
fishing activities and escape the chaos of urban living.9 In turn, not only did these designated 
green spaces generate significant revenue for neighbouring towns whose economies came to rely 
on the visiting tourists but it also allowed the state to extend its jurisdiction over more land. In an 
effort to enforce game laws, provincial governments established a surveillance system to better 
coordinate their conservation efforts. At the heart of this new endeavor included the appointment 
of game wardens following Confederation in 1867 who, as extensions of the state, were tasked 
with implementing provincial game laws.10 Although provincial governments relied heavily on 
these individuals, they were granted limited resources, which resulted in many being poorly paid 
and working part time with little incentive to enforce state regulations.11 Even with these 
challenges, this new wildlife management system reflected the state’s increasing powers and 
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their growing desire to bring vast amounts of land – and resources – under federal and provincial 
jurisdiction.  
Similar to other provinces, Québec’s game laws operated on the assumption that wildlife 
conservation fell under their jurisdiction, and as such, they maintained exclusive rights to 
implement their own sets of rules and strategies. Where the province deviates from its 
counterparts, however, is in the extent to which its approach centered on a collaborative 
partnership with groups of private citizens.12 In fact, historian Darcy Ingram argues that the 
province’s strategy of granting land leases and fishing permits was characterized by a “state-
administered, privately regulated system of conservation” that conceded the benefits and 
responsibilities of fish and game management to a limited number of protectionist clubs and 
sporting associations.13 Thus, while the province was responsible for creating and administrating 
a wildlife conservation strategy, the onus of enforcing state guidelines fell to small groups of 
men who acquired this right by purchasing land leases and fishing permits from the 
government.14  
However, the opportunity to collaborate with the government on conservation 
management was not open to everyone. Rather, Ingram maintains that the private citizens who 
entered into a partnership with the province were a group of like-minded men with significant 
political, economic, and social power whose desire to protect and improve the quality of 
Québec’s wildlife formed an important part of their conservationist approach.15 Ingram argues 
that this patrician culture, which sought to establish, maintain, and reinforce a specific set of 
beliefs and practices that reflected these men’s socio-economic status, formed the basis of 
Québec’s first phase in wildlife conservation.16 For instance, aside from hunting and fishing for 
sport, patricians also maintained that these practices benefited society as trade and food items.17 
In 1880, however, Québec entered into its second phase of wildlife management when a 
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narrower interpretation of hunting and fishing practices developed in relation to the economic 
potential of the province’s natural resources.18 During this time, Ingram argues that commercial 
and subsistence activities, which once played an integral part in patricians’ overall plan to 
improve Québec’s wildlife resources, fell out of favour with the new generation of sportsmen 
because these activities were conceptualized as obstacles to the province’s economic 
development.19 As such, commercial and subsistence hunting and fishing were no longer seen as 
necessary activities. Nevertheless, even though this second phase ushered in important changes, 
the exclusionary nature of Québec’s conservation system persisted.  
 Unsurprisingly, among those left out of the province’s wildlife management strategy 
were Indigenous peoples.20 According to Ingram, the decision to exclude them from this system, 
was not accidental. In fact, Ingram maintains that this approach fit neatly into the federal 
government’s assimilationist policy that sought to transform First Nations into productive 
citizens by having them abandon “primitive” economic practices in favour of more “civilized 
modes of production” such as agriculture.21 Furthermore, while small scale subsistence hunting 
and fishing were permitted to prevent starvation, the economic and cultural practices associated 
with these activities were severely limited under Québec’s new conservation system.22 
Consequently, provincial game laws that prioritized private leases and sport hunting not only 
undermined existing traditional Aboriginal practices but they also rendered some of them 
illegal.23 This had a devastating impact on communities who relied on these activities for their 
survival. For the Innu and the Mi’kmaq, for instance, the introduction of fishing licences in the 
mid-nineteenth century essentially outlawed the salmon harvesting practices along the North 
Shore and Gaspé Peninsula that had sustained the locals for generations.24 Evidently, the state 
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believed that by using the law to limit Indigenous peoples’ ability to harvest Québec’s natural 
resources, it would eventually push them towards permanently adopting agricultural production.  
However, provincial legislation did not act as a deterrent for Indigenous peoples, such as the 
Wendat, who continued to hunt wildlife. Instead, Québec’s Games Laws brought Wendat 
hunters into contact with the criminal justice system by outlawing their traditional economic, 
subsistence, and cultural practices, which contributed to their territorial dispossession and 
deprived them of their ability to engage in activities that had sustained their people for 
generations.  
Divided into two main sections, this chapter draws from a total of nine cases, seven of 
which involve one or more Wendat offenders. The first part begins by analyzing the legal 
journeys of two Wendat men, Antoine Groslouis25 and Gérard Sioui, who were both charged 
with violating Québec’s game laws. More specifically, this section argues that by failing to 
recognize the diversity of the Wendat’s hunting practices, the province’s conservation strategy 
criminalized them while simultaneously denying them the ability to maintain their independence. 
Moreover, in an effort to highlight the impact of Québec’s partnership with elite private citizens 
on the Wendat, Groslouis’ experience is contrasted with a non-Indigenous sports hunter who was 
also charged for violating the province’s game laws around the same time. The second part of 
this chapter examines how five Wendat men – Silvio Rhéaume, Marcel Guénard, Henri Sioui, 
Gustave Groslouis, and Théophile Groslouis – navigated the Canadian criminal justice system 
after they were accused of stealing trees. More specifically, this section explores how their 
criminalization reflected Québec’s desire to regulate access to the province’s natural resources. 
Similar to the first section, this part contrasts the legal journeys of these five men with three non-
Indigenous offenders to shed light on the differential treatment the Wendat experienced. Finally, 
this chapter ends with a reflection on how the criminalization of these seven Wendat men fits 
into the larger pattern of racialization.  
In an attempt to bring wildlife under provincial jurisdiction, Québec’s game laws 
effectively denied the Wendat the ability to participate in the economic, subsistence, and cultural 
activities that had sustained the community for generations. The impact of the province’s 
conservation strategy is seen most clearly in the criminalization of Wendat men who, despite 
                                                          
25 Antoine Groslouis was charged with violating Québec’s game laws twice, once in 1925 and again in 1926. In the 
first case, his surname was written as “Gros Louis” and in the second case, it was spelled “Groslouis”. I have chosen 







existing game laws, continued to engage in these practices. On October 10th, 1925, Barthélemie 
Lirette filed a formal complaint against Antoine Gros Louis of Loretteville accusing him of 
“chasse illégale”.26 According to the plumitif, the incident took place on May 13th of that year, 
but, for reasons that are not clearly indicated in the file, it was only brought to the attention of the 
authorities nearly five months later.27 Nevertheless, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste 
Choquette28 signed off on Lirette’s complaint and Gros Louis was escorted to the courthouse 
where he was granted a conditional release on a promise to appear for his hearing on October 
16th.29 The first day of the trial marked the start of a long judicial process in which Gros Louis 
appeared in court on thirteen separate occasions in the span of eleven months without entering a 
plea.30 However, on May 15th, 1926, the defendant officially pled guilty to three counts of 
“chasse illégale” and the judge sentenced Gros Louis to pay a $5 fine for the first charge, $20 for 
the second, and $50 for the third.31 Unable to pay the total fine of $75 plus applicable fees, a 
warrant for Gros Louis’ imprisonment was issued on September 3rd, and the accused was taken 
to the local prison that same day to serve out his sentence of an unspecified duration.32  
 Unfortunately, specific details about the case such as Lirette’s original statement 
describing the circumstances of the incident, the evidence that was presented at trial by the 
crown prosecutor, and the length of Gros Louis’ prison sentence are all missing from the 
plumitif. As such, this case, like many others that will be explored throughout this thesis, present 
unique analytical challenges. Nevertheless, this court case demonstrates that by criminalizing the 
Wendat for engaging in practices that had sustained them for generations, Québec’s game laws 
failed to take into consideration the Wendat’s subsistence and economic reliance on hunting and 
trapping as well as their cultural attachment to these activities. Towards the end of the 
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seventeenth century, the Wendat shifted their attention from agricultural production to hunting 
and trapping.33 More specifically, during the spring and fall months, a number of male 
community members embarked on hunting expeditions that focused on the acquisition of marten, 
mink, beaver, weasels, and big game because aside from their economic value of their pelts, 
these animals represented an important food source for the Wendat.34 However, as the state and 
settlers expanded deeper into the Wendat’s hunting territory, wildlife was gradually pushed out 
or eliminated from certain areas altogether. As such, the Wendat, and other Indigenous 
communities across the country, gradually came to depend on western food staples such as flour, 
fat, tea, salt, and oatmeal that was provided for them by the state as a substitute for their 
traditional cuisine.35 Given that these goods were strictly rationed by the Department of Indian 
Affairs (DIA), hunting and trapping allowed the Wendat to supplement the food they had. Thus, 
by criminalizing Gros Louis for engaging in these activities, the Québec Government essentially 
denied him the ability to supplement his diet with traditional modes of subsistence, thereby 
chipping away at his independence and further pushing him to rely on the federal government.  
Moreover, aside from hunting and trapping being used as a method of sustenance, it was 
also deeply embedded into the community’s economy. In fact, meat, hides, furs, and other 
animal parts could be sold for profit, exchanged for other goods, or transformed into final 
products. The importance of these practices is reflected in the Wendat reserve’s source of 
revenue list during the same time period Gros Louis was charged with violating Québec’s game 
laws. For example, throughout the 1920s, hunting, trapping, and fishing activities produced an 
average annual income between $1000 and $3400.36 Even though the profits generated from 
other industries such as the manufacturing sector were significantly higher at this time, these 
activities illustrate the diversity and adaptability of the community’s economy.37 Although the 
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income brought in by hunters and trappers was not essential to the community’s survival, it did 
allow them to earn extra money. One of the most profitable industries for the reserve included 
the manufacturing of leather goods. More specifically, the Wendat used animal skins and furs for 
artisanal purposes to create moccasins and gloves, which were then sold to Indigenous and non-
Indigenous customers.38 In turn, this practice generated a significant amount of revenue for the 
reserve and companies, such as Bastien Bros who specialized in the production of leather goods. 
While the plumitif does not specify the exact circumstances of Gros Louis’ arrest, it can be 
inferred that by restricting Gros Louis’ access to hunting and fishing, his ability to acquire the 
necessary materials that were needed for manufacturing production were severely limited. 
Furthermore, along with their subsistence and economic reliance on hunting and trapping, 
the Wendat shared a profound cultural connection to these practices. In fact, these activities were 
deeply woven into Wendat spirituality, identity, and society. According to Wendat historian 
Georges Sioui, at the heart of the Wendat belief system was the notion of the Sacred Circle of 
Life, which was founded on the interconnection between “[e]very life, material, or immaterial” 
and the importance of mutual respect to keep these relationships alive.39 In this circular way of 
thinking, there was no hierarchy and living creatures, including humans and animals, were made 
equally.40 Thus, when the Wendat engaged in hunting and fishing practices, they recognized the 
inherent value of the animals they killed and appreciated them for providing the community with 
the necessary nourishment they needed to survive. This way of thinking differed from Euro-
Canadian ideology, which was founded on a strict hierarchical pyramid that placed human beings 
above animals, waterways, fauna, and vegetation.41 More specifically, the human and non-
human relationship was often thought of in terms of ownership and the understanding that as 
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property owners, individuals were entitled to certain rights and privileges in regards to their 
possessions. Thus, middle and upper-middle class sportsmen who wished to hunt and fish gained 
their ability to engage in these activities through provincial land leases or permits that gave them 
legal title to tracts of land and bodies of water.42 From a Euro-Canadian perspective, however, 
Aboriginal  hunting grounds, were not conceptualized as private property. In fact, since their 
territories were considered Crown Lands, these areas were managed as federal property, thereby 
denying Indigenous peoples the same property rights and privileges as their non-Indigenous 
counterparts.43 Aside from being a fundamental part of their spirituality and identity, hunting and 
fishing was also vital to the transmission of knowledge. For instance, when sons were old 
enough, they joined their fathers on hunting and fishing trips where they learned valuable 
survival skills. The knowledge that was conveyed from father to son in these situations was 
critical because not only were important skills passed on but so too were the ideological 
frameworks that shaped these activities. In other words, these opportunities allowed fathers to 
pass on their wisdom to their sons and for their children to practice and embody these skills. 
 The following year, Antoine Groslouis once again found himself in a Québec courtroom. 
On March 30th, 1926, the game warden of Loretteville, François Cloutier, filed a formal 
complaint against Groslouis accusing him of three counts of “infraction à la loi de chasse de 
Québec.”44 According to his statement, Cloutier claimed that on or around March 12th on the 
National Park territory belonging to the St-Vincent Club “un nommé Antoine Groslouis […] a 
illégalement eu en sa possession, savoir pendant la saison de prohibition, de la viande d’orignal, 
le dit orignal étant une femelle […]”45 In the same statement, Cloutier also accused Groslouis “ 
[d’avoir] illégalement chassé, tué et pris des animaux à fourrure sur le territoire du Parc National 
des Laurentides, avoir eu en sa possession des trappes ou pièges dans les limites du dit parc et 
s’y être établi sans licence ou permis […]” and “ [d’]avoir chassé sur les terrains loués par bail 
au Club St-Vincent, formant partie du terrain du Parc National des Laurentides, sans permis du 
locataire ou de ses représentants et pendant la saison de prohibition […]”46 Based on the 
complaint laid out before him, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued an 
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arrest warrant for Groslouis’ apprehension the following day and within two weeks, the accused 
was in police custody.47 On April 12th, Groslouis’ preliminary hearing took place before Judge 
Choquette and the accused was granted a conditional release on a promise to appear in court for 
his preliminary hearing on April 20th at 10am.48 In the meantime, Groslouis was released into the 
custody of Ovide Sioui, also from Loretteville, and the defendant paid $100 as collateral.49 
However, neither Groslouis nor his counsel were present and as a result, the session was 
adjourned and the Honourable Judge Arthur Lachance rescheduled it for three days later.50 Over 
the next three weeks, Groslouis and his lawyer, Maître Lavigne, failed to appear in court on four 
separate occasions and it was only on May 15th, that the latter, appeared on behalf of his client, 
and pled guilty to all three charges.51 The Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette 
accepted this plea and set the sentencing hearing to May 26th, but neither party was present on 
that day so the hearing was rescheduled once again.52 This occurred again before a sentencing 
hearing finally took place on May 28th, without the defendant and his counsel, in which the 
accused was sentenced to pay $100 fine for the first offence, $5 for the second, and $20 for the 
third; failure to pay this fine plus applicable fees, would result in a three months prison 
sentence.53 Shortly thereafter, Groslouis paid the entire sum of $143.45 and the matter was 
settled.54 
 Similar to his previous encounter with the judicial system, this case illustrates that the 
Québec government’s vision of wildlife conservation excluded the Wendat by not taking their 
usage of the land into consideration when developing their strategy. More specifically, Cloutier 
v. Groslouis (1926) sheds light on the negative impact the province’s wildlife management 
policy coupled with the increase in nature tourism had on the Wendat’s ability to continue their 
way of life. To begin, the idea of clearly defined open and closed hunting seasons was a staple 
feature of Québec’s game laws. This concept was enshrined in law after the province expanded 
its existing legislation in 1888 by explicitly forbidding hunting throughout the months of March 















to September for deer, caribou, moose, furbearing animals, and a number of game birds.55 Over 
the years, various amendments to this act strengthened and expanded Québec’s game laws. For 
example, in 1909, the province’s hunting territory was divided into two main zones, stricter 
limits were placed on the number of animals and birds that could be hunted, the sale of game 
meat was only permitted during the open season, and government issued licences and permits 
became mandatory.56 Enacted as part of the government’s wildlife conservation policy, these 
initiatives conflicted with Wendat understanding of hunting as a nexus of interconnected 
activities that sustained families and communities throughout the year. Similar to Québec, the 
Wendat also hunted according to seasons, however, theirs took place during the spring and fall 
months, in which hunting parties sought to acquire enough game to bring back to their 
communities.57 This different perspective is seen most clearly in the first offence Groslouis was 
charged with as it reveals crucial ideological discrepancies between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous conservation practices. According to the case file, Groslouis was accused of being in 
possession of female moose meat in mid-March.58 Even though Groslouis’ hunt was in line with 
the Wendat spring hunting season, it contravened Québec’s game laws that were rooted in a 
Eurocentric understanding of wildlife management that forbade spring hunting. Consequently, 
Groslouis was criminalized for both participating in traditional Wendat behaviours and for 
refusing to conform to Québec’s vision of nature conservation. 
 Along with creating open and closed seasons, Québec’s 1888 game laws expanded the 
existing land lease system, further restricting the Wendat’s access to their traditional hunting 
grounds and exacerbating their territorial dispossession. As a pillar of their conservation strategy, 
this approach allowed the state to reinforce its jurisdiction over wildlife management by leasing 
parcels of land to groups of individuals who were given certain property rights including the 
ability to hunt and fish in that particular area. This practice began in the late 1850s after the 
province established a lease system on the salmon rivers of the lower St. Lawrence that 
coincided with the creation of the Québec City and Montreal factions of the Fish and Game 
Protection Club of Lower Canada in 1858 and 1859, respectively.59 At the core of this practice, 
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club members would pay an annual fee and enforce Québec’s game laws and in exchange, the 
government would take their interests into consideration when drafting hunting and fishing 
legislation, thereby creating a partnership between both parties.60 Over the years, the province 
continued to strengthen and expand its lease system. For instance, in March 1883, the Québec 
government extended the current system by passing legislation that allowed them to grant 
temporary leases to the province’s waterways.61 In other words, it was now possible to obtain 
fishing leases for all of Québec’s lakes and rivers for those who were both able and willing to 
pay the yearly fee. Although this was done with the goal of privatizing Québec’s access to 
natural resources, it also allowed the government to generate revenue and prosecute offenders.62  
Two years later, in 1885, Québec’s lease system underwent another expansion. This time, 
the provincial government passed legislation that officially encouraged fish and game clubs to be 
incorporated into its wildlife management policy.63 Similar to the public-private partnership 
established in 1858, Darcy Ingram states that this law promoted the creation of local associations 
that would take on the responsibility of protecting fish and game resources; thus, alleviating part 
of the government’s spending costs while also indirectly recognizing its practical inability to 
supervise and manage the vast territory.64 In turn, these clubs received exclusive hunting and 
fishing rights on parts of the province’s land and waterways. Among them were middle and 
upper-middle class sportsmen whose vested interest in hunting and fishing were significantly 
different from the protectionist values of their predecessors.65 In particular, they were more 
concerned about preserving their ability to continue practicing sport hunting and fishing than 
wildlife conservation.66 To this end, government officials and sporting associations worked 
together to secure their interests.67 Like seasonal hunting and fishing provisions introduced in 
Québec’s game laws, land leases and exclusive game club permits also failed to take into 
consideration the Wendat’s usage of these territories. In fact, Groslouis’ case exemplifies the 
negative impact that this system had on Wendat hunters who were largely excluded from these 
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groups. For example, Groslouis was convicted of hunting without a license on the territory 
belonging to Club St-Vincent.68 Consequently, his criminalization was a result of the Québec 
government’s failure to recognize and incorporate the Wendat into this land lease system. 
 Moreover, this court case highlights the impact of Québec’s nature tourism and 
conservation movement on the Wendat way of life. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
Canadian officials were inspired by American National Parks to create wilderness spaces for 
middle and upper middle-class members of society to escape dense urban centers and indulge in 
nature. In fact, according to historians Ted Binnema and Melanie Niemi, national parks were less 
about protecting wildlife for humanitarian reasons and more about preserving game for sport 
hunting and tourism, which would generate important revenue for the state.69 This is seen most 
clearly in the establishment of Banff National Park in 1887. For example, the authors maintain 
that following the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, an increased number of 
sportsmen, along with tourists and members of other sportsmen associations, flocked to the 
areas, thereby bolstering the local economy.70 While the economy benefited from this increased 
presence, subsistence hunters, many of whom were Indigenous, were now in competition for the 
same limited resources. However, the political and economic influence of sport hunters was 
significant and many of them fought to restrict Aboriginal hunting in national parks.71 In 
Québec, the Wendat faced a similar situation after the Laurentides National Park was established 
in 1895.72 In particular, part of the Wendat’s hunting territory was included in the national park, 
effectively denying them access to their traditional lands. The challenges this posed is seen most 
clearly in Cloutier v. Groslouis (1926) when the latter was charged with illegally hunting in the 
Laurentides National Park without a valid permit.73 Given the circumstances of Groslouis’ arrest, 
it is possible that he was hunting on traditional Wendat territory that was now part of the national 
park. Therefore, by failing to recognize the Wendat’s ownership rights over hunting grounds, the 
Québec government actively participated in the territorial dispossession of the Wendat. 
 However, for non-Indigenous peoples also charged with violating sections of Québec’s 
game laws, their legal experiences were significantly different compared to Wendat hunters. In 
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fact, part of this difference can be attributed to the fact that these individuals were primarily 
white middle and upper-middle class sportsmen whose political and economic influences were 
widely felt throughout the province. According to Binnema and Niemi, sportsmen were heavily 
involved in political activism because it was “understood to be an important responsibility 
[…]”74 As such, it was fairly common for sportsmen to be members of various clubs that 
reflected their interests.75 Similar to Binnema and Niemi, Darcy Ingram explores the role of 
sportsmen in the political sphere. More specifically, he focuses on how their involvement in 
politics expanded after their associations were formally incorporated into Québec’s game laws.76 
The importance of their political power is seen most clearly when examining its impact on 
Aboriginal hunting and fishing rights. For instance, after Québec’s sportsmen associations 
voiced their displeasure at the government for not removing an exemption for Indigenous hunters 
in 1857, provincial officials quickly enacted an amendment the following year limiting 
Aboriginal hunting and fishing to subsistence practices.77 Evidently, these individuals’ status as 
prominent members of society who belonged to various clubs coupled with the public-private 
partnership they shared with the government gave these men direct access to the ears of state 
officials.  
The political and socio-economic power of sportsmen is evident when analyzing their 
journey through the legal system. For example, on March 30th, the game warden of Loretteville, 
François Cloutier, filed a complaint against Dermott O. Gallagher, a civil engineer from the 
Donacona Paper Co. Ltd, on April 9th, 1926 accusing him of three counts of “infraction à la loi 
de chasse de Québec.”78 According to his statement, Cloutier alleged that on or around March 
7th, on the territory leased by the Club St-Vincent in the Laurentides National Park, Gallagher 
“[a] illégalement, étant le chef d’une expédition pour exploration et arpentage pour la Cie. 
Donacona Paper Co. Ltd eu en sa possession, dans les tentes et camps servant aux opérations de 
la dite expédition […] de la viande d’orignal pour consommation, et de la peau du dit orignal 
[…]”79 In the same statement, Cloutier also accused Gallagher “[d’]avoir illégalement, savoir 
pendant le temps de prohibition chassé ou accompagné un autre à chasser […]” and “[d’]avoir 
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illégalement chassé, tué et pris un orignal sur le terrain du Parc National des Laurentides […]”80 
Based on Cloutier’s complaint, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued a 
summons on April 9th, which was personally delivered to the accused at his office by Ulric 
Gelly, the local bailiff for Québec City, on April 12th, 1926.81 In this document, the charges 
against Gallagher were restated and he was requested to appear in court at 10am on April 16th.82 
When the preliminary hearing began, Gallagher was not present and as such, the Honourable 
Judge Arthur Lachance rescheduled for April 24th; when the court session resumed eight days 
later, the accused’s absence forced another adjournment to April 30th.83 However, before the 
hearing could begin, Gallagher submitted a signed statement to the court on April 28th, in which 
he pled guilty to the first offence and the two other charges were dropped.84 Based on his 
confession, Judge Lachance sentenced Gallagher to pay the minimum $100 fine for this offence 
plus applicable fees, and by May 3rd, the entire sum of $123.65 was paid, with half going to the 
prosecutor and the rest given to Cloutier. 85  
 Despite the fact that the cases against Groslouis and Gallagher share some similarities 
such as being accused by the same game warden for illegal possession of moose meat during the 
prohibited season and for hunting without a valid permit in the Laurentides National Park on the 
St-Vincent Club’s land, there are also important differences.86  In particular, these discrepancies 
explain the differential treatment Indigenous and non-Indigenous hunters experienced in the 
judicial system. This case reveals the value and respectability the Eurocentric sportsmen code of 
conduct placed on certain hunting practices, which was later adopted by state officials and 
unilaterally applied to all hunters in the province regardless of existing traditional customs. 
According to the case file, out of the three charges Gallagher was accused of, none were related 
to his methods of hunting.87 Based on this, it can be assumed that the reason why Gallagher was 
not charged for the way he hunted was because his approach was considered appropriate by 
Euro-Canadian standards. For example, like the vast majority of his fellow sportsmen, Gallagher 
engaged in hunting for leisure and to acquire trophies while simultaneously adhering to the 















hunter’s code of ethics that was founded on the notions of fairness and restraint.88 However, 
Groslouis’ traditional hunting methods were criminalized by Quebec’s game laws. This is seen 
most clearly in the fact that he was charged and convicted for being in possession of traps and for 
installing them in the National Park without a valid hunting licence.89 By using hunting 
strategies that were considered undesirable according to Euro-Canadian standards, Groslouis 
became a target for state officials who sought to eradicate the usage of certain Indigenous 
hunting methods. As such, Groslouis was criminalized for refusing to conform to the Euro-
Canadian sportsmen’s code of conduct. More importantly, however, criminalizing aspects of 
Wendat hunting went beyond trying to eliminate traditional customs. In fact, it was part of the 
provincial government’s refusal to accept – or even acknowledge – the existence of a Wendat 
hunting regime that followed traditional customs and understandings of property. Thus, under the 
guise of conservation, Québec’s game laws completely ignored and dismissed Wendat hunting 
rights, thereby reinforcing Euro-Canadian perceptions of ownership. Moreover, as a subsistence 
hunter, Groslouis represented a way of life that both federal and provincial governments had 
been trying to discourage for decades. Thus, the law was used as a deterrent to dissuade the 
Wendat from continuing to practice their traditional ways of life. 
  Furthermore, this court case demonstrates that federal and provincial departments 
wielded a significant amount of influence over the legal process. More specifically, it reveals 
how outside departmental involvement shaped a person’s judicial experience. For example, on 
April 27th, 1926, one day before Gallagher’s preliminary hearing was scheduled to begin, L. 
Richard, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Colonization, Mines, and Fisheries sent a 
letter to the Crown Prosecutor, Edgar Rochette, stating that “si monsieur Galla[g]her désire 
plaider coupable, il pourra être condamné au minimum de l’amende soit $100.00, pour une 
offence, et vous êtes autorisé à demander au juge de suspendre la sentence dans les autres 
plaintes.”90 This decision directly influenced Gallagher’s plea because the following day, he 
submitted a signed confession in which he pled guilty to the first charge and the two others were 
dropped. This intervention is significant because it demonstrates the ability of state departments 
to intervene in the judicial process, thereby altering the outcome. The fact that this was the 
Department of Colonization, Mines, and Fisheries is equally significant. By the turn of the 
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twentieth century, this department was heavily involved in promoting the benefits of hunting for 
leisure. In fact, this department capitalized on the growing interconnection between hunting and 
colonization by pushing for “la colonization sportive” as a way to encourage settlement and 
economic development in Québec.91 With this in mind, it clarifies the reasons why Deputy 
Minister Rochette chose to intervene into Gallagher’s judicial process. 
 A little over ten years later, Wendat hunters continued to be criminalized for engaging in 
traditional economic and subsistence practices. On June 1st, 1937, Odina D. Rhéaume, of Lac St-
Charles, filed a complaint against “Village des Hurons” resident, Gérard Sioui, accusing him of 
“Infrac[tion] à la Loi de Chasse”.92 After accepting Rhéaume’s complaint, the Honourable Judge 
Laetare Roy issued a summons requesting Sioui’s presence in court on June 8th to face the 
charges against him.93 When the preliminary hearing began, Sioui, accompanied by his lawyer, 
Maître Paul Lesage, pled not guilty and the trial was set for June 14th.94 On the first day of trial, 
all parties were present while the crown prosecutor, Maître M. Dorion, presented evidence 
against Sioui.95 The five following court sessions unfolded similarly until a decision was to be 
rendered on September 7th, however, Sioui was absent and the final verdict was postponed to 
September 14th.96 Although Sioui was still not present, Judge Roy went ahead and delivered a 
verdict, finding the defendant guilty of violating Québec’s game laws and sentencing him to pay 
a $5 fine plus applicable fees or serve fifteen days in jail.97 That same day, Sioui was given until 
September 29th to pay the fine, but according to the plumitif, on September 20th, an arrest warrant 
was issued and the matter was resolved.98  
 Unlike the two previous court cases that were brought forward by the local game warden, 
this one is missing a significant amount of details and as such, it makes this case more 
challenging to analyze. However, based on the information that is provided in the plumitif 
coupled with what we know from similar cases and the extensive coverage this case received in 
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the local newspaper, Le Soleil, certain inferences can be made about how Sioui’s experience 
unfolded before the courts. The charge against Sioui provides an important starting point. 
According to the plumitif, Sioui was accused of and convicted of contravening Québec’s game 
laws.99 No further details were provided in the plumitif, but an article published in Le Soleil on 
July 21st fills the gap by explaining that Sioui was accused of violating the province’s game laws 
after he was found “en possession de deux peaux d’orignals [sic] en temps prohibé.”100 Similar 
to Cloutier v. Groslouis (1926), Sioui’s hunt took place during the Wendat’s spring hunting 
season; nevertheless, because provincial game laws failed to recognize the legitimacy of the 
community’s economic, subsistence, and cultural practices, Sioui was convicted of contravening 
the law. Thus, like Groslouis, Sioui was criminalized for engaging in traditional Wendat hunting 
practices. The ramifications of this judicial process, however, extended far beyond criminalizing 
certain behaviours. Rather, the provincial government’s determination to punish Wendat hunters 
for disobeying Québec’s game laws also served to dispossess them of their land base, thereby 
affecting their ability to maintain their economic independence. Consequently, by chipping away 
at the Wendat’s ability to provide for themselves, the state contributed to the community’s 
marginalization.  
Along with analyzing the offence Sioui was charged with, it is equally important to 
examine the plea he entered. As stated in the plumitif, Sioui pled not guilty to one count of 
violating Québec’s game laws but it does not indicate whether a defence was invoked.101 Based 
on the research I conducted, I discovered that Sioui did indeed provide an argument for his 
defence; according to the same article published in Le Soleil on July 21st, the accused maintained 
that “[…] la nation à laquelle il appartient est régie par les seules lois fédérales. Or les lois 
fédérales permettent en tout temps, sans restriction, le droit de chasse aux Indiens, de sorte que 
M. Sioui soutient qu’il n’a pas commis d’illégalité.”102 Therefore, from his perspective, Sioui 
believed he was well within his right to engage in hunting practices despite the limitations 
imposed by provincial game laws. This legal argument is very interesting because by claiming 
that a nation-to-nation agreement between the Wendat and the federal government exempted him 
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from provincial game laws, Sioui was essentially contesting the jurisdictional authority of the 
Québec government. As a result, his argument indirectly called into question the province’s right 
to manage the land – and wildlife – within its borders. Unsurprisingly, this argument was 
countered by the crown prosecutor, Maître Ross Drouin “qui en s’appuyant sur les textes 
fédéraux déclare que lorsque l’Indien sort de sa réserve, il est soumis comme les autres citoyens 
aux lois générales et que le statut provincial de la Chasse et Pêche s’applique à lui, comme aux 
autres, lorsqu’il est en dehors de sa réserve.”103 Evidently, both parties’ arguments revolved 
around the scope of Québec’s jurisdictional authority over provincial lands and the Wendat’s 
place in the province’s legal framework.   
In addition to analyzing the offence Sioui was charged with and the plea he entered, an 
examination of the evidence presented at trial further demonstrates the racialization he faced. 
More specifically, it provides yet another example of the state’s refusal to recognize and 
acknowledge the existence of Aboriginal hunting rights. For instance, in an effort to support 
Sioui’s argument, his lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, mailed a letter to the Department of Indian 
Affairs (DIA) requesting a copy of the 1933 debate that took place in the House of Commons, in 
which Senator Malcom declared that “[…] the federal government has made a treaty with them 
to give them certain treaty moneys, and in that treaty have agreed that Indians may fish and hunt 
so long as the grass grows and the water flows […]”104 However, in their correspondence, not 
only did the DIA claim that they were unable to locate the document Maître Lesage requested, 
but they were also not aware of any existing treaty that guaranteed Wendat hunting rights.105 
This statement is important because even though it acknowledged that agreements between 
Indigenous peoples and the Crown existed, it completely dismissed the idea that they protected – 
let alone guaranteed – Wendat hunting rights. Although it is impossible to know whether or not 
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the DIA ever really looked for a copy of the debate, this court case demonstrates how state 
institutions worked together to racialize the Wendat.106 
The final two aspects of this case that need to be analyzed in order to fully grasp the 
racialized treatment Sioui experienced are the judge’s verdict and the context that shaped it. 
According to the plumitif, Judge Roy found Sioui guilty of violating Québec’s game laws and 
sentenced him to pay a $5 fine plus applicable fees or spend fifteen days in jail.107 Although the 
plumitif does not go into detail about the judge’s reasons for this decision, an article published in 
Le Soleil on September 14th provides a very interesting excerpt of the judge’s six-page report in 
which he partially explains why he found the defendant guilty: 
Un fait domine la situation de l’Indien dans ce pays. Il y a 200 ans, il avait tout et 
aujourd’hui il n’a presque plus rien. On lui refuse les droits de citoyens et on le parque 
dans des réserves. À pareille enseigne, la loi souvent prime le droit. C’est l’histoire de 
toutes les conquêtes et les pays vainqueurs trainent tous ce boulet. L’injustice légalisée 
est encore de l’injustice, mais elle porte le manteau de la loi et lui emprunte sa force. 
Puis, peu à peu, par l’usage, l’usure, la durée et l’habitude, la loi devient le droit.108 
 
Evidently, the first few sentences of this passage indicates that Judge Roy recognized the 
hardships of Indigenous peoples, especially in relation to their political and social exclusion from 
Canadian society, which had placed them at a significant disadvantage. However, he made it 
abundantly clear that he believed adhering to the letter of the law takes precedence over 
correcting perceived wrongs. In other words, Judge Roy prioritized positive law over natural law. 
Thus, even though he acknowledged that legalized injustice disguised as law was still injustice, 
he maintained that it would eventually come to be considered right. By applying this logic to 
Sioui’s case, it demonstrates that Judge Roy saw himself as playing an important role in this 
process: one where, similar to colonizing nations, the judge would take on the burden of 
enforcing the law until the legalized injustices within it became acceptable. This understanding 
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of the law reinforces the notion that punishing the Wendat for their economic, subsistence, and 
cultural practices was an integral part of bolstering federal and provincial legislation. This line of 
thinking is supported by a number of scholars, including Alain Beaulieu, Stéphanie Béreau, and 
Jean Tanguay. According to the three authors, Wendat hunting and fishing was initially tolerated 
and dealt with primarily by handing out fines.109 However, by the turn of the twentieth century, 
this approach was abandoned and replaced in favour of one that involved harsher 
punishments.110 More specifically, in order to deter members of the Wendat reserve from 
engaging in these activities, the authors maintain that the state routinely confiscated and 
destroyed the hunting tools of those who were caught.111 While there is no definitive evidence 
that this happened to Sioui or Groslouis, it is certainly possible given that this was common 
practice among Québec game wardens at the time. In addition, Wendat hunting tools could also 
be seized and used against the accused in the courtroom as evidence. For example, according to 
the article published in Le Soleil on July 21st, Sioui was found in possession of two moose 
hides.112 Given that the plumitif stated that evidence of an unknown nature was presented against 
the accused, it can be assumed that items such as meat, hides, or hunting tools were confiscated 
and later shown as physical proof of his transgressions.  
Aside from hunting violations, the Wendat were also penalized for continuing to use 
natural resources; based on my case study, five members of the reserve were charged with 
stealing trees. The first incident took place on March 7th, 1933 when Silvio Rhéaume and Marcel 
Guénard from the “village des Hurons, Lorette” were charged with one count each of “vol 
d’arbres”.113 Appearing before the Honourable Judge G. Demers, both men pled guilty and that 
same day, the judge sentenced each one to either pay a $10 fine or spend ten days in prison if 
they were unable to afford the fee.114 According to the plumitif, an arrest warrant was issued and 
Rhéaume and Guénard were taken to the local jail.115 The next day, however, Guénard paid the 
fine and he was released while his co-defendant stayed behind to serve out his sentence.116 
Although the missing details make this case difficult to analyze, the information that is available 
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combined with what we already know about Wendat economic and subsistence practices sheds 
light on the importance of these two men’s legal journeys. As stated in the plumitif, both 
defendants were charged with one count of stealing trees. As such, even though the 
circumstances of the arrest are unknown, some inferences can be made based on what we already 
know about traditional Wendat economic and subsistence practices. First, forests had an 
important role in the Wendat’s way of life due to their versatility as an ecosystem. On the one 
hand, they were home to an abundance of wildlife, which provided an important source of food 
and economic subsistence for the Wendat. On the other hand, the trees inside the forests could 
also be used to create goods such as snowshoes, canoes, hunting cabins, traps, firewood, and 
tools and weapons.117 In turn, these products could then be used by community members in order 
to facilitate their economic and subsistence activities or sold for a profit. Therefore, it could be 
assumed that it was related to the traditional activities they had undertaken for generations118; by 
denying these two men the ability to undertake economic and subsistence practice the state 
effectively limited the Wendat’s capacity to maintain their independence.  
Four years later, three other members of the reserve, Henri Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and 
Théophile Groslouis were separately tried for stealing trees as part of an incident that took place 
in April 1937. According to the first case, on April 15th, Loretteville resident, Berthe 
O’Sullivan119, filed a complaint against Henri Sioui of the “Village des Hurons” accusing him of 
“vol d’arbres”.120 After formally signing off on her statement, the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy 
issued a warrant for Sioui’s arrest and by the following day, he was apprehended.121 On April 
16th, Sioui, accompanied by his lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, stood before Judge Roy and when 
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asked to enter his plea, the accused pled not guilty and the preliminary hearing was scheduled for 
one week later.122 In the meantime, Sioui was granted a conditional release on a promise to 
appear in court.123 When the case resumed on April 23rd, all parties were present for the start of 
the preliminary hearing, which reconvened on three separate occasions until April 30th and 
during each court session, the prosecutor, Maître Dorion, presented evidence of an unspecified 
nature against the accused.124 For reasons that are not clearly explained in the plumitif, the matter 
was not settled until the new year when on January 20th, 1938, Sioui, along with his counsel, 
requested an expedited process that was approved by Judge Roy.125 That same day, the accused 
pled guilty and the judge released him “par caut[ion] de Paix” of twelve months.126 
 Alongside Sioui, Gustave Groslouis’ experience with Québec’s judicial system was fairly 
similar. On the same day O’Sullivan filed a complaint against Sioui, she also accused Groslouis, 
from the “Village des Hurons” of “vol d’arbres”.127 This time, however, it was the Honourable 
Judge Hugues Fortier who signed off on the plaintiff’s complaint and issued a warrant for 
Groslouis’ arrest.128 By the following day, Groslouis was apprehended by a local constable 
before appearing in front of the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy where he pled not guilty to one 
charge of stealing trees.129 After the preliminary hearing was scheduled for April 23rd, Groslouis, 
like Sioui, was given a conditional release on a promise to appear in court.130 When the court 
reconvened, all parties were present, including Groslouis who was accompanied by his counsel, 
Maître Lesage.131 Over the next week, the court met on two separate occasions in which Maître 
Dorion, as the crown prosecutor, presented evidence against the accused and on April 30th, 
Groslouis was granted another conditional release.132 For reasons that are not clearly explained 
in the plumitif, the case resumed later that year on October 23rd when Groslouis was back in a 
Québec courtroom requesting an expedited process.133 After Judge Roy granted Groslouis’ 
request, the accused pled guilty and he was given a suspended sentence until the matter was 



















resolved a year later on November 23rd after the Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier official 
released him.134  
 Like Sioui and Gustave Groslouis, “Village des Hurons” resident, Théophile Groslouis, 
was also charged with “vol d’arbres” following a complaint by Berthe O’Sullivan of Loretteville 
on April 15th, 1937.135 After the Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier accepted the plaintiff’s 
deposition, he issued a warrant for Groslouis’ arrest and within two days, the accused was 
apprehended by local police.136 On April 17th, appearing before Judge Fortier, and accompanied 
by his lawyer, Maître Lesage, Groslouis pled not guilty and, like Sioui and Gustave Groslouis, 
the defendant was granted a conditional release on a promise to appear in court.137 When the 
preliminary hearing resumed on April 26th before the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy, Groslouis’ 
experience was nearly identical to that of the two others charged for the same incident. In fact, 
during this session, and the subsequent one four days later, all parties were present when the 
crown prosecutor, Maître Dorion, presented evidence against Groslouis. However, on April 30th, 
after hearing the prosecutor’s arguments, the case was adjourned and Judge Roy granted another 
conditional release to the accused.138 Like Sioui and Gustave Groslouis, the case did not resume 
again until the new year when on January 20th, 1938, Groslouis and his lawyer requested an 
expedited process.139 The Honourable Judge Roy accepted their request and that same day, 
Groslouis pled guilty to one count of stealing trees, in turn, the judge released him “Par caut[ion] 
de Paix” and the matter was finally settled.140 
  Even though the case file does not explicitly state that all three arrests were part of the 
same incident, these cases share important similarities. In particular, aside from being charged on 
the same day, by the same plaintiff, and with the same offence, Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and 
Théophile Groslouis’ experiences in the legal system were nearly identical. First, in all three 
cases, the judicial process was long and stretched out over several months. For example, in 
Gustave Groslouis’ case, the matter was settled in November, seven months after he was initially 
arrested, whereas for Sioui and Théophile Groslouis, a final verdict was only delivered the 
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following year. Unfortunately, no information explaining the reasons behind these delays are 
given. Yet, all three men were the ones to request an expedited process, and once they were 
granted their request, they all pled guilty to the offence they were charged with. This is 
interesting because, perhaps entering a formal guilty plea was required in order for them to 
receive their expedited judicial process. If this is correct, it brings up the question as to whether 
or not these men pled guilty for the sake of solving this matter and no longer having the 
uncertainty hang over their heads. Finally, although Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and Théophile 
Groslouis were released, they now had a criminal record and any future encounter with the 
judicial system could potentially increase their chances of receiving a harsher punishment 
because they would be considered repeat offenders.  
Furthermore, similar to Le Roi v. Rhéaume and Guénard (1933) the circumstances of 
Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and Théophile Groslouis’ arrests were not indicated in the plumitif. 
However, two articles published in Le Soleil on September 16th and October 7th, 1937 shed light 
on what may have transpired. According to both pieces, all three men were charged with “couper 
et voler des arbres”.141 Although this statement is very brief, it implies that, like the two men 
arrested before them, all three men were most likely engaging in resource extraction by cutting 
and taking trees for personal use, as they had for generations. Nevertheless, the most important 
theme connecting all four of these cases is that it is evident that the Wendat’s continued 
harvesting of forest resources clashed with the government’s desire to exploit the province’s 
natural resources. In particular, the Wendat’s behaviours were at odds with large timber, forestry, 
logging, and mining companies who sought to maintain their undisputed jurisdiction over these 
resources. According to Darcy Ingram, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, granting 
timber licenses to various industries was a well-established practice throughout the province.142 
In fact, these permits essentially gave companies a monopoly over a parcel of land in order to 
conduct their business, which in turn, generated a significant amount of revenue for Québec. The 
importance of these companies for Québec’s economy increased significantly between 1880 and 
1914 when the provincial government recognized the growing interest and profitability of 
Québec’s forestry, mining, and hydroelectric resources.143 Consequently, the presence of the 
Wendat came to be seen as an obstacle to the economic success of the province. This 
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conceptualization of the Wendat as being in the way of Québec’s success is reflected in all four 
court cases where each member of the community was arrested for making use of the province’s 
natural resources without prior government approval. Thus, the criminalization of the Wendat is 
significant because, similar to the game law violations that were committed by Groslouis and 
Sioui, the ability to exploit natural resources was not seen as an inherent right. Rather, it was 
viewed as a privilege that was granted – or denied – by the government. Aside from 
demonstrating how these court cases were at odds with Québec’s goal to capitalize on the 
province’s natural resources, they also illustrate the state’s continued denial of Wendat property 
regimes. In fact, similar to Antoine Groslouis and Gérard Sioui, the arrest and conviction of 
Wendat men who harvested natural resources was a manifestation of the province’s refusal to 
acknowledge – and accept – Wendat concepts of ownership. As such, the Wendat continued to 
experience prosecution for exercising their property rights.  
 For three non-Indigenous peoples charged with the same crime around the same time, 
however, their experiences in a Québec courtroom differed significantly from their Wendat 
counterparts. On January 5th, 1938, J. Omer Dion filed a complaint against Robert Robert, Paul 
Devarennes, and François Savard accusing them of “vol d’arbres”.144 After accepting the 
plaintiff’s complaint, the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy issued an arrest warrant for the three 
men that same day. But, while Robert and Devarennes were apprehended by a member of the 
local police force, Savard’s father, listed only as “Savard Sr.”, was accidentally taken into 
custody and then quickly released.145 Later that day, Robert and Devarennes appeared in front of 
Judge Roy and both men pled not guilty before they were granted a conditional release on a 
promise to appear in court for the start of their preliminary hearing.146 When the court was back 
in session on January 12th, Robert, Devarennes, and Savard, who was eventually apprehended, 
appeared alongside their lawyer, Maître Bourget, before the Honourable Judge Hugues 
Fortier.147 Unfortunately, the specific details of this hearing are not included in the plumitif, 
however, by the end of that session, all three defendants were given a second conditional release 
on a promise to appear in court on January 20th.148 This began a two week period in which the 
                                                          











hearing reconvened on two other occasions until the plaintiff’s counsel, Maître Jules Royer, 
“présente une mot.[ion] verbale pour retirer la plainte.”149 Given that all three defendants were 
not in court that day, the motion was adjourned and rescheduled to February 25th.150 When the 
case resumed, even though Robert was the only accused present, the Honourable Judge Arthur 
Roy formally accepted the plaintiff’s request to withdraw the complaint and declared “qu’il met 
les 3 prévenus hors de cour.”151  
 When compared to the three previous cases, Dion v. Robert, Devarennes, and Savard 
(1938) demonstrates how non-Indigenous offenders who were charged with similar offences 
were treated differently by the judicial system. First, all three defendants enjoyed a quick and 
efficient process. For example, Dion filed his complaint against Robert, Devarennes, and Savard 
on January 5th and by next month, he recanted his statement and the matter was settled outside of 
court.152 This is significantly different from the experiences of Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and 
Théophile Groslouis, whose judicial processes lasted months before a final verdict was reached. 
Based on this difference, it can be assumed that for the Wendat, at least in these three cases, legal 
processes took much longer. Furthermore, unlike in the previous cases, this matter was settled 
outside of court. For instance, after Dion put in a request to withdraw his complaint, Judge Roy 
formally dismissed the case.153 By allowing this matter to be resolved outside of court, it ensured 
that all three accused would not have a criminal record. This is interesting because for the five 
other men – Rhéaume, Guénard, Sioui, Gustave Groslouis, and Théophile Groslouis – who were 
charged with the same offence, this was not an option. As a result, their arrest, trial, and 
conviction not only brought them into the Canadian judicial system, but it also labelled them as 
criminals. So, while the law was theoretically fair and impartial, it had the negative effect of 
defining Wendat claims and uses of the land as illegal. Subsequently, it turned these five men 
into criminals for pursuing traditional activities. Although they would not be considered 
dangerous offenders by any means, the existence of a criminal record could have profound 
consequences on the way in which the legal system would treat them in the future. For instance, 
should they be suspected of committing any other crime, their previous encounters with the law 












could be used as a justification to increase state intervention and surveillance either by detaining, 
arresting, or interrogating these men.  
 As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, the criminalization of the Wendat for 
participating in economic, subsistence, and cultural practices contributed to their territorial 
dispossession while simultaneously depriving them of their ability to engage in activities that had 
sustained their communities for generations. To support this argument, I drew from a total of 
nine court cases, seven of which listed at least one Wendat defendant. Among those seven cases, 
five of them included offenders accused of stealing wood and in the remaining two, one 
defendant, who was tried on two separate occasions, was charged with violating Québec’s game 
laws. These findings demonstrate that, regardless of the type of activity the Wendat engaged in, 
they were systematically prosecuted for harvesting the province’s natural resources because they 
did not receive prior government approval. Thus, even though the Wendat operated under the 
assumption that their Aboriginal rights to hunt were both guaranteed and protected by the treaties 
their ancestors signed with the government, these criminal proceedings served to reinforce the 
notion that hunting and fishing practices were not inherent rights. Rather, they were privileges 
that one did not possess until it was granted by the state. The importance of reinforcing the 
government’s position on Aboriginal treaty rights is reflected in the punishment Wendat 
offenders received. According to my case study, all seven Wendat defendants who were charged 
with violating Québec’s game laws or illegally harvesting natural resources, were convicted. In 
fact, although three of those cases resulted in the defendant’s conditional release, in the four 
remaining ones, all the offenders were either imprisoned or sentenced to pay a fine. By contrast, 
in the two cases that examine non-Indigenous offenders charged with the same infractions, 
neither one resulted in a prison sentence. Even though this represents a small number of cases, 
this study demonstrates that Wendat men were more likely to receive a harsher punishment than 
their non-Indigenous counterparts who were charged with the same crime. 
Moreover, it is equally important to mention that all seven defendants were men. This 
obvious gendered division is significant for a number of reasons. First, this illustrates that several 
community members continued to engage in traditional activities despite repeated attempts by 
the federal and provincial governments to persuade them to abandon customary practices in 
favour of Euro-Canadian modes of subsistence. Therefore, their decision to continue practicing 







attachment the Wendat had to harvesting natural resources. Second, this gendered division 
reflects a certain continuity in traditionally male activities. For instance, the fact that Wendat 
men continued to engage in economic, subsistence, and cultural practices illustrates that these 
activities did in fact continue into the twentieth century, albeit on a much smaller scale. In turn, 
the gendered nature of these practices explains Wendat women’s lack of representation in this 
study. Finally, it is important to consider why there are not many cases that deal with hunting 
and fishing violations. On the one hand, this could be explained by the fact that, since the turn of 
the century, a number of community members had moved away from traditional practices – not 
necessarily because they no longer felt an attachment to them but because existing games laws 
coupled with the loss of their traditional lands made it difficult for the Wendat to harvest 
resources as they had before. Therefore, the men who once regularly practiced these activities 
were either no longer doing so at the same frequency or had stopped altogether. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that some incidents went unnoticed or unreported, perhaps because no 
one saw or there was not enough evidence to prove wrongdoing. Thus, it is certainly plausible 
that a number of Wendat men may have continued to engage in these activities without ever 
being discovered by state officials. Nevertheless, this case study demonstrates that by rendering 









Chapter 2: Reinforcing Social, Moral, and Legal Regulation 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century and continuing well into the first couple decades of the 
1900s, the Canadian government enacted a series of laws as part of their ‘nation building 
project’.1 In an attempt to assert its sovereignty and maintain its authority, the state implemented 
different forms of social, moral, and legal regulation, which would allow them to extend their 
reach into people’s everyday lives. By employing various tactics such as regulating common 
spaces, monitoring peoples’ moral behaviours in the privacy of their own homes, and reinforcing 
Euro-Canadian principles, the federal government sought to extend its legislative reach to public 
and private spheres alike. To this end, the Canadian government operated alongside provincial 
political leaders to create a legal system with various regulatory agencies such as police services, 
courts of law, and penitentiaries that would work together by acting on behalf of the state to 
enforce the values of the nation. Thus, the legal system and its officials played a significant role 
in this project.2 In other words, the state and its various actors worked together to assist each 
other in identifying, pursuing, and punishing perceived threats to law and order.   
In theory, no one was immune to the effects of state expansion and state laws applied to 
everyone. However, a number of social historians, including Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo, 
demonstrate that social and moral regulation strategies were implemented with the goal of 
monitoring certain populations. For example, Strange and Loo maintain that “legal moral 
regulation was in many respects a project of imposing upon aboriginals, the poor, immigrants, 
children, and women standards of conduct idealized (but often flouted) by the principal 
                                                          
1 In this line of thinking, I am influenced by scholars such as Mariana Valverde and Ian McKay who have also 
examined this idea in their own works. For example, in Age of Light, Soap, and Water (1991), Valverde explores the 
concept of nation building by deconstructing the role English Protestant organizations and individuals, such as 
clergymen, doctors, and educators played in the social purity movement. More specifically, the author examines 
how notions of race, gender, and class intersected during their campaign for moral reform in Post-Confederation 
Canada in their desire to create a country whose citizens would be of good moral and sexual character. Similarly, 
McKay’s Liberal Order Framework (2000), he questions the way historians write about Canadian history. In 
particular, he argues for a re-examination of ‘Canada’ as a project with two main goals: first, establish liberal rule 
over a vast territory, and second, create citizens who have internalized these ideological assumptions. That said, both 
authors have shaped my way of thinking of Canada as a nation building project put forward by a variety of actors. 
2 By legal system and its officials, I am not only referring to courtrooms and the individuals who work in those 
places such as judges, magistrates, crown prosecutors, and defence lawyers, to name a few. I am also including 
police forces, RCMP officers, jailhouses, wardens, prison guards, and Indian agents who were - and still are with the 








powerholders in early twentieth-century Canada: wealthy Anglo-Celtic Protestants, and, to a 
lesser extent, bourgeois French-Catholics.”3 In other words, the overall purpose of these 
strategies was to entice groups of individuals to blend into Canadian society by regulating their 
behaviour in public – and eventually private – spaces. While all of these groups experienced 
various level of surveillance, for Indigenous peoples, this type of state intervention was felt much 
differently. In fact, not only did social and moral regulation coincide with the federal 
government’s assimilationist policies that sought to transform them into self-sufficient citizens, 
but it also operated within a framework that both identified and treated them as a separate legal 
category. As a result, the racialization that was embedded in the Indian Act (1876) worked to 
bring Indigenous peoples, such as the Wendat, into contact with the judicial system. 
Organized thematically, this chapter is divided into two sections. Drawing from a total of 
nine cases, the first part examines the different social and moral regulation strategies 
implemented by the Canadian government in both public and private spheres, and their impact 
on the Wendat. In particular, this section explores how the Indian Act’s alcohol ban resulted in 
the criminalization of the Wendat for offences that were inextricably linked to their identity as 
Indigenous peoples. In the second section, I use seven court cases to analyze the different ways 
in which the Indian Act itself was used as a pretext to bring the Wendat into the criminal justice 
system, which resulted in an increased number of interactions between the Wendat and legal 
officials. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief discussion on other types of disadvantages 
the Wendat faced when encountering the court system such as a language barrier, and its 
negative effects on the accused.  
 Monitoring Indigenous peoples’ behaviours in public spaces was an important aspect of 
social and moral regulation. This is seen most clearly in Genest v. Sioui (1923), which provides a 
relatively complete picture of how the accused’s journey through the legal system unfolded. On 
April 6th, 1923, Alexandre Sioui, from Loretteville, appeared before the Honourable Judge 
Arthur Lachance after being accused of vagrancy.4 According to the complainant, J. A. Genest, 
on or around March 30th 1923, Sioui “ […] étant vagabond, [a] illégalement causé du trouble 
dans le chemin public, en blasphémant et en tenant une conduite tumultueuse, troublant par là, la 
                                                          
3 Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo, Making Good: Law and Moral Regulation in Canada, 1867-1939 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), 9. 







paix des habitants paisibles […]”5 Judge Lachance accepted the complainant’s statement, 
however, he did not issue a warrant for Sioui’s arrest; instead, the accused was taken into 
custody by Constable Lamothe the same day.6  With Sioui appearing before him, the presiding 
judge explained the charge to the accused and gave him the opportunity to share his side of the 
story by allowing him to state his reasons for why he should not be found guilty. When it was his 
turn to speak, however, Sioui did not elaborate any further and instead, he simply pled guilty to 
one count of vagrancy. After entering his plea, Judge Lachance ordered Sioui to pay a fine of 
$25 and to compensate Genest in the amount of $7.15.7 But, if Sioui was unable to pay the total 
fine of $32.15, Judge Lachance stipulated that he would have to serve one month in jail at the 
local prison in Québec City.8  
 On the surface, this case seems to be fairly straightforward; a man appeared before the 
court after he was accused of vagrancy, the judge explained the charges to him, the offender pled 
guilty, and the judge ordered him to either pay a fine or spend one month in jail. The entire 
process was over within a day and it seemed as though justice had been served. In addition, the 
idea of a fair judicial system is bolstered by both the “accusation et plaidoyer” and the 
“condamnation” legal forms Judge Lachance filed out because these two pre-prepared, fill-in-
the-blanks style documents give the impression that everything happened by the book.9 As such, 
it appears to be an open and shut case with little to offer socio-legal historians interested in 
analyzing the legal treatment of Indigenous peoples. However, this case is not as simple as it 
seems, and by peeling back and analyzing each layer, it becomes clear that Sioui’s conviction is 
part of a pattern in which state officials used the law to discipline Aboriginal peoples.  
In an effort to monitor people’s behavior and reinforce social, moral, and legal regulation 
in public spaces, state officials often employed vagrancy laws. The introduction of these laws 
“signified a move away from a moral economy of regulation to direct state intervention in the 
lives of the poor.”10 According to social historian Mary Anne Poutanen, “the broad interpretation 
of vagrancy and its relationship to ethnicity, class, and gender meant that a wide range of female 
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and male activities were construed as illicit and subject to state intervention”.11 Consequently, 
vagrancy laws applied differently to women and men. On the one hand, the state was 
preoccupied with regulating women’s morality, especially when it involved their sexual 
behavior. On the other hand, the state viewed male vagrants as a moral threat because they 
refused to work and as a physical danger for their potential for aggression.12 For Aboriginal 
peoples, the implementation of vagrancy laws took on a different meaning because they were 
employed alongside the state’s goal of assimilation. The historic usage of vagrancy laws in 
Canada and its impact on First Nations has been studied by a number of historians. Brian 
Hubner, for example, explores how the Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP) used the law to 
restrict Aboriginal people’s movements in order to prevent them from engaging in certain 
behaviors the government was trying to eradicate like cross-border horse stealing and cattle 
killing.13 In particular, Hubner focuses on how vagrancy laws were used to enforce the pass 
system since the latter had no actual legal standing.14 Thus, he concludes that “[…] vagrancy law 
was employed extensively to remove undesirable Indians from wherever the authorities did not 
want them.”15 In other words, Indigenous peoples were methodically removed from locations 
where their presence was not welcomed. Unfortunately, however, most of the existing 
scholarship focuses on the usage of vagrancy laws on First Nations in western Canada, and as 
such, little is known about how these legal measures were applied in the eastern part of the 
country.  
Alexandre Sioui’s interaction with Québec’s justice system and the offence he was 
charged with supports Poutanen’s and Hubner’s arguments. More specifically, Genest v. Sioui 
(1923) sheds light on how the Canadian government sought to regulate public spaces based on 
Euro-Canadian codes of conduct. Simply put, these codes of conduct were founded on Western 
notions of patriarchy, liberalism, property, and law and order, and it was assumed that both men 
and women would take their rightful places in society in accordance with their gender. Over 
time, these values were enshrined in the 1892 Criminal Code (CC) following the consolidation of 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 36. 
12 Ibid. 40-41. 
13 Brian Hubner, “Horse stealing and the borderline: the NWMP and the control of Indian movement, 1874-1900,” 
in The Mounted Police and Prairie Society, 1873-1919, ed. William M. Baker (Regina: University of Regina, 
Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998), 53. 
14 Ibid. 68. 







existing laws. In particular, the CC outlined crimes against the state, public order, property, and 
persons while also laying out the repercussions for each offence.16 Not only did this piece of 
legislation reflect the government’s objectives to incorporate Western social norms into the legal 
fabric of Canadian society but it also gave the government the judicial authority to enforce these 
laws against people who did not conform to the law. To this end, the state frequently used 
legislation related to public order, such as vagrancy laws to regulate public spaces and monitor 
people’s behavior. According to section 207 of the 1892 CC, for example, a vagrant was defined 
as a “loose, idle or disorderly person.”17 However, given that there were twelve ways a person 
could be identified as a vagrant18, this law cast a net wide enough so that it could be used in 
conjunction with the discretion of police officers.  
In addition, the application of these legal provisions was deeply rooted in the Canadian 
government’s perceived role as a paternal figure for Indigenous peoples. That being said, state 
officials “saw their role as one of "elevating" the Indians […] to the "civilized standards" of the 
white man.”19 In other words, it was the responsibility of white men to improve the lives of 
Aboriginal peoples and lift them up from their primitive state by educating them in European 
ways of knowing. The racialization of First Nations coupled with this sentiment of benevolence 
is reflected in the way Sioui is described in the case file and the desire to correct behavior that 
                                                          
16 Criminal Code, S.C. 1892 (55-56 Vic.), c. 29, s 207, http://www.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_02094/91?r=0&s=1  
17 Ibid. 
18 According to section 207 of the 1892 Criminal Code, there were twelve ways a person could be defined as a 
vagrant: “a) not having any visible means of maintaining himself lives without employment; b) being able to work 
and thereby or by other means to maintain himself and family willfully refuses or neglects to do so; c) openly 
exposes or exhibits in any street, road, highway or public place, any indecent exhibition; d) without a certificate 
signed, within six months, by a priest, clergyman or minister of the gospel, or two justices of the peace, residing in 
the municipality where the alms are being asked, that he or she is a deserving object of charity, wanders about and 
begs, or goes about from door to door, or places himself or herself in any street, highway, passage or public place to 
beg or receive alms; e) loiters on any street, road, highway or public place, and obstructs passengers by standing 
across the footpath, or by using insulting language, or in any other way; f) causes a disturbance in or near any street, 
road, highway or public space, by screaming, swearing or singing, or by being drunk, or by impeding or 
incommoding peaceable passengers; g) by discharging firearms, or by riotous or disorderly conduct in any street or 
highway, wantonly disturbs the peace and quiet of the inmates of any dwelling-house near such street or highway; h) 
tears down or defaces signs, breaks windows, or doors or door plates, or the walls of houses, roads or gardens, or 
destroys fences; i) being a common prostitute or night walker, wanders in the fields, public streets or highways, 
lanes or places of public meeting or gathering of people, and does not give a satisfactory account of herself; j) is a 
keeper or inmate of a disorderly house, bawdy-house or house of ill-fame, or house for the resort of prostitutes; k) is 
in the habit of frequenting such houses and does not give a satisfactory account of himself or herself; or l) having no 
peaceable profession or calling to maintain himself by, for the most part supports himself by gaming or crime, or by 
the avails of prostitution.” For more information, see Criminal Code, S.C. 1892 (55-56 Vic.), c. 29, s 207. 
http://www.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_02094/91?r=0&s=1 








was deemed socially unacceptable. For example, according to the complainant, Sioui was 
illegally causing trouble in a public space by behaving in a blasphemous and tumultuous 
manner.20 Although there are no specific details that reveal exactly what Sioui said or did, based 
on the characterization of his actions, his behavior likely against section 207 of the 1892 
Criminal Code (CC), which defined a vagrant as someone who “causes a disturbance in or near 
any street, road, high-way or public place, by screaming, swearing or singing, or by being drunk, 
or impeding or incommoding peaceable passengers.”21 Evidently, the language used to define 
this offence was written in such a way to include a number of behaviors that could be interpreted 
as vagrancy. Consequently, Sioui’s actions fell under the purview of this law and he went against 
what Canadian society considered socially acceptable behavior. Moreover, it is noteworthy to 
state that Sioui was described as disturbing the peace of law-abiding citizens.22 This is 
significant because the wording implies that not only were his actions disruptive, but his 
presence was considered a public nuisance. Based on that, the state believed it was well within 
its rights to forcibly remove him. In addition, there was an assumption that it was the city’s 
responsibility to uphold law and order. This point is reinforced by the letter that was signed by 
Genest and a witness, Emile Farladeau, and sworn by Loretteville Mayor Alfred Verret. In this 
document, Genest and Farladeau demand that the municipality of Loretteville arrest and punish 
Sioui “pour avoir causer [sic] le trouble dans le faubourg par les plus affreux blasphèmes […]”23 
While the letter did not explicitly state that the city was responsible for regulating public spaces, 
the wording suggests that Genest and Farladeau believed that the city did in fact have a role to 
play in maintaining the public order. 
Moreover, the state blurred the lines between public and private spheres by enacting 
legislation that allowed them to make their presence felt in both domains. More often than not, 
moral regulation was at the heart of these laws because it was a way for the government to 
reinforce Western values. Social historians Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo explore this topic by 
examining the intimate relationship between law and morality in Post-Confederation Canada. In 
particular, the authors’ argument is twofold. First, they maintain that during this critical phase of 
state formation, morality was used as a strategy to distinguish between good and bad 
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behaviour.24 At the heart of the government’s vision was a nation founded on “capital 
accumulation” and the “heterosexual family comprising a male breadwinner and a wife dedicated 
to raising future productive Canadians.”25 Second, in order to ensure the success of this goal, the 
state used the law to back moral guidelines.26 Therefore, by intertwining morality and the law, 
the latter essentially functioned “as a means of moral regulation.”27 Gosselin v. Sioui (1937) 
supports the argument put forward by Strange and Loo because it illustrates how the state used 
the law to extend its reach into public and private spaces in order to monitor the Wendat’s moral 
behavior. In particular, this case highlights the intersection between morality and public and 
private regulation. After a complaint was lodged against Jules Sioui by an unknown individual, 
the Honorable Judge Hugues Fortier issued a warrant for his arrest on February 11th, 1937. 
Narcisse Gosselin, a member of Québec’s provincial police force, arrested the accused, and, on 
the following day, he pled not guilty to one charge of “actes de grossière indécence.”28 The trial 
continued over the course of a couple weeks and on February 20th, Sioui was found guilty of 
gross indecency, and three days later, he was sentenced to four months and fifteen days of 
imprisonment.29  
Similar to Genest v. Sioui (1923), the case against Jules Sioui exemplifies how the state 
sought to correct behavior it deemed unacceptable. In both cases, a complaint was lodged against 
the two men and legal measures were taken in order to rectify the situation and dissuade them 
from engaging in that behavior again. By contrast, for Jules Sioui, the state was clearly looking 
at this case through a moral lens. This inference is supported by section 178 of the Criminal 
Code (CC), which stipulates that “every male person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable 
to five years’ imprisonment and to be whipped who, in public or private, commits, or is a party 
to the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person, of 
any act of gross indecency with another male person.”30 The sexual and moral connotations are 
deeply embedded in the wording of the law, which made it a criminal offence for men to engage 
in relations with each other, whether in public or in private. Thus, not only did this law support 
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25 Ibid. 9. 
26 Ibid. 4. 
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28 Gosselin v Sioui (11 February 1937), Québec 14073 (Québec Cour des Sessions de la Paix) 
29 Ibid. 







the idea that morality transcended the public and private spheres, but it also granted the state the 
authority to regulate what goes on in the privacy of someone’s home. While we know for a fact 
that Alexandre Sioui was accused of causing a raucous and disturbing the peace in a public 
space, it is unknown whether or not Jules Sioui’s actions took place in public or behind closed 
doors. If the latter is true though, it shows a significant break from the earlier case because the 
state was extending its reach into the private domain. Moreover, although Sioui’s punishment 
falls well within the five-year maximum prison sentence mentioned in the law, the incomplete 
case file leaves a number of unanswered questions. For instance, it is not known why Jules Sioui 
was found guilty by Judge Fortier.31 In fact, there is no information about what was said nor 
what type of evidence – if any – was presented at the trial. So, aside from knowing that Jules 
Sioui was represented by his lawyer Maître A. Jolicoeur, little else is known about how this case 
unfolded. Consequently, there is a lack of information, which could have helped to paint a 
clearer picture of what took place.   
However, an article published in Le Soleil on Thursday February 18th, 1937 – the same 
day Jules Sioui’s trial was scheduled to begin – may provide answers by filling in some of the 
gaps in the case file. In particular, this piece discloses important information that sheds light on 
the context this case emerged in. For example, before stating that “un individu de Loretteville a 
commencé à subir son procès ce matin devant M. le juge Hugues Fortier […]”, the article begins 
by mentioning that “les accusations de grossière indécences continuent à pleuvoir en cour des 
sessions.”32 This statement is intriguing because it reveals that the crime Jules Sioui was charged 
with was part of a larger trend involving numerous incidents of gross indecency. Although the 
article does not specifically mention who these other individuals were, the language used to 
describe this phenomenon is clear: in the winter of 1937, the court was seeing a significant 
number of gross indecency cases. That being said, perhaps the prevalence of these crimes played 
a role in Sioui’s sentencing. In fact, Judge Fortier’s decision to sentence Sioui to four months and 
fifteen days of imprisonment was likely influenced by the state’s desire to reinforce both social 
and moral regulation in an effort to uphold the Euro-Canadian value of heterosexual 
relationships. Thus, not only did the state use the law to deter others from engaging in behaviour 
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that was deemed socially and morally inappropriate, but it also used the legal system to 
legitimize state intervention into people’s private lives. 
Part of the state’s ability to enforce social and moral regulation was made possible by the 
government’s increasingly intrusive powers, which provided the government with an opportunity 
to reinforce moral regulation among Indigenous peoples on the reserve and inside their own 
homes. On August 20th, 1919, Madame Ludivine Dion laid two formal complaints against her 
husband, Narcisse Picard. According to the case file, in the first statement, she declared that “son 
époux, Narcisse Picard, étant un sauvage, a, sur la réserve des sauvages, à Indien Lorette, dans le 
District de Québec, depuis environ le 1er juin 1919, […] donné à des sauvages des substances 
enivrantes […].”33 Based on Dion’s statement, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste 
Choquette, issued a warrant for Picard’s arrest, accusing him of “donner de la boisson à des 
sauvages”.34 Following his arrest, Picard stood before the judge on August 21st, 1919 and was 
released pending his next court appearance on August 27th, 1919 at 10 am. In the meantime, 
Judge Choquette ordered Picard to follow certain conditions; namely, he was required to pay a 
fine of $100 and maintain “[…] la paix et soit de bonne conduite envers Notre Souverain 
Seigneur le Roi et tous et chacun de ses loyaux sujets, et plus particulièrement envers la dite 
Ludivine Dion […].”35 The following day, Dion abandoned her first complaint but the second 
one continued.36 According to that statement, Dion claimed that “Narcisse Picard, son mari, a sur 
la réserve des sauvages, à Indien Lorette […] en différents temps, depuis le 1er Juin 1919 […] été 
trouvé ivre, [et] aux mêmes temps et lieux, avoir eu, en sa possession, illégalement des 
substances enivrantes […].”37 It is unknown whether or not another warrant was issued for his 
arrest based on Dion’s second statement but, Picard did reappear before Judge Choquette on 
August 26th, 1919, and when asked to enter his plea, he pled guilty.38 The judge sentenced him to 
either pay a $30 fine plus applicable fees or spend one month in jail; Picard paid $15 that same 
day and the balance was paid on October 20th.39  
                                                          













 This court case bears a striking resemblance to Gosselin v. Sioui (1937) because it too 
illustrates how the government used the law to extend its reach beyond the public sphere and into 
the private domain by regulating Aboriginal peoples’ behaviors. However, the case involving 
Narcisse Picard is one of the most interesting because unlike the other court cases in my study, 
the racialization is obvious. So, while the other cases require a lot more reading between the lines 
in order to analyze how it affected the legal system’s treatment of Indigenous offenders, this one 
is immediately visible. More specifically, it is seen in the derogatory language that was used to 
describe both Picard and the Wendat reserve in the official case file. For example, at every stage 
of his interaction with the legal system, he was described as being a “sauvage de Indien 
Lorette.”40 This overt racialization illustrates how the law was not, in fact, blind to race. Rather, 
it was fully aware of this concept because it was deeply embedded in the justice system. Over the 
years, multiple scholars have analyzed the intersection between race and the law in Canadian 
history. In particular, legal historian Constance Backhouse analyzes race as a fluid social 
construct that affected the treatment of racialized minorities before the law. Basing her argument 
on six court cases, she argues that race was used to justify Euro-Canadian domination over 
others.41 The Dion v. Picard (1919) court case supports Backhouse’s argument because it shows 
how the conceptualization of race was deeply embedded in all levels of the justice system and 
manifested itself through Picard’s unequal treatment before the law. Thus, the racialization 
written in law was reinforced by judges in the courtroom.  
 However, this type of racialization was not unique to First Nations. As shown by 
Backhouse and other scholars, other minorities were also racialized by the court system. Social 
historian Barrington Walker, for instance, examines how the interaction between Blacks and the 
Canadian justice system in nineteenth century Ontario produced and reproduced race. More 
specifically, he argues that, “when Blacks appeared before the criminal courts, ‘race,’ whether 
tacitly or overtly, procedurally or rhetorically, was on trial.”42 In other words, a defendant’s race, 
as well as his or her behaviour, was subject to scrutiny when Black Canadians encountered the 
justice system. As I went through the archives, I came across a case that supports the arguments 
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made by both Backhouse and Walker. In fact, Paquet v. Sasso (1926) demonstrates that race as a 
social and legal construct was incorporated within the court system and used as an identifying 
marker. On February 24th, 1926, Arthur Paquet, a constable from the municipal police force of 
Québec, accused a Black man of vagrancy. In his written statement, he declared that a “nègre”, 
whose name was currently unknown but who resided at 336 rue St Luc, was capable of working 
and providing for himself but voluntarily chooses not to.43 That same day, the Honorable Judge 
Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued a warrant for the man’s arrest, and between then and March 
4th 1926, the Black man who was eventually identified as Robert Sasso appeared before the 
Honourable Judge Arthur Lachance. According to the case file, three witnesses, Constables 
Arthur Paquet and Narcisse Auclair and Deputy Chief Bigaouette, testified against Sasso and on 
April 5th, the judge dismissed the charge and Sasso was released.44 Similar to the case against 
Narcisse Picard, the discriminatory language in this case was used to identify and categorize the 
accused. In fact, Picard and Sasso were othered in two ways: not only were they seen as other 
because they were alleged deviants who disobeyed the law, but they were also viewed as 
racialized others. Inhabiting this dual identity of a racialized suspect, both men were treated 
differently by the legal system. Thus, both cases openly reveal how race was deeply intertwined 
in the justice system. 
Although the explicit racialization in Dion v. Picard (1919) makes this case stand out 
from the rest, this case is similar to the others because Picard’s racialized treatment also appears 
in more subtle ways. More specifically, this case – and several others like it – exemplify how 
alcohol restrictions that targeted Indigenous people went beyond simply intruding into their 
private lives. Instead, it served as a way to racialize First Nations. This is apparent in the 
dehumanizing language that was used to describe Picard and the reserve, and by the fact that 
both crimes he was charged with explicitly singled out Indigenous peoples. Earlier laws 
regulating Aboriginal peoples’ alcohol consumption were established during the seventeenth 
century at the height of the fur trade and in the lead up to Confederation before being 
amalgamated under the Indian Act (1876), and later revised in the 1906 amendments. In Picard’s 
case, his wife’s second complaint, which accused him of possessing alcohol, most likely went 
against section 137, which stipulated that:  
                                                          








Every Indian or non-treaty Indian who makes or manufacturers any intoxicant, or who 
has in in possession, or concealed, or who sells, exchanges with, barters, supplies or gives 
to any other Indian or non-treaty Indian, any intoxicant shall, on summary conviction 
[…] be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and not less than one 
month, with or without hard labour […]45 
 
Evidently, this part on intoxicants racialized First Nations because it applied only to Indigenous 
people as defined by the state, thereby labelling and categorizing them as a separate group. 
Indeed, this act did not exist for any other group of people but was crafted with the goal of 
regulating and assimilating First Nations under the guise that, as wards of the state, they were 
incapable of managing their own affairs. Consequently, this resulted in their unfair treatment 
before the law. In Dion v. Picard, this is seen most clearly in the consistent use of the term 
“sauvage” to describe the accused and the Wendat Reserve.46 This overt racialization contradicts 
the idea of the judicial system as being unbiased, fair, and colour-blind. Therefore, while the 
language in itself was used to racialize Indigenous people, it was also a product of the 
racialization that was already deeply embedded in the justice system through the enactment of 
the Indian Act and subsequent amendments and regulatory measures.  
Over the years, a number of historians have made significant contributions to the study of 
alcohol regulation in Canada and its impact on those who fell under its purview. Historian 
Mariana Valverde, for instance, examines how alcohol regulation was tied to the notion of self-
control and the idea that state intervention was needed for those, it assumed, did not have the 
capacity to regulate their own alcohol consumption.47 Not surprisingly, the concept of self-
control – and the presumed absence of it – was deeply intertwined with race. Given that 
Aboriginal peoples were considered to be part of the “problem subpopulations”, the government 
took a keen interest in regulating their alcohol consumption.48 Thus, Valverde argues that “liquor 
laws governed racial status as much as, and perhaps more effectively than, they governed 
drinking”.49 In other words, the goal of alcohol restrictions in Canada was twofold: not only did 
they allow the government to regulate alcohol consumption, but they also allowed it to use these 
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regulations to create distinctions along racial lines between those who were permitted to 
consume alcohol and those who were not. In turn, this racialized Indigenous peoples as ‘other’ 
before the law. 
 Expanding on Valverde’s research, historian Robert Campbell examines the history of 
alcohol regulation vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples. In particular, he argues that the Indian Act’s 
1876 alcohol ban further racialized First Nations because these laws created a link between 
citizenship and the ability to possess and consume alcohol. 50 For example, “one of the 
citizenship rights denied to Indians was the right to possess and consume alcohol, and 
enfranchisement was linked to sobriety.”51 In turn, this established two groups of people: citizens 
and non-citizens. As mentioned by Valverde, this resulted in the creation of a strict racial binary 
between “Indians” and “non-Indians” based on people’s capacity to access alcohol.52 Moreover, 
Campbell points out that the Indian Act was clear; the only way to get around the alcohol ban 
was through enfranchisement.53 According to section 86, “Indians”, as defined by the act, must 
possess “integrity, morality and sobriety” to be considered eligible for enfranchisement.54 By 
making alcohol one aspect of citizenship rights, Indigenous peoples were forced to either keep 
their Indian status and continue to be denied the same rights as everyone else or give up their 
status and be granted equality. My case study on the Wendat is an extension of both Valverde’s 
and Campbell’s research because it expands on the idea that “liquor laws helped to define and 
regulate Aboriginal peoples.”55 With this in mind, I demonstrate how the Indian Act’s alcohol 
ban and the Criminal Code racialized the Wendat while also denying them the same rights as 
“non-Indians”. 
Charles Sioui’s numerous interactions with Québec’s judicial system provides valuable 
insight on the relationship between the Wendat’s racialized treatment and the prosecution of 
alcohol related crimes. Based on my research, Sioui’s first interaction with Canadian criminal 
law occurred on January 20th, 1925 after Wilfred Turgeon filled a complaint against him 
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accusing him of being “[en] possession illégale d’alambic”.56 According to the plumitif, Sioui 
briefly appeared in front of an unnamed judge later that day before he was granted a conditional 
release on a promise to appear in court.57 On February 18th, Sioui abstained from entering a plea, 
however, for reasons that are not made clear in the plumitif, he was immediately convicted and 
sentenced to either pay a $200 fine plus applicable fees or spend six months in the local jail.58 By 
April 16th, Sioui paid the fine for a total of $223.15, and the matter was settled.59 Although a 
significant amount of detail is missing, the offence Sioui was charged with provides an important 
analytical starting point. As mentioned in the plumitif, Sioui was charged with illegally 
possessing an alembic, a still used to distill alcohol.60 By this time, however, alcohol production 
was strictly regulated by the provincial government’s liquor commission, La Commission des 
Liqueurs du Québec.61 As a result, because Sioui was in possession of a device used to 
manufacture alcohol without proper authorization from of the state, his actions were deemed 
illegal. Along with examining the offence, it is equally important to analyze how this case may 
have unfolded during Sioui’s trial. For example, even though there is no information in the court 
docket on what type of evidence was presented against the accused, it is possible that the alembic 
was used as physical proof of his transgressions. If this line of thinking is correct, it may also 
explain why Sioui was convicted and sentenced on the first day of his trial.  
A little over two years later, Sioui, once again, found himself in a Québec courtroom. On 
August 17th, 1928, La Commission des Liqueurs du Québec acted as the plaintiff for a case after 
a formal complaint was filed against Sioui accusing him of “contrevenir la Loi Liqueurs 
Alcooliques”.62 According to the plumitif, Sioui appeared before Judge Arthur Lachance that 
same day and was sentenced to either pay a $1,000 fine or spend one month in jail after pleading 
guilty.63 Unlike his previous encounter with the system, Sioui did not pay the fine and a warrant 
for his imprisonment was issued, and Sioui was taken to the local jail to serve out his sentence.64 
Similar to his first interaction with the legal system, this case is also incomplete. For instance, it 
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is not known who from the liquor commission filed the complaint and the details from the 
deposition are also not included. Furthermore, no explanation was given on why Sioui chose to 
plead guilty nor is there any mention of the specific clause in the liquor act he was accused of 
contravening.  
Regardless, this case symbolizes the state’s increasing intervention into the lives of the 
Wendat with the creation of La Commission des Liqueurs du Québec, and the repercussions of 
this intrusion. Founded in 1921, the purpose of Québec’s liquor commission– and others more 
broadly – was twofold. On the one hand, it provided a certain degree of control over morality by 
tolerating alcohol consumption under certain circumstances that were outlined by the state.65 On 
the other hand, it also generated a new source of revenue for the government by fining 
individuals who contravened it.66 Although these new guidelines applied to everyone, for 
Indigenous peoples, liquor boards were used as a colonial tool to regulate their alcohol 
consumption.67 In other words, by acting on behalf of the state, la Commission des Liqueurs du 
Québec reinforced government laws, in turn allowing the state to bolster their political authority 
over First Nations and reassert their sovereignty. Given that it operated as an extension of state 
power, going against the liquor commission was viewed as a direct threat to law and order 
because it disregarded the government’s jurisdiction and its ability to create regulations, thus 
questioning its legitimacy. In La Commission des Liqueurs du Québec v. Sioui (1928), the 
meaning behind his actions was reflected in his punishment. For example, the choice he was 
given between paying a large fine or spending time in prison illustrates the severity of this 
crime.68 While I recognize that Sioui’s status as a repeat offender may have contributed to the 
harsh punishment he received, it does not take away from the fact that this case reflects the 
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government’s attempt to use alcohol regulation as a pretext to bring Indigenous peoples’ into the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, this large fine coupled with the possibility of prison time 
echoes the government’s desire to deter people from committing alcohol-related infractions. 
Even though this particular case, unlike the others, does not contain the language that explicitly 
ties it to moral regulation, it is, nevertheless, part of a broader pattern in which liquor laws were 
used to racialize First Nations as other.69 
After serving his one-month prison sentence in a local jail, Sioui was released sometime 
in September 1928. Shortly thereafter, he reappeared in front of an unknown judge on October 
23rd after Canadian border agent, Léon Hardy accused him of illegally importing alcohol.70 
According to the records, Sioui appeared before a judge, one week later on October 30th.71 That 
same day, Sioui abstained from entering a plea and the case was adjourned.72 Over the next two 
weeks, the case was postponed for a second time on November 7th and rescheduled for 
November 15th, but after abstaining for a third time, the case was dismissed and all charges were 
dropped.73 However, as this case made its way through the court system, Hardy laid another 
complaint against Sioui on November 14th, 1928, a day before his second trial ended. While the 
document explaining the details of his statement are missing, Hardy accused Sioui of illegally 
possessing a still.74 Sioui stood in front of a judge the same day before the case was rescheduled 
and he was given a conditional release pending the start of his trial.75 He reappeared in a Québec 
City courtroom on November 22nd, 1928, but abstained from entering a plea and the case was 
adjourned.76 After reconvening and adjourning for a second time five days later, the judge finally 
rendered a decision on November 29th; Sioui was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of 
$200 or serve six months in the local jail.77 However, it took over a year for a warrant to be 
executed, and on February 2nd, 1930, Sioui was arrested and brought to the local jail to serve his 
sentence.78  
                                                          
69 To consult two other cases that support this pattern, see Commission des Liqueurs du Québec v Bastien (15 
August 1930), Québec 4102 (Que CSP) and Commission des Liqueurs du Québec v Bastien (27 May 1931), Québec 
5302 (Que CSP). 















Even though these two cases seem simple and straightforward, they shed light on the role 
every branch of the state had in enforcing alcohol regulation and protecting state interests. Even 
though specific details such as Hardy’s original statements in both cases are missing, the facts 
provide historians with a clear indication of what could have happened. For instance, since the 
complaints were laid within weeks of each other and Hardy is identified as the plaintiff and a 
border agent in both case files, it can be assumed that the two complaints are part of the same 
incident that took place in the fall of 1928 when Sioui was apprehended along the Canada-US 
border in the Province of Québec.79 The crimes Sioui was charged with support this theory. In 
the first instance, Sioui was charged with “boisson illégale importée”, so, even without the 
original statement, this charge is self-explanatory.80 If this line of reasoning stands, it could also 
be assumed that Hardy came across the still during the same search that revealed the alcohol, 
thereby explaining the second complaint brought against him.81 However, it is unclear why these 
two charges were not filed together. One possible explanation is that Hardy assumed the chances 
of conviction would be higher if each offence was brought before the court separately. Given the 
outcome of both cases, this legal strategy was successful, if that was the intention. Another 
possible reason for filing two separate complaints was to extend Sioui’s criminal record. This 
tactic worked in Hardy’s favour because it ensured Sioui’s status as a repeat offender, thereby 
affecting all of his future potential encounters with the court system. Thus, not only would Sioui 
be racialized as “Indian”, but now he would also be labelled as a recidivist.  
Similar to his previous interaction with the court system in the summer of 1928, Sioui’s 
two final encounters with the judicial system later that same year involved state actors who 
operated as extensions of the government. For instance, like the member of Québec’s liquor 
commission who denounced Sioui’s actions in August 1928, Canadian border agent, Léon Hardy 
was also acting as an arm of the state when he filed two back-to-back complaints against Sioui in 
October and November.82 Thus, the two cases are clear examples of a state actor who was 
working on behalf of the government to enforce state rules. In turn, Hardy’s actions legitimized 
the state and its ability to create legislation and impose its authority. Although it is unknown 
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whether Hardy had personal motivations in bringing forward his complaints, these two instances 
are part of the pattern of racialization members of the Wendat community experienced 
throughout the 1920s and 30s. Moreover, for Aboriginal peoples, more broadly, enforcing 
alcohol related laws was part of Canada’s policy that sought to erode First Nations’ sovereignty, 
regulate Indigenous peoples, and, eventually, assimilate them into Canadian society. So, even if 
Sioui’s racialization is not apparent through language, like in other cases, for example, it still 
occurred within a legal and political framework that aimed to assimilate him and all Indigenous 
peoples. 
Four years later, another case involving Québec’s liquor commission demonstrates how 
alcohol regulation and state power continued to be deeply intertwined. On November 2nd, 1932, 
Moïse Groslouis from “Village Huron, Loretteville” was accused of illegally selling alcohol.83 
That same day, the Honourable Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick issued a warrant for Groslouis’ arrest 
and the accused was apprehended the next day by constables Couillard and Laforest84; Groslouis 
appeared before Judge Fitzpatrick on November 3rd, 1932 and when asked to enter his plea, 
Groslouis pled not guilty.85 According to the court docket, the crown presented their evidence to 
the judge and the proceedings were adjourned.86 In the meantime, however, Groslouis was 
granted a conditional release on a promise to appear in court.87 After the case was adjourned for 
a second time on November 9th, all parties reconvened a week later and Groslouis was found 
guilty of illegally selling alcohol and Judge Fitzpatrick sentenced him to either serve one month 
in jail plus pay a $320 fine or spend three months in prison.88 Groslouis chose the former, and 
that same day, an order for his imprisonment was issued and he was taken to the local jail.89  
Similar to Charles Sioui’s encounter with the legal system four years prior, this case is 
another example of state expansion and increasing government intrusion into the private lives of 
the Wendat. Yet, unlike Commission des Liqueurs du Québec v. Sioui (1928), Groslouis’ 
punishment included a mandatory prison sentence regardless of which of the two sentencing 
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options he chose.90 Unfortunately, the plumitif does not explain why such a harsh punishment 
was given to Groslouis. However, an article published in Le Soleil on Thursday November 3rd, 
1932 – the day after Groslouis was accused of illegally selling alcohol – may provide some 
answers by shedding light on the context of the case. According to this piece, Groslouis’ arrest 
was not a random occurrence. Rather, it was part of a state campaign against contraband 
undertaken by the Département des Douanes et de l’Accise; approaching this task under the 
assumption that the trafficking of illegal goods was rampant in Québec City, this government 
institution, in cooperation with local law enforcement, sought to quickly and efficiently 
dismantle these prohibited operations.91 Among those who were arrested included alleged 
cigarette importers such as Lomer Jacques, who was accused of being in possession of 13,000 
illegal cigarettes with intent to sell and purported alcohol traffickers like Groslouis.92 That being 
said, on the one hand, it can be assumed that crimes that ignored the government’s authority 
were punished more severely. Thus, to a certain extent, Groslouis’ sentencing reflects the state’s 
desire to deter others from engaging in behaviours that flouted state authority. On the other hand, 
the harsh punishment Groslouis received could also have been in response to the argument his 
lawyer made at trial. Based on the article in Le Soleil, the author stated that “la Défense, dans 
cette affaire va soulever un point de droit autour duquel le débat ne manquera pas d’intérêt, 
savoir que les officiers provinciaux n’ont pas le droit d’opérer en territoire de la réserve 
huronne.”93 Given the argument Groslouis was making – and the potential repercussions should 
it be accepted in court – it is certainly possible that Judge Fitzpatrick’s decision to find him 
guilty and imprison him was done to reinforce the idea that the Wendat were subject to both 
federal and provincial laws. This inference is supported by the case of Lomer Jacques. For 
example, although Jacques was arrested and tried as part of the same ongoing campaign against 
contraband, Judge Fitzpatrick sentenced him to pay a $50 fine plus applicable fees or to serve 
one month in jail should he not be able to afford the fine.94 Therefore, even though both men 
were charged with and convicted of different crimes, Groslouis’ identity as a Wendat man who 
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sought to reaffirm the reserve’s self-determination affected the way he was treated before the 
law. 
In 1937, Moïse Groslouis once again found himself in a Québec City courtroom. On 
February 9th, 1937, based on the suspicion that Groslouis was illegally keeping alcohol in his 
home, a warrant was issued to search his residence located in the “Village Huron de Lorette”.95 
J. Ouimet, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), executed the warrant that 
same day and, according to the court docket, alcohol was found in Groslouis’ home. As a result, 
he was arrested and he later appeared before the Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier.96 When 
asked by the judge to enter his plea, Groslouis pled guilty to one count of “garder en sa 
possession liqueur dans l’habitation d’un Indien”.97 Judge Fortier ordered him to either pay a $50 
fine plus applicable fees or spend one month in jail. Unable to pay the fine, Groslouis was 
imprisoned the same day.98 This case is interesting because it reinforces my argument that the 
Indian Act’s alcohol ban racialized the Wendat. This is seen most clearly when examining the 
offence Groslouis was charged with. For instance, the plumitif states that Groslouis was 
convicted of illegally keeping alcohol in his home.99 Based on the wording of the offence, his 
actions likely went against section 137 of the Indian Act (1906), which made it illegal for “every 
Indian or non-treaty Indian” to possess any kind of intoxicant.100 By explicitly targeting 
Indigenous people, the law reinforced the notion that two separate categories of people existed: 
“Indians” and “non-Indians”. Therefore, even though there is no overt racialized language in this 
case like the one used against Narcisse Picard and the Wendat reserve in 1919, Groslouis’ 
inequitable treatment of was visible in the type of crime he was accused of committing.  
Evidently, even though the Indian Act’s alcohol ban was not part of the Criminal Code 
(CC), it worked alongside the CC and the province’s liquor commission to bring the Wendat into 
the justice system for alcohol related infractions. Legal historian Shelly Gavigan presents a 
similar analysis on the usage of the Indian Act in which she criticizes the current discourse on 
criminalization for being too narrow and pushes for a more precise definition that distinguishes 
                                                          












between various forms of law.101 She concludes that while the Indian Act did not criminalize 
First Nations; it “Indianized” them for not letting go of the behaviors the government was trying 
to eliminate.102 Though Gavigan focuses specifically on the interactions between First Nations 
on the prairies, my findings demonstrate that, in Québec, the Indian Act functioned in a similar 
way. In particular, it operated as a pretext to bring the Wendat into the justice system – not only 
for alcohol related infractions but for all other offences punishable under the Indian Act. 
According to the research I conducted, between 1935 and 1939, seven cases involved defendants 
who were explicitly charged for contravening at least one section of the Indian Act. Out of these 
seven, there were six men and one woman. Four of the men were Wendat; three were from the 
reserve and one lived in the city of Loretteville. It is impossible to know if the two other men 
were Indigenous, but we do know that one was from Joliette and the other resided in Loretteville, 
and the only woman was from the Wendat Reserve. Moreover, five of the seven cases were 
brought to the court by members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the two 
remaining cases listed a resident from the Village des Hurons as the plaintiff. Finally, five of the 
seven defendants were convicted and sentenced to either pay a fine plus applicable fees or be 
imprisoned if they were unable to do so. The significance of these cases is twofold. First, they 
support Gavigan’s argument in which she maintains that the Indian Act “Indianized” Aboriginal 
peoples on the Plains for holding onto behaviors the Canadian government sought to eradicate.103 
In addition, they demonstrate that her analysis can be applied to both a different geographical 
location and time period. Second, and perhaps most importantly, these cases expand on her 
research by illustrating how the Indian Act went beyond racializing Indigenous peoples. Instead, 
it was also used a pretext to bring the Wendat into the judicial system. Thus, by employing this 
act as a colonial tool, state officials increased the chances of Wendat men and women being 
brought into the court system.  
 Dame Zéphilda Laliberté’s first encounter with Canadian criminal law occurred on 
December 12th, 1935 after local RCMP officer Maurice Laberge accused her of “contravev[enir] 
à la Loi des Indiens”.104 Though not a lot of information about her is given in the plumitif, we do 
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know that she was a widow from “Lorette (Réserve Indienne)” and she was represented at trial 
by her lawyer, Maître Ed Leclerc.105 After Officer Laberge filed a formal complaint against her, 
Laliberté appeared before the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy two days later, and when asked to 
enter a plea, she pled not guilty.106 According to the plumitif, evidence was entered that same 
day, however, there is no clear indication about what type of proof was provided, and the case 
was adjourned until December 19th.107 Laliberté’s judicial process continued over the course of 
the next two weeks and on January 7th, she changed her plea from not guilty to guilty, and the 
Honourable Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick sentenced her to either pay a $50 fine plus applicable fees, 
or spend fifteen days in jail.108 That same day, Laliberté paid a $20 deposit and she was given 
until January 22nd to pay the remaining balance, however, she received three extensions to pay 
the rest of the amount she owed, and finally, on February 8th, she paid her outstanding balance 
for a total of $61.25.109  
Even with some gaps in the records, this case is important because of what it can tell us 
about Laliberté’s interaction with the justice system. On the one hand, it demonstrates that, like 
the other cases that include a Wendat offender charged under the Indian Act, her racialization is 
not immediately visible such as through language like it was in Dion v. Picard (1919). Instead, it 
was embedded in the judicial system through law and enforced with the help of state actors. This 
is seen most clearly when looking at the offence she was charged with. According to the plumitif, 
Laliberté was accused of contravening the Indian Act.110 Although the specific section she 
violated is not mentioned in the court docket, her case reflects the different ways in which this 
act was used as a pretext to bring Aboriginal peoples into contact with the criminal justice 
system. On the other hand, this case also sheds light on how Laliberté’s process unfolded. First, 
while specific information about the type of evidence that was presented against her is missing, 
the breakdown of the fine offer potential clues. For instance, according to the plumitif, 3.00 of 
her fee was given to an unspecified number of “témoins”.111 Therefore, at least two witnesses 
either to the incident in question or her character were called to testify during Laliberté’s trial 














and as such, she had to reimburse them for their time. If this inference is correct, it opens up 
another set of questions such as who these individuals were, what did they say in their testimony, 
and what were their motives. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the answers to those questions, 
however, that does not take away from the importance of this case and the role these witnesses 
may have played in Laliberté’s conviction. Furthermore, the presence of witnesses could explain 
why the trial lasted over three months; given that each individual had to provide a statement, this 
would have surely extended the entire process. Another important aspect of this case that needs 
be analyzed is the change in Laliberté’s plea. At the start of the trial, Laliberté pled not guilty, 
however, a little less than one month later, she changed her plea to guilty.112 The plumitif does 
not include a reason for this sudden change but there are a couple reasons that could explain this. 
First, it is possible that, on the advice of her counsel, Laliberté chose to plead guilty because he 
believed that changing her plea would make the judge more lenient during sentencing. Or, 
perhaps a deal was negotiated between herself and the crown prosecutor for a reduced sentence, 
if she pled guilty. 
 A similar incident took place on July 23rd, 1936 when another member of the state, 
RCMP officer Corporal M.P. Delaney, filed two separate complains against René Bilodeau and 
Elzéar Sioui, accusing them of “contrav[enir] Loi des Indiens”.113 Based on the fact that Officer 
Delaney is listed as the plaintiff in both cases and they occurred on the same day, it can be 
assumed that Bilodeau and Sioui were part of the same incident. According to the plumitif, 
Bilodeau, a resident of Loretteville, appeared before the Honourable Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick on 
July 28th and when asked to enter his plea, he pled not guilty in the presence of his lawyer, Paul 
Drouin.114 That same day, the crown prosecutor, Maître Paul Roy, presented his evidence to the 
judge and Bilodeau’s defence lawyer, and the case was adjourned and set to take place on 
August 4th.115 When the trial resumed, Roy explained his evidence to the court and Bilodeau 
abstained from testifying in his defence.116 This went on for another week until Bilodeau, 
accompanied by his lawyer, changed his plea to guilty on August 19th.117 Following his 
admission of guilt, the presiding judge, the Honourable Laetare Roy, sentenced Bilodeau to 
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either pay a $50 fine plus applicable fees or spend one month in jail.118 On the day he was 
convicted, Bilodeau paid a portion of his fine and after receiving an extension, the entire balance 
of $67.80 was paid by September 2nd.119 
 After being accused of contravening the Indian Act, Elzéar Sioui, from the “Réserve 
Indienne of Loretteville”, appeared before Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick on July 28th, 1936. Standing 
there with his lawyer, Maître J-P. Galipeault, by his side, Sioui pled not guilty when asked by the 
judge to enter his plea.120 That same day, evidence of an unspecified nature was presented by the 
crown prosecutor, Paul Roy, and the trial was adjourned and rescheduled for August 4th.121 
According to the plumitif, the trial continued with all parties present, and at the end of the 
session, Judge Fitzpatrick stated that he would deliver his verdict one week later.122 On August 
11th, the judge found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to either pay a $25 fine plus 
applicable fees or spend nine days in jail.123 By August 27th, an arrest warrant was issued and 
Sioui was taken to the local jail to serve out his sentence.124 
The experiences of Bilodeau and Sioui reinforce the fact that the Indian Act increased a 
person’s chance of encountering the judicial system. As a result, individuals who engaged in 
behaviours that were not prohibited by the Criminal Code (CC) but were outlawed under the 
Indian Act, were now brought into the courtroom and prosecuted. In other words, both the Indian 
Act and the CC could be used to target individuals whose behaviours were illegal under one type 
of law but not the other. However, what differentiates these two cases from Laberge v. Laliberté 
(1935), are the intentions behind the Indian Act’s application, which depended on whether or not 
the offender was Indigenous. For example, in Bilodeau’s case, given that the plumitif does not 
mention any affiliation to a specific Aboriginal community, it can be assumed that he was not 
Indigenous. As a result, Corporal Delaney could have decided to charge Bilodeau under the 
Indian Act for two reasons. First, Bilodeau’s behavior was not illegal under the CC, and 
therefore, he needed to be prosecuted under the Indian Act. Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, he viewed Bilodeau’s actions as working against government efforts to regulate 
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Indigenous peoples. In other words, since Indigenous peoples were considered wards of the state 
due to their perceived inability to manage their own affairs, anyone whose behaviors could 
potentially corrupt them and delay their assimilation was penalized. If this line of inquiry is 
correct, it may also explain why Bilodeau was given a harsher sentence. For instance, while 
Sioui had the choice between paying $25 fine plus applicable fees or spending nine days in jail, 
Bilodeau was sentenced to either pay a $50 fine plus applicable fees or spend one month in 
jail.125 However, it is interesting to note that, even though Bilodeau received a harsher 
punishment compared to Sioui, he was able to pay the fine and avoid jail time, whereas the latter 
was not. Perhaps this is an indication that Bilodeau was financially stable given that he was also 
able to afford a lawyer.   
In addition, the lack of specific detail in these two cases, especially when it comes to the 
type of evidence that was presented at trial, make it difficult to analyze how the judicial process 
unfolded. In Bilodeau’s case, unlike the one involving Laliberté, there is no breakdown of the 
fees he had to pay. Consequently, it is difficult to identify possible evidence that was used 
against him at trial.126 By contrast, Sioui’s case is slightly more specific. For instance, on the 
same day Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick convicted Sioui, he also gave the order for a 
“confiscation”.127 While there is no mention about what exactly was seized, it can be assumed 
that it was alcohol or liquor making equipment such as a still, since that was usually taken away 
as part of the confiscation order.128 If this is correct, it can provide a couple of answers to a few 
questions. First, it can be assumed that Sioui was charged with violating a section of the Indian 
Act’s alcohol ban. Second, the alcohol found in his possession may have been used as evidence 
against him at trial, and if this was the case, it would explain why he was convicted; the crown 
had physical evidence that proved his transgressions.  
 As a branch of the state, the RCMP continued to play a key role in enforcing the Indian 
Act. In fact, though a majority of the men and women who were charged under the act were 
Wendat, certain provisions of the law could also be applied to non-Indigenous peoples. On 
November 4th, 1937, Roch Allaire from Joliette was charged with “Loi des Indiens” by RCMP 
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member J. Romeo Roy.129 According to the court docket, Allaire was arrested without a warrant 
and brought before the Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier. When asked to enter his plea, the 
defendant, without a lawyer by his side, pled guilty.130 Following his admission of guilt, Allaire 
was immediately convicted and sentenced to either pay a $50 fine plus applicable fees or spend 
one month in jail.131 The accused chose the former and paid the total fine of $53.90 and the 
matter was resolved.132 While some details are missing, the offence Allaire was charged with 
provides an interesting analytical starting point. The plumitif states that Allaire was accused of 
contravening the Indian Act for “ventes substances enivrantes”.133 Based on that information, 
Allaire was charged with violating the Indian Act’s alcohol ban because his actions went against 
the government’s goal of regulating Indigenous peoples’ alcohol consumption. In other words, 
by providing “Indians” with alcoholic substances, Allaire was undermining the government’s 
efforts to assimilate them into Canadian society. 
 Like the three other RCMP officers who brought Indian Act violations before the court, J. 
A. Turgeon was no exception. On August 10th, 1939, he arrested Désiré Groslouis, a resident of 
the “Village des Hurons”, for “Infr[action] à la Loi des Indiens”.134 Following his apprehension, 
Groslouis was taken before the Honourable Judge T. Tremblay, and when asked to enter his plea, 
the accused, accompanied by his lawyer, Maître G. Coot, pled not guilty.135 After entering his 
plea, Judge Tremblay adjourned for the day and set the next court date for October 16th. On that 
day, with all parties present, Groslouis suddenly changed his plea to guilty.136 As such, the 
presiding judge accepted his guilty plea and ordered that all liquor found in his possession be 
seized immediately. In addition, Judge Tremblay sentenced Groslouis to either pay a fine of $10 
plus applicable fees or be imprisoned for eight days, if he was unable to pay.137 Unable to pay, a 
warrant for his imprisonment was issued and Groslouis was taken to the local jail to serve out his 
sentence.138 Compared to other cases involving Indian Act violations, this one contains important 
details that shed light on the circumstances of Groslouis’ arrest. To begin, even though the 
                                                          
















plumitif does not explicitly state which part of the act was contravened, the judge’s order to 
confiscate the liquor found in Groslouis’ possession makes it clear that he was charged for going 
against the act’s alcohol ban. In particular, it can be inferred that his actions contravened section 
137, which made it an offence for “every Indian or non-treaty Indian” to make, manufacture, or 
possess any alcoholic substance.139 Given that this provision applied only to “Indians”, as 
defined by the state, it is evident that, by charging Groslouis under this act, the legal system both 
reinforced and upheld his racialization. Furthermore, the confiscation order reveals more clues 
on how the judicial process may have unfolded. For instance, the alcohol that was found in his 
possession may have also been used as evidence against Groslouis in his trial, and perhaps this 
concrete proof of his guilt is what convinced him to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.  
While most cases involving Indian Act violations were brought forward by state actors, 
there were two instances in which a member of the reserve filed charges against other Wendat 
men. On May 30th, 1938, Jules Sioui, from the “Village Huron”, accused Maurice Bastien, the 
Indian agent of the Wendat reserve, of “Infrac[tion] à la Loi des Indiens, 3 chefs.”140 According 
to an article published in Le Soleil on June 11th, the plaintiff alleges that, on May 23rd, Bastien 
violated the Indian Act during the Wendat elections because “[il] ne s’était pas tenu au bureau 
durant les heures spécifiés par la loi et [qu’]il avait accepté la candidature de J.H Vincent, 
comme grand-chef et de Maurice Picard, Mathieu Bastien et Emery Sioui, comme sous-chefs, 
alors qu’ils n’étaient pas des Indiens.”141 After the formal complaint was filed, Bastien turned 
himself in and he appeared before the Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier on June 3rd.142 Though 
the plumitif indicates that he entered a plea, the writing is illegible, however, a preliminary 
inquiry was scheduled for June 10th, which indicates that he pled not guilty.143 When they 
reconvened, Sioui’s lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, spoke on his client’s behalf asking for “[…] la 
permis[sion] d’abandonner la […] plainte”, and five days later, on June 15th, Judge Fortier 
decided to grant this motion.144  
Unlike the plaintiffs in the other cases that involve Indian Act violations, Jules Sioui is 
the only Indigenous person to file this type of complaint. One the one hand, this case reinforces 
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the idea that Aboriginal peoples were not passive victims of colonialism; rather, they chose to 
actively engage in the justice system on their own terms. This is seen most clearly in Sioui’s 
decision to file a complaint against a state official and bring his grievance before a court of 
law.145 While this reflects a certain level of agency, it is also the result of his prominent status in 
the Wendat community as a political activist. In fact, throughout the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, Sioui 
became known as a fierce proponent of Indigenous self-determination and openly opposed the 
federal government’s paternalistic approach by writing petitions to the Department of Indian 
Affairs (DIA), organizing meetings with other Aboriginal chiefs and community leaders, and 
travelling to Ottawa on several occasions.146 As such, his status as a well-known political activist 
made him more informed than most about the workings of the law. On the other hand, this case 
also sheds light on how colonialism and state intervention limited one’s agency. According to the 
plumitif, Sioui’s lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, on behalf of his client, asked that all charges be 
dropped against the accused.147 Unfortunately, no explanation was given, however, an article 
published in Le Soleil on June 11th reveals a possible reason behind this request. For instance, the 
article explained that during Bastien’s trial “le département des Affaires Indienne d’Ottawa émit 
l’opinion que l’article du code criminel invoqué ne s’appliquait pas en cas de différend 
Indien.”148 Based on the department’s involvement in this case, on behalf of their employee, it is 
possible that the state’s decision to intervene influenced Sioui’s decision to withdraw his 
complaint against Bastien. Therefore, while in theory Sioui’s knowledge of the law and his 
political status may have given him an important advantage over others, in practice, this case 
clearly demonstrates that his agency was constrained by the colonial framework in which he 
lived. 
Four months later, on September 26th, 1938, Jules Sioui was once again in a Québec City 
courtroom after he accused a second community member, Narcisse Savard, of “Infraction à La 
Loi des Indiens”. 149 The hearing began seven days later, on October 3rd, and when the 
Honourable Judge Hugues Fortier, asked Savard to enter his plea, the accused, accompanied by 
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his lawyer, Maître J. Blais, pled not guilty.150 Judge Fortier released Savard on a promise to 
appear and the case was adjourned. On October 17th, the case continued; all parties were present 
before the Honourable Judge T. Tremblay, and Sioui’s lawyer, Charles Dorion, presented his 
evidence against Savard before the court session ended and the case was rescheduled.151 When 
the court reconvened on October 20th, Savard’s lawyer “[a] présente verbalement une motion 
demandant le renvoi des procédures”.152 After this motion was submitted, Judge Tremblay 
adjourned for the day and on October 21st, he accepted the motion and the case was dismissed.153  
Similar to Sioui’s previous encounter with the legal system, this case also demonstrates 
his knowledge of the law as a tool of social regulation. In fact, an article published in Le Soleil 
on October 4th, 1938 demonstrates that not only was Sioui aware of the Indian Act’s existence, 
but he also knew how to use it against other Indigenous people. For example, according to this 
piece, “M. Savard a été traduit devant le magistrat pour répondre à une accusation assez spéciale. 
Durant les six mois qui ont précédé le 26 septembre dernier, il aurait résidé au village huron de la 
région Québécoise sans avoir obtenu l’autorisation nécessaire.”154 Unfortunately, neither the 
plumitif nor the newspaper explicitly mention which part of the Indian Act Savard was accused 
on contravening. However, based on the wording in the article, this charge likely refers to section 
33, which stipulates that “No person, or Indian other than an Indian of the band, shall without the 
authority of the Superintendent General, reside or hunt upon, occupy or use any of the land or 
mash, or reside upon or occupy any road, or allowance for road, running through any reserve 
belonging to or occupied by such band.”155 As a result, it is clear that Sioui used this provision of 
the Indian Act against Savard with the goal of regulating who was – and by extension, who was 
not – allowed to reside on the reserve. 
In conjunction with the racialization that was deeply embedded in the criminal court 
system through the Indian Act, the language barrier between state officials and Indigenous 
offenders exacerbated the growing challenges associated with navigating the legal system. While 
a significant portion of the current scholarship examines this issue within the healthcare system, 
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it is equally important to analyze how the lack of familiarity with legal terminology impacted 
Indigenous offenders’ encounter with the judicial system.156 While the question on the language 
barrier can be applied to a majority of my court cases, Genest v. Sioui (1923) and Dion v. Picard 
(1919) provide concrete examples of the language barrier between the Wendat and the legal 
system, and its potential impact in the courtroom. According to the case file, the Honourable 
Judge Arthur Lachance stated that he explained the pending charges against Sioui. For example, 
he wrote “je lui ai expliqué la substance de l’accusation portée contre lui […]”157 On the one 
hand, this gives the impression that, in theory, Sioui was given a clear and thorough explanation 
of the charges brought up against him. However, because the case file does not include a detailed 
description of the judge’s explanation, there is no way to know what was actually said to him. 
On the other hand, even if this legal explanation was given to him, it is unknown whether or not 
Sioui actually understood what was said. As such, it is impossible to know for certain if he knew 
what he was admitting to when he entered his guilty plea to Judge Lachance. This is not to say 
that because of his Indigenous identity, Sioui did not understand French. Rather, this line of 
inquiry questions to what extent Sioui genuinely understood what he was pleading guilty to and 
the consequences of his declaration of guilt. Therefore, Sioui’s unfamiliarity with legal 
terminology would have given the prosecutor an advantage over him. If this is so, it clearly 
contradicts the image of a fair and impartial judicial system. 
Moreover, the court documents that describe Narcisse Picard’s encounter with the justice 
system in 1919 call into question his level of comprehension in relation to the legal process. For 
instance, on the “Cautionnement” form, Picard’s name is written at the bottom of the page, but it 
is not his signature. Instead, there is an “x” in between both his first and last names, and right 
above his name, it says “sa marque” in the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette’s 
handwriting to indicate that Picard signed the document with an ‘x’.158 This example creates 
some doubt on whether or not Picard understood the gravity of the situation and its potential 
consequences. Although illiteracy was widespread at the time and does not necessarily indicate a 
lack of experience in legal matters, this example does suggest that perhaps Picard possessed a 
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basic knowledge of the Canadian court system. Thus, it is certainly possible that he did not 
completely understand what he was signing. Nevertheless, this line of inquiry speaks to the 
power imbalance between the state and its legal actors vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples, and the 
former’s ability to potentially manipulate and take advantage of the latter’s unfamiliarity with the 
system. 
The court cases analyzed in this chapter make it clear that a majority of the racialization 
experienced by the Wendat was not visible. In fact, out of the sixteen159 cases that were 
analyzed, only one, Dion v. Picard (1919), exhibited clear signs of racialization. For every other 
case in this collection, it occurred in more subtle ways because it was deeply embedded in the 
legal system. Consequently, racialization manifested itself in the types of crimes the Wendat 
were charged with and their subsequent unequal treatment before the law. In the first part of this 
chapter, a total of nine cases were used to analyze the different ways in which the Canadian 
government’s social and moral regulation strategies resulted in the racialization of the Wendat 
before the law. In particular, I examined how the Indian Act’s alcohol ban on Indigenous peoples 
was an integral part of social and moral regulation. The importance of alcohol restriction as a 
strategy for moral regulation is reflected in the court cases. According to my findings, seven of 
these nine cases included alcohol related infractions. In addition, of these seven, 5 were 
complaints brought forward by state institutions such as Québec’s liquor commission and 
officers from the RCMP, and only one did not result in a conviction. This clearly reflects how 
various government agencies worked together to enforce moral regulations against the Wendat. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that all nine defendants were men and there was only one 
female plaintiff, Dame Ludivine Dion. Based on this information, it appears that Wendat men 
were likely to be charged for violating the alcohol ban than their female counterparts. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that Wendat women were not racialized under the Indian Act’s 
alcohol ban. Rather, it could reflect how, in general, criminal courts tend to deal more with men 
than women. 
In the second section of this chapter, I drew from seven cases to examine how the Indian 
Act was used as a pretext to bring the Wendat into contact with the criminal justice system. In 
turn, increasing the chances of the Wendat encountering the legal system for behaviors that were 
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not criminalized under the Criminal Code. Similar to the first part of this chapter, Wendat men 
make up the majority of those accused of violating the Indian Act. Out of the seven cases that 
contravened the Loi des Indiens, there were six male defendants, and of those six, four were 
Wendat; three lived on the reserve and one resided in the city of Loretteville. This finding is 
significant because, based on this study, it appears as though Wendat men were the ones being 
charged under the Indian Act. However, this could be due to the fact that Wendat women are 
disproportionately underrepresented in criminal courts; according to my case study, only one was 
charged for contravening the Indian Act. Again, this does not mean that they were not arrested 
and tried for Indian Act violations. Similar to the cases I examined in the first section, infractions 
related to the act were mostly brought forward by state officials who enforced government 
regulations. In fact, five of the seven cases were brought to the court by members of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, and of these five, three involved Wendat defendants. What is most 
interesting about this is the 100 percent conviction rate. While there are a number of possibilities 
that could explain this such as the defendant’s plea during the preliminary hearing, the 
prosecutor’s arguments, and the strength of the evidence presented at trial, it demonstrates the 
likelihood of conviction for cases brought forward by state officials. Finally, it is interesting that 
two of these seven cases were filed by a Wendat, Jules Sioui, which not only showcases his 









Chapter 3: Interpersonal Relationships 
 
As colonial empires expanded deeper into Aboriginal peoples’ territories, so too did colonial 
law. Initially, the law focused on adjudicating crimes amongst colonizers and between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. However, extending the rule of law to encompass other 
types of crimes became increasingly important as settlers sought to create permanent settlements 
by establishing a “legally structured society.”1 A significant part of this judicial expansion 
included the desire to bring inter se crimes – crimes committed between members of the 
colonized population – under the purview of colonial law. Over the years, a number of scholars 
such as Hamar Foster, Mark Walters, and Sidney Harring, have contributed to this field of study. 
In fact, the overarching theme in the scholarship focuses on the challenges nineteenth-century 
colonial officials faced when trying to incorporate Indigenous peoples within their judicial 
frameworks. Foster, for instance, examines the different ways state officials in British North 
America sought to extend their legal jurisdiction beyond Rupert’s Land. More specifically, he 
argues that the Canada Jurisdiction Act of 1803 and the 1821 Regulation of the Fur Trade Act 
did not establish legal authority in the west due to a lack of judicial institutions and no real effort 
to apply these laws to Indigenous peoples in the area.2 In other words, the legal measures that 
were introduced did not produce uncontested jurisdiction, which resulted in the Crown’s inability 
to make their presence felt in the prairies. That being said, Foster explores the gaps between 
officials in Upper Canada and the lived realities on the ground out west. For instance, even 
though the 1821 act granted the Crown the ability to administer legal proceedings for civil and 
criminal transgressions in Rupert’s Land and beyond, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) 
employees, whom they relied on to implement these laws, believed that “its law enforcement 
obligations did not apply to offences committed among Indians […]”3 As such, inter se crimes, 
especially those that occurred outside HBC territory, were rarely brought to the attention of 
colonial officials in the Province of Canada, thereby limiting the legal reach of British 
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authorities. Nevertheless, extending the rule of law to Indigenous peoples and lands remained a 
growing concern in the Canadas. But without concrete means to do so, Canadian officials had 
few options. Thus, Foster suggests that part of the colonial strategy involved giving the HBC 
loosely defined authority over Aboriginal peoples until state officials were in a position to extend 
their legal jurisdiction beyond current territorial boundaries.4 As a result, it was only after the 
creation of the Dominion of Canada followed by the country’s purchase of Rupert’s Land from 
the HBC in 1869 that state officials were finally in a position to implement concrete measures to 
extend their legal jurisdiction.  
 Similar to Foster, Walters examines the challenging situation colonial officials 
encountered when trying to determine the legal status of First Nations in British North America. 
In particular, he argues against the notion that the 1822 R. v. Shawanakiskie case laid the 
groundwork for inter se crimes being subject to colonial law.5 Drawing from documents that he 
maintains were misinterpreted, he argues that this case “did not deny native jurisdiction over 
internal native matters, nor did it subject natives to colonial criminal jurisdiction in all cases.”6 
Indeed, under certain circumstances, crimes committed between Indigenous peoples did not 
automatically fall under the colony’s legal jurisdiction. To illustrate these challenges more 
clearly, Walters deconstructs the wording used in the English laws that were introduced in the 
colony. For example, he argues that not only were English statutes written in broad terms with no 
explicit exemption for Indigenous peoples and their lands, but First Nations living in unceded 
territories continued to practice their customary laws with minimal interference from officials on 
the ground.7 In fact, he believes that this inability to get involved stemmed from the realization 
that before British authority could be properly established on the frontier, Aboriginal lands had 
to be ceded to the Crown.8 According to Walters, what makes R. v. Shawanakiskie (1822-1826) 
case different was the fact that the murder of an Indigenous woman by an Ottawa man occurred 
on ceded and settled Crown lands.9 As such, the Crown was able to successfully claim legal 
jurisdiction over the area, and thus, the right to put the accused on trial, where he was eventually 
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found guilty of capital murder.10 Therefore, while the Crown did indeed struggle to extend their 
legal reach into other parts of Indigenous lands, it was easier to justify their legal presence in 
areas where permanent settlements were already established. However, Walters demonstrates 
that the Crown’s opinion was not shared by everyone. In fact, in a case report submitted by 
Justice William Campbell to Lieutenant Governor, Peregrine Maitland, the judge stated that 
“[…] Indians of this Country are in no case amenable to our Laws, being exempted therefrom by 
Treaty […].” As such, he asked the Governor to overturn Shawanakiskie’s conviction.11 Thus, 
Walters illustrates that colonial officials were clearly not unanimous when deciding whether or 
not crimes committed between Indigenous peoples should fall under colonial law.  
 Building off Foster and Walters, Harring examines how Canadian criminal law was 
applied to Indigenous people during the early years of state formation. More specifically, 
Harring argues against the idea of liberal treatment of First Nations by demonstrating that 
Canada consistently denied Aboriginal peoples their basic rights.12 Part of his analysis focuses 
on how state officials in the Province of Canada dealt with inter se crimes at a time when 
extending their legal reach to the frontier presented significant challenges. For instance, Harring 
maintains that, depending on the types of social relationships that existed on the ground, there 
were two sets of laws; one that applied to offences committed within the reach of British 
authorities and another for inter se crimes that took place on Indigenous lands.13 As a result, if 
crimes between Aboriginal peoples occurred where the presence of colonial officials was 
minimal, it was harder to enforce colonial law. Exacerbating this issue was the gap between state 
officials in the east and those in other parts of the country. For example, judicial discretion gave 
judges the ability to dismiss cases without having to justify their decisions.14 Therefore, judges 
had a significant amount of leeway when it came to trying cases, which sometimes contradicted 
state officials in the Canadas. Furthermore, Harring also examines the socio-legal implications of 
applying Canadian criminal law to Indigenous peoples by analyzing a series of wendigo killings 
that came to the attention of Canadian authorities at the turn of the twentieth century.15 On the 
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one hand, similar to Foster and Walters, the author uses these examples to illustrate the 
challenges colonial officials faced when trying to implement the rule of law. In particular, he 
focuses on the traditional legal framework of the Ojibwa-Cree and the deeply embedded 
religious and spiritual codes of conduct that sought to resolve internal disputes.16 On the other 
hand, these examples reflect the extent of state expansion Post-Confederation and the act of legal 
imperialism.17 Thus, state officials’ intrusion into First Nations’ legal and spiritual worlds was 
part of the way in which they bolstered their colonial authority.  
Evidently, colonialism was indeed something that was done to Indigenous peoples, which 
had a devastating impact on communities in North America – and in other parts of the world. For 
instance, the destruction caused by the introduction of European diseases to the continent, the 
estimated numbers of Indigenous peoples who perished since contact, and the intergenerational 
trauma caused by the legacy of Residential Schools are well documented. As Foster, Walters, 
and Harring demonstrate, however, Indigenous peoples were not passive victims of colonialism. 
Rather, they also had a level of agency; especially when it came to negotiating and renegotiating 
their role in terms of the new colonial order and deciding which elements of European culture to 
adopt or disregard.18 Therefore, although colonialism impacted the dynamics between settlers 
                                                          
wendigo acts erratically and becomes fuelled by greed and an insatiable appetite for human flesh. Moreover, if left 
to its own devices, the condition could worsen, and the wendigo could transform into a beast-like creature. Given 
that a wendigo poses a significant threat to the local community, the Algonquian would kill them. When placing 
these instances into the larger context of law and colonialism, the four wendigo killings that Harring discusses are 
significant because, on the one hand, they shed light on the legal worlds of the Cree, Saulteaux, and Ojibwa. (237) 
More specifically, these court cases coupled with the fact that community members openly spoke about these 
killings demonstrate that punishing a wendigo with death was viewed as an appropriate way of keeping the 
community safe. (237) On the other hand, the arrest, trial, and conviction of the men accused of killing a wendigo is 
also a reflection of legal imperialism and the desire of the Canadian state to bring colonial law to the frontier. (237) 
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(1990) aims to deconstruct the narrative that paints First Nations as passive victims of colonialism, rather than active 
historical agents who engaged with the colonial system. Miller argues that the implementation of Canada’s 
nineteenth century assimilationist policies such as the ones that implemented cultural bans, the Pass System and 
Residential Schools were weakened by Indigenous peoples’ acts of resistance, thereby rendering government 
initiatives less effective. However, Miller’s sole focus on Aboriginal agency as acts of resistance appears to cast 
aside the devastating impact of colonialism, especially in relation to the Residential School system. For example, 
Miller argues that even though Residential Schools were designed with a “totalitarian and assimilative spirit”, it 
“never reached more than a minority of young Indians and Inuit.” (396) Although this is true, it does not negate the 
fact that this experience had a profound effect on the lives of those who were swept up in the Residential School 







and First Nations, the latter continued to actively engage in the colonial system. But, a number of 
historians, such as Robin Brownlie and Mary-Ellen Kelm caution against focusing solely on 
Indigenous peoples’ agency and acts of resistance. In particular, they argue that this analytical 
lens can lead some scholars to “go beyond the argument for the recognition of Native agency to 
one that uses evidence of Native resilience and strength to soften, and at times to deny, the 
impact of colonialism, and thus, implicitly, to absolve its perpetrators.”19 As such, they maintain 
that it is important not to remove Aboriginal peoples’ agency from the colonial context that 
simultaneously shaped and restricted their actions. Among those who Brownlie and Kelm 
believe have erroneously applied this analytical framework is historian J.R. Miller. In his work, 
Miller states that he is skeptical about the effectiveness of Canada’s nineteenth century 
assimilationist policies.20 For example, when assessing the impact of the cultural ban on 
Indigenous peoples, Miller argued that while some would “wait until the Indian agent was not 
expecting a dance and then hold it” others chose “ […] to seek informal approval for a modified 
version of their forbidden dance […]”21 Although their ability to adapt to these conditions 
demonstrates a certain level of agency, Miller’s focus on their behaviours as acts of resistance 
fails to take into consideration that these actions occurred within a colonial structure that limited 
their ability to respond and react. Therefore, as emphasized by Brownlie and Kelm, it is vital to 
strike a balance between emphasizing Indigenous agency and acknowledging the ways in which 
it was limited by colonialism.  
With this in mind, this chapter explores both the legal ramifications of colonization on 
First Nations across Canada and the role of Indigenous peoples as active historical agents who 
navigated the colonial world. More specifically, I seek to balance recognizing the law as a tool of 
colonial control that was implemented by the state while acknowledging that, at the same time, 
the Wendat saw it as a forum in which they could possibly find redress for injustices committed 
against them or resolve conflicts occurring within their own communities. As such, this chapter 
builds on the existing scholarship of law and colonialism and Aboriginal agency by exploring the 
different ways the Wendat interacted with the legal system. I argue that Wendat men and women 
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engaged with the justice system in three important ways; to mediate internal tensions, resolve 
intimate disputes between spouses, and settle conflicts with non-community members. Organized 
thematically, this chapter is divided into three main sections and examines a total of eleven 
cases, including the 1939 dispute between Pierre-Albert Picard and Jules Sioui, which to my 
knowledge, never made it to court. In the first section, I focus on internal conflicts by examining 
the different ways three members of Wendat society engaged with the court system to resolve 
tensions between community members. More specifically, I frame this analysis within traditional 
Wendat conflict resolution methods to illustrate how the plaintiffs adapted to the expectations of 
this colonial institution. In the second part of this chapter, the focus shifts to domestic disputes 
with a thorough examination of Wendat spouses. In particular, I analyze how three women and 
one man engaged with the legal system to hold their partners accountable to them and their 
families. Finally, I conclude with an in-depth analysis of two cases involving one Wendat man 
and woman who sought to resolve their conflicts with non-community members through legal 
intervention. 
Based on my research, the final two cases I examined in the previous chapter were not 
the only ones in which a Wendat filed a complaint against another member of the reserve. In 
fact, Wendat men who held positions of power with a significant amount of influence on the 
community also used the legal system as a means to resolve internal conflicts. Among them was 
Chief Ovide Sioui. On April 16th, 1920, Ovide Sioui, who is described in the case file as “grand 
chef de la tribu Huronne, de Loretteville”, filed two separate complaints against Michel Sioui.22 
Appearing before the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette, Ovide Sioui declared in 
his first statement that “le six avril 1920, […] Michel Sioui, étant un sauvage faisant parti de la 
tribu huronne de Lorette ayant été requis pas le plaignant […] de cesser de faire usage et 
d’occuper pour les fins de déposer son bois, un chemin ou route de la réserve, a illégalement 
manqué de se conformer à l’injonction susdite.”23 As such, Ovide Sioui requested that Michel 
Sioui be charged for “refus de se conformer à un ordre”.24 After signing Ovide Sioui’s statement, 
Judge Choquette did not issue an arrest warrant. Instead, the accused appeared before the court 
on his own and was let go on a promise to appear for his next court date, which was scheduled 
                                                          









three days later.25 When the proceedings resumed on April 19th, Michel Sioui pled not guilty 
when asked by the presiding judge to enter his plea, and the trial was set to begin in five days. 
Unfortunately, the case file does not include any information about what was said during the 
trial, however, it contains a list of witnesses who testified at Michel Sioui’s trial: Maurice 
Bastien, Joseph Samuel Picard, Ludger Bastien, Adilard Lavoeau, and Charles Gros Louis.26 
After the trial ended, Judge Choquette rendered his verdict on May 4th, where he found Michel 
Sioui guilty “pour avoir obstrué le chemin d’un passage public” and sentenced him to either pay 
a $5 fine plus applicable fees for a total of $45.27 However, should he be unable to do so, Sioui 
would have to serve fifteen days in jail.28 The following day, Michel Sioui paid the total fine of 
$35.75 and the matter was settled.29  
That same day, the Grand Chief of the Wendat, Ovide Sioui, filed a second complaint 
against Michel Sioui as part of the earlier incident; this time, naming the accused’s wife, Eugénie 
Beaumont, as a co-defendant.30 Having accused the couple of “voies de fait”, Ovide Sioui 
described in his written statement that “le quinzième d’avril 1920, à Loretteville, sur la réserve 
huronne […] Michel Sioui et son épouse, née Beaumont ont illégalement menacé de violence, 
assailli, frappé, et autrement maltraité le plaignant susdit”.31 After accepting Ovide Sioui’s 
statement, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued a warrant for the couple’s 
arrest, and later that day, both Michel Sioui and his wife, were taken into custody.32 It is not clear 
if the couple appeared together or separately before the judge, but the two defendants pled not 
guilty.33 After they entered their plea, both of them were granted a conditional release pending 
their next court date.34 As part of their release, Michel Sioui and his wife were placed into the 
custody of her father, Pierre, on a promise to appear in court on April 24th, but should they fail to 
do so, Pierre would be liable for a $100 surety.35 On April 24th, for reasons that are not 
mentioned in the case file, Michel Sioui and his wife changed their plea to guilty.36 Following 
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their admission of guilt, the judge accepted their statements and he sentenced them both to pay a 
$5 fine plus applicable fees.37 After the verdict was rendered, the couple paid a $20 deposit, and 
by May 5th, the remaining balance of $28.20 was paid.38 
These two cases stand out because of what they can tell us about how Wendat chiefs used 
the legal system to resolve internal conflicts within their community. Unlike the other cases I 
analyze in this chapter, they are the only ones to list a Wendat leader as a plaintiff. This 
demonstrates that all levels of Wendat society, including those who held important positions of 
power within the community, engaged with the judicial system to a certain extent. Therefore, 
Chief Sioui seems to have treated this institution as a valid option to resolve disputes with 
members of his community.39 Moreover, the circumstances that led Ovide Sioui to file a 
complaint against Michel Sioui indicate that bringing this incident to court was part of the 
resolution process. For example, in his first written statement, Ovide Sioui revealed that the 
reason both parties came before the court was because Michel Sioui refused to respect the 
injunction that ordered him to stop using a reserve road as a place to dispose of his wood.40 
Based on that information, it appears that Ovide Sioui viewed the Canadian legal system as the 
next logical step in resolving a dispute since a legal intervention through the form of an 
injunction had already been issued.  
Furthermore, a letter from the local Indian Agent, Maurice Bastien, who was also called 
to testify in this case, reveals that Chief Sioui and the band council collaborated with colonial 
institutions. For instance, after the injunction was issued, the band council gave the accused eight 
days to remove his barn because it was located on a road belonging to the reserve.41 In turn, this 
illustrates that council members played a critical role in enforcing legal measures within the 
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boundary of the reserve. And, should the defendant not comply, there would be important legal 
repercussions. For instance, in his letter to the accused, Bastien mentions that “tout refus de votre 
part de y conformer, sera reconnu comme infraction à la loi et fautif d’amende suite à la loi des 
Sauvages.”42 On the one hand, this letter is stating that should Michel Sioui refuse to comply 
with the injunction, he would be subject to two laws: the Criminal Code and the “loi des 
Sauvages.”43 Thus, similar to the seven Loi des Indiens cases I analyzed in the previous chapter, 
the Indian Act functioned as another form of law to bring Michel Sioui – and other Wendat – into 
the criminal justice system. On the other hand, this letter also reveals that as leader of the 
Wendat, Chief Sioui, used all the methods at his disposal, including colonial institutions such as 
the legal system and the Department of Indian Affairs, to pressure the defendant to abide by 
reserve rules. Chief Sioui’s decision to bring this matter before the courts and force one of his 
people to follow his demands is in sharp contrast to the historical role of a traditional Wendat 
chief. According to Wendat historian Georges Sioui, although chiefs represented the voice and 
soul of their people, they did not have complete authority over them and therefore, could not 
unilaterally impose their will.44 Instead, their position was earned through great personal 
sacrifice and maintained through mutual respect and friendship with the people they 
represented.45  
However, colonialism reshaped the power dynamics between community members as the 
legal system now became a tool that could be used to bolster the authority of the chief. In fact, 
for those elected after the federal government introduced the triennial electoral system in 1899, 
which essentially replaced traditional chiefs with elected band councils based on the principles of 
the Euro-Canadian political system, this was particularly beneficial.46 In their case, the law could 
be used as a strategy to persuade the community to recognize their authority. For example, 
according to an article published in Le Soleil on February 11th, 1920, shortly after Sioui was 
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elected chief, the election was declared null and void “par suite de certaines irrégularités de sorte 
que les sauvages de la réserve huronne de Lorette sont obligés de reprendre l’affaire en entier, et 
de relancer dans une nouvelle campagne électorale.”47 Even though Sioui won the election that 
took place the following week on February 18th, it is certainly possible that his decision to bring 
Michel Sioui to court for refusing to abide by an injunction and for assaulting him was shaped by 
his desire to both strengthen and legitimize his authority over the community. As such, this case 
reinforces my main argument that Indigenous peoples engaged with colonial institutions under 
different circumstances and when it was in their interest to do so.  
Chief Ovide Sioui was not the only Wendat man in a position of power to interact with 
colonial institutions. In fact, other members of the community, some of whom belonged to 
prominent families, also reached out to the legal system to mediate internal conflicts. On May 
23rd, 1938, Ludger Bastien, a resident of Loretteville, accused Jules Sioui from the “Village 
Huron” of libel.48 After accepting Bastien’s complaint, the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy issued 
a warrant for Sioui’s arrest; that same day, Sioui was apprehended and when asked to enter his 
plea, the defendant pled not guilty and the preliminary hearing was scheduled for eight days 
later.49 On May 31st, all parties were present including Bastien and his attorney, Maître Philippe 
Ferland, as well as Sioui who was accompanied by his lawyers Maîtres Jean Lesage and C. N. 
Dorion.50 According to the plumitif, the trial went on for several months and included a 
significant amount of back and forth between the lawyers on both sides; in fact, multiple 
subpoenas were issued from the plaintiff and the defence.51 Finally, on November 5th, the 
Honourable Judge Cannon found Sioui guilty and sentenced him to one month in prison.52 
However, it was only on November 23rd that a warrant for his imprisonment was issued and 
Sioui was escorted to the local jail to serve out his sentence.53 By December 3rd, Sioui and his 
lawyers filed an appeal but on February 1st, 1939, the Court of Appeal refused to hear it because 
it was not filed on time and, as such, Judge Cannon’s decision stood.54  
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Although the plumitif does not go into detail about this case, the coverage it received in 
the local newspaper, Le Soleil, fills in many of the gaps. By combining the information from 
both sources, Bastien v Sioui (1938) sheds light on how a Wendat man from a prominent family 
used the Canadian justice system to resolve an internal conflict and restore his reputation. 
Bastien’s testimony, in which he addressed the personal and professional allegations made 
against him in an article published by Sioui on April 28th, served as an important legal strategy to 
correct the information that was circulating about him.55 For example, when Sioui’s lawyer, 
Maître C. N. Dorion, asked Bastien to confirm his place of birth, he testified under oath that he 
was born within the existing boundaries of the reserve.56 Evidently, his response to this question 
was to dispel any notion that Bastien was not who he claimed to be. Furthermore, Bastien used 
his testimony to highlight his connection to the community. For instance, Bastien explained that 
although he no longer lived on the reserve, he actively participated in community affairs by 
voting in band elections.57 On the one hand, Bastien’s decision to emphasize this point 
demonstrates that he felt a deep attachment to his community, despite not living there. On the 
other hand, his willingness to use the court system against another Wendat in order to defend his 
reputation is ironic given that his testimony focused on the ongoing connections he felt to the 
community and its members. 
In addition, Bastien also used the trial as an opportunity to change the narrative about him 
and his family by calling upon numerous individuals to serve as character witnesses. Among 
them was Grand Chief Herménégilde Vincent, who testified that “la famille Bastien était l’une 
des plus distinguées de Lorette”, and that, to his knowledge, since Bastien entered politics in 
1923, “aucune plainte n’avait été portée [contre lui]”.58 The decision to have Chief Vincent 
testify as a character witness proved to be an effective legal strategy because given his position 
of authority in the community, it is evident that his opinion of Bastien and his family would be 
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taken into consideration. This view of the Bastien family was reinforced by the testimony of 83-
year-old Raphael Dumont. According to Dumont, Bastien was “le meilleur citoyen du village.”59 
Similar to Chief Vincent, the testimony of a respected elder would have definitely carried a 
significant amount of weight during this trial. Therefore, it is not surprising that both Chief 
Vincent and Dumont were summoned to the court to testify on behalf of Bastien and his family.  
Along with examining Bastien’s journey through the legal system, it is equally important 
to take into consideration the circumstances that led him to seek redress through the Canadian 
court system rather than traditional Wendat conflict resolution. On the one hand, it is possible 
that after years of contact with European settlers and increasing state intrusion, traditional 
conflict resolution methods had eroded to the point where they were no longer a viable option to 
deal with internal disagreements. Historically, kinship ties founded on the principles of mutual 
respect, friendship, mediation, communication, and trust were woven into the social fabric of 
Wendat society as a way to prevent conflicts from escalating; this was rooted in the idea that clan 
membership and alliances operated as a system of conflict resolution that offered people a code 
of conduct for regulating disputes and social problems, thereby, reducing the chances of 
increased tension between community members.60 Although disagreements did occur, kinship 
ties acted as a social safeguard to avoid escalating conflicts. Furthermore, these values were 
deeply ingrained in Wendat law and manifested themselves through community building 
strategies. For instance, rather than using coercive authority like in Western systems of law, the 
Wendat resolved problems through gift-giving, negotiation, and consensus.61 In turn, this 
allowed clans to work together to resolve conflicts while maintaining friendships. However, 
colonialism gradually chipped away at these social bonds, in turn reducing the ability of 
traditional forms of conflict resolution to be utilized. Consequently, this forced the Wendat to 
turn to Canadian law.  
On the other hand, Bastien’s socio-economic status in the community coupled with his 
political connections may have also influenced his decision to resolve an internal conflict in the 
Canadian court system. To begin, Bastien was a well-established and well-respected 
businessman in the community. According to the testimony he provided during Sioui’s trial, 
Bastien is the current co-owner of the Bastien Bros leather goods company, which was originally 
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founded by his ancestor, Maurice E. Bastien in 1826.62 As the co-owner of a company, Bastien 
occupied a privileged position in the community that provided him with the opportunity to 
develop important relationships with other businessmen. Thus, it is possible Bastien chose to 
pursue legal action against Sioui because his allegations would have negatively impacted these 
relationships. Along with being a prominent entrepreneur, Bastien was also a politician with 
important political connections. For example, after years of serving as a member of the band 
council, Bastien was elected to the Quebec Legislative Assembly in 1924.63 After losing his re-
election in 1927, Bastien returned to local politics and two years later, he was elected grand chief 
of the Wendat in 1929.64 Evidently, Bastien’s long political career allowed him to familiarize 
himself with provincial and federal law and enabled him to establish friendships with men who 
held important positions of power. Given his knowledge of Canadian institutions, it is not 
surprising that Bastien chose to seek redress through the legal system. However, it is important 
to note that as a member of the prominent Bastien family and the son of former chief Maurice 
Sebastien, Ludger Bastien was able to access certain opportunities that would not be possible for 
other Wendat men and women born into less affluent families. Thus, while his accomplishments 
are very impressive, the socio-economic status he inherited from his family enabled him to 
pursue his personal and professional ambitions. 
 The vast majority of cases analyzed in this thesis focus on the part of the dispute that 
plays out in the courtroom. However, there is one incident involving the former chief and Indian 
agent of Lorette, Pierre-Albert Picard, whose situation provides a glimpse into how an 
interpersonal conflict may have unfolded prior to legal intervention. Between 1939 and 1940, 
Picard sent a number of letters to the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) in an effort to resolve a 
territorial dispute with another member of the reserve, Jules Sioui. In a letter he wrote to the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs on July 17th, 1939, Picard described how this conflict began and 
what he intended to do about it should it not be resolved quickly and efficiently. According to 
this letter, Picard stated that on July 14th, DIA inspector, M. Thibault, visited the reserve to 
inquire about the band council’s grievances on a number of issues, which included Sioui’s 
request to obtain a parcel of land that was currently owned by his mother, the widow of the late 
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Paul Picard.65 Although Pierre-Albert Picard was not present at the time of Thibault’s visit, he 
later found out that the council expressed their interest in giving into Sioui’s demands. However, 
he made it clear in his letter that as heir of the estate, he was completely opposed to this action 
since he possessed legal title to this land.66 For reasons that are not made clear in this letter, nor 
in subsequent ones, after Thibault’s visit, a decision was made by the DIA and Sioui was granted 
the piece of land he requested.67 In turn, this began a year-long conflict in which Picard 
frequently wrote letters to his former employers demanding they reverse their decision and return 
his father’s land to him.68 
To my knowledge, this case never made it to court; even so, it remains one of the most 
interesting cases in my study because of what it tells us about how disputes unfolded prior to 
being taken before a judge. First, Picard’s position as both the former chief and Indian agent of 
Loretteville influenced how this conflict played out from 1939 to 1940. For instance, Picard was 
appointed as the Indian agent on September 1st, 1929; a position he held for two years until he 
was relieved of his duties on February 21st, 1931 and replaced by Maurice Earl Bastien two 
months later on April 27th.69 As a result of his involvement in federal and local politics, Picard 
had access to the Canadian government, which allowed him to voice his concerns directly to the 
source. This can be seen by the number of letters he sent to the DIA. According to his personal 
records, between 1939 and 1940, Picard sent a total of six letters, including the first one he sent 
to voice his initial concerns over the plan to give Sioui his father’s land.70 Thus, his status as a 
former chief and employee of the DIA granted him a privilege that was not offered to other 
members of the community; that of directly communicating with the DIA. In addition to his 
successful professional life, Picard was also a member of a well-known Wendat family, which in 
turn, shaped his interaction with the Canadian government. In particular, he was the grandson of 
Chief Tahourenche, renamed François-Xavier Picard, who held this position from 1870 until his 
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death in 1883.71 The prestige attached to this status created a variety of opportunities for Picard, 
including the ability to be educated at the Séminaire de Québec, from which he graduated with a 
diploma in rhetoric in 1900.72 Therefore, Picard’s former position as chief and Indian agent 
coupled with his educational background allowed him to engage with the DIA; something that 
would not be possible for members of his community who did not have the same level of 
education or direct access to government officials.  
Moreover, Picard’s education and knowledge of rhetoric shaped his correspondence with 
the DIA and parliament officials. One strategy he used was to combine metaphors with 
references to the international conflict taking place in Europe at the same time in order to evoke 
a certain reaction from the recipients of his letters. For instance, when he referred to a similar 
dispute that occurred in 1910 between the band council and an unknown member of the reserve 
in a letter written on July 17th, 1939, Picard described the council as acting in a “dictatorial 
way.”73 On the one hand, this language demonstrates that Picard was aware of the global issues 
going on at this time such as Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. On the other hand, it also 
served to warn Canada and its officials against following the same path as countries that 
distorted the rule of law for their own personal gain. Picard reiterated the importance of 
protecting the values of truth, justice, and private property from misrepresentation in a letter 
written to Mr. Hugues Lapointe, a Member of Parliament, on May 8th, 1940. In this 
correspondence, he stated that “il faut nécessairement reconnaitre que la vérité a ses droits 
comme la justice a ses droits; et le Département a été odieusement trompé par la perfidie de son 
représentant à Lorette, puisque j’ai un droit indiscutable de propriété et d’occupation sur le dit lot 
de terre, selon la preuve faite. Laissons à Hitler son système répugnant.”74 Visibly frustrated with 
the DIA and their inability to quickly and efficiently resolve this dispute, Picard was appealing to 
the rule of law and the notion that governments, like all citizens, are subject to the law. 
Therefore, by using Hitler as an example, he was demonstrating his disappointment that the 
Canadian government and the DIA were acting like dictatorships by subverting the law for their 
own personal benefit instead of treating it as an objective set of principles by which all citizens 
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must abide by. Furthermore, Picard’s references to the rule of law were strategically employed to 
illicit a reaction from the reader. For instance, instead of framing his critique within traditional 
Wendat law, which was based on the principles of interpersonal autonomy and achieving 
consensus through negotiation, Picard chose to invoke the liberal values that purport to underpin 
the rule of law. Evidently, this was done with the purpose of appealing to the senses of the 
Canadian government and DIA officials whose institutions were founded on the values he used 
to plead his case.  
In addition, Picard used legal terminology and the threat of judicial intervention. He 
reinforces his point when he states that “every legal means will be made use of, against any 
encroachment of aforesaid property.”75 His focus on private property is very interesting, and 
there are a number of things that could explain it. First, given his French-Canadian education, it 
can be assumed that his interest in preserving his family’s property was influenced by his 
exposure to non-Indigenous culture and values, which included the importance of individual 
liberties and private property as markers of citizenship. Thus, it appears that, although Picard 
was Wendat, his way of thinking was deeply shaped by Western principles. Also, it is equally 
possible that Picard’s insistence to keep his father’s land was more personal as he sought to fulfil 
his father’s final wishes. Although he does not specifically mention that his father bequeathed 
this land to him in his will, he does state that he is the heir to the estate, which implies that he 
was the next of kin.76 Aware of his legal options, Picard invoked the possibility of bringing this 
matter to court on a couple of occasions. For instance, after months of corresponding with DIA 
officials, Picard sent a follow up letter to Lapointe on May 22nd, 1940. In this letter, he 
demanded that the department take responsibility for mistakenly giving Sioui his father’s land 
“sinon je demanderai justice devant la cour et dans ce cas j’aurai besoin de mon dossier.”77 Thus, 
it is evident by Picard’s statement that he is fully aware of his legal options, and as such, this 
knowledge assisted him in trying to reclaim his property. Unfortunately, however, the letters do 
not indicate whether or not the piece of land was ever given back to him. Nevertheless, Picard’s 
letters give us a glimpse into how a man from a well-known Wendat family used his education 
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and familiarity with Canadian bureaucracy to try and resolve a conflict he had with another 
community member. 
While Ovide Sioui, Ludger Bastien, and Pierre-Albert Picard used colonial institutions to 
mediate disagreements with their neighbours, others engaged with the system to resolve 
domestic disputes with their spouses. Out of the five cases I identified that involved a conflict 
between intimate partners, four were brought forward by Wendat women. From those four cases, 
three included women who charged their husbands with failure to provide the necessities of life 
and one of those three later accused her husband of attempted murder; only one case involved a 
husband filing a complaint against his wife. These findings are significant because the noticeable 
gendered division seems to be at odds with the patriarchal values enshrined in the Indian Act. On 
the one hand, this act granted male heads of households an enormous amount of economic, 
political, and social power over their wives and children, thereby rendering them dependent on a 
man’s good will. This new reality contradicted the Wendat’s matrilineal society in which clan 
mothers exercised a great deal of authority such as arranging marriages, regulating the wealth of 
their community, educating children, and negotiating peace and war.78 However, the patriarchal 
framework disrupted the Wendat’s traditional system, and as such, women were removed from 
these social connections. On the other hand, as we will see, these three Wendat women actively 
engaged with the colonial system to ensure their survival and hold their husbands accountable all 
while navigating a new colonial order that essentially excluded them from holding positions of 
power in their communities.79  
One of these women included Philomène Latulippe whose first interaction with the 
Canadian legal system demonstrates how this colonial institution was used by Wendat women 
who sought the help of the law to deal with their neglectful husbands. On April 24th, 1923, 
Latulippe filed a complainant against her husband, Napoléon Gignac, accusing him of “refus de 
pourvoir”.80 In her complaint, Latulippe stated that “son époux résident à Loretteville […] depuis 
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un an et auparavant, et encore actuellement refuse et néglige sans excuse légitime de pourvoir à 
ses besoins, la laissant par là, dans l’indigence et la nécessité.”81 That same day, the Honourable 
Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued an arrest warrant for Gignac and by May 3rd, the 
accused was apprehended and brought to court. Standing before the judge, Gignac pled not guilty 
and the trial was scheduled for May 11th.82 However, according to the court docket, neither the 
defendant, the plaintiff, nor their respective counsel were present that day. As such, the judge 
stated that evidence of Gignac’s alleged wrongdoing was insufficient, thus he concluded that “la 
plainte est renvoyée.”83  
This case is significant because it demonstrates the reasons why Wendat women engaged 
with colonial law. This is seen most clearly in the language that is used in Latulippe’s statement. 
For instance, according to her deposition, the plaintiff described that, as a result of Gignac’s 
neglect, she was living in poverty for over a year.84 On the surface, this explanation is 
straightforward; the plaintiff is providing a clear reason why she chose to file a complaint against 
her husband. However, I believe it is important to place this statement within its context, in 
particular the colonial institution and its underlying patriarchal principles. Traditionally, given 
that kinship ties were established through the female line, Wendat women were surrounded and 
supported by their kinfolk.85 As a result, women could rely on their social connections in times 
of need. With the introduction of patriarchal systems and the removal of Wendat women from 
positions of power, however, these connections were lost, and they were forced to turn to others 
for support. Thus, by employing this rhetoric that emphasizes her dependence on her partner, 
Latulippe was appealing to the patriarchal values that placed husbands as sole providers for their 
families and wives as economic dependants on their partners. In other words, Latulippe adapted 
to this system by using language that was meant to elicit a certain reaction; one that would view 
her husband’s transgressions and failure to provide for his spouse as going against the patriarchal 
norms at a time when the Wendat were pressured to conform to Western gender norms. 
Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why both Latulippe and her husband did not show up 
for court on May 11th. First, perhaps the couple chose to resolve their issues amongst themselves. 












In addition, it is also plausible that either one, or both, decided they did not want to invest their 
time and money on a process that would take place in a foreign institution and in a language they 
may not have been familiar with. This line of interpretation is supported by the fact that 
Latulippe did not write her own statement; instead, she described the events, someone else wrote 
it down, and she signed the document with the letter ‘x’.86  
 The following year, Philomène Latulippe and her husband, Napoléon Gignac, were once 
again in a Canadian courtroom. This time, however, the situation between them seemed to have 
escalated and the charges were a lot more serious. On July 14th, 1924, Latulippe filed a complaint 
against her spouse for “tentative de meurtre”.87 According to her statement, Latulippe described 
that “le douze Juillet 1924, dans la paroisse de Loretteville, […] son époux Napoléon Gignac, de 
Loretteville, a criminellement tenté de tuer et assassiner dame Philomène Latulippe […].”88 The 
case file does not indicate whether an arrest warrant was issued for the accused. However, it does 
reveal that Gignac appeared before the Honourable Judge Arthur Lachance the same day his wife 
accused him of attempted murder and that the presiding judge scheduled the preliminary hearing 
for July 17th.89 In the meantime, Gignac was “envoyé en prison sur mandat […]” until the start of 
the trial.90 That same day, Judge Lachance issued two separate subpoenas for a number of 
witnesses who were believed to have pertinent information regarding the events that unfolded 
between Latulippe and Gignac.91 Unfortunately, detailed witness testimony is not included in the 
case file, but based on the statement that was written and signed by Judge Lachance on 
November 4th, 1924, the trial lasted over four months and after all the witnesses testified, and 
when the judge asked the accused to enter his plea, Gignac pled not guilty.92 But, for reasons that 
are not explained in the case file, the defendant was convicted that same day and ordered to serve 
his sentence of an unknown length at a psychiatric hospital in Québec.93  
Whereas Latulippe v. Gignac (1923) sheds light on how the plaintiff navigated the legal 
system, the second case shifts the focus back to the state by examining their response to inter se 
crimes, especially ones of a violent nature. Indeed, this court case stands out from the rest of the 
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ones I examine in this chapter because it is one of the richest files. In fact, the magnitude of this 
case is clearly seen by the number of people who were involved in the court process and the 
traces they left behind in the form of letters, reports, notes, and transcripts. Aside from both 
parties and the presiding judge, witnesses, priests, medical professionals, and the couple’s 
children were all involved at different points throughout this process. In fact, as I stated 
previously, there were a number of witnesses who were called to testify at Gignac’s trial. For 
example, Madame Joseph Robitaille, Mr. Renaud, Alfred Gignac, and Mr. Auclair were among 
some of the individuals subpoenaed by the court.94 Unfortunately, some of their testimonies have 
been lost to history. But, the number of witnesses who were included in this trial reflects the 
complexity of this case. Among them were psychiatrists, who played a critical role in this 
process. For example, while the defendant was in jail awaiting trial, he was evaluated by Dr. Roy 
from the Hôpital St. Michel Archange on July 26th, 1924; in his letter to the Honourable Judge 
Philippe-Auguste Choquette, the psychiatrist concluded that “Napoléon Gignac est un aliéné et 
qu’il devrait être interné dans un Hôpital d’aliéné.”95 Not only did this expert witness testimony 
impact the judge’s decision to convict Gignac, but more importantly, it illustrates how different 
institutions coordinated their efforts to prosecute inter se crimes. Three years later, this 
collaboration between state officials continued. For instance, on August 17th, 1927, Dr. Roy sent 
another letter to the presiding judge based on his re-evaluation of Gignac. According to his most 
recent assessment, Dr. Roy states that Gignac “souffre évidement d’idées de persécution, 
orientées surtout, du côté de sa femme” and he recommends that, at the very least, the defendant 
should be placed in a long-term care facility for the elderly.96 While the amount of detail is truly 
impressive, it can almost certainly be explained by the violent nature of the crime that was 
committed and the need for the judicial system to treat this case with caution and precision. 
Thus, it is evident that, when it came to violent inter se crimes, collaboration between state 
institutions was an integral part of the judicial process. 
Along with the procedural information, the case file also provides personal details about 
the couple. For instance, we know that Latulippe is from Loretteville and she is listed as the 
“épouse commune en biens de Napoléon Gignac.”97 However, other than knowing where she 











resides and her relationship to the accused, the case file does not mention anything else about 
her. Based on the information that is in the file – or the lack thereof – it is possible that her dual 
identity as an Indigenous woman may be to responsible for this omission. First, it was fairly 
common for women to either be completely left out of court records or have little information 
written about them. Consequently, while the decision to exclude so much detail is not surprising, 
it requires a closer reading of the case file in order to make inferences that can be used to fill in 
some of those gaps. Moreover, along with identifying as a woman, Latulippe was also Wendat, 
and as such, her Indian status may have contributed to her marginalization. Although Latulippe is 
not listed as Indigenous, she would have automatically acquired Indian status through her 
marriage to Gignac because prior to 1985, it was passed down exclusively through the male line. 
Originally, this was enshrined in section 3 of the 1876 Indian Act – and upheld in subsequent 
amendments – that defined a legal “Indian” as “any male person of Indian blood reputed to 
belong to a particular band, any child of such person, and any woman who is or was lawfully 
married to such person.”98 As a result, this patriarchal model that was used to determine Indian 
status not only served to undermine the Wendat’s matrilineal system but it simultaneously 
resulted in Latulippe’s racialization as an Indigenous women. 
By contrast, the case file contains a lot more information about Gignac. In fact, even 
though it does not explicitly state that the defendant was Indigenous, I strongly believe that he 
was. For instance, Gignac and a few of his sons are listed as “tanneur de cuir”.99 This type of 
employment was not uncommon for Wendat men. In fact, starting in the mid-twentieth century 
and continuing throughout the 1920s, the reserve’s economy revolved around this manufacturing 
activity. As such, a number of tanneries were located on the reserve, which provided community 
members with important employment opportunities.100 Thus, it is plausible that Gignac was one 
of those Wendat men who was employed by a local tannery. Moreover, the strongest clue comes 
from the way he talks about hunting and its importance in his life during a 1927 interview with 
an unnamed medical professional. After the doctor informed him that he was here to inquire 
about whether or not he should send him to an insane asylum, Gignac stated that “je veux bien 
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allé au Sacré-Cœur ou à Beauport, mais qu’il me laisse faire la chasse.”101 Not only does this 
illustrate that Gignac was indifferent about going to the insane asylum, but it also highlights the 
cultural value and significance of hunting not only as an economic activity but as a Wendat 
tradition; one that would allow Gignac to maintain a link with his Wendat heritage. 
Aside from Philomène Latulippe, Dame Marguerite Burke also used the justice system to 
resolve an intimate dispute with her spouse. On July 22nd, 1925, Burke filed a complaint against 
her husband, Eugène Sioui, accusing him of “refus de pourvoir”.102 The same day the complaint 
was filed, Sioui was apprehended and appeared in court before an unknown judge.103 When 
asked to enter his plea, standing alongside his lawyer, F. Gosselin, Sioui pled not guilty and the 
trial date was set for July 30th.104 For reasons that were not mentioned in the plumitif, the trial 
began one day earlier than scheduled; nevertheless, the complainant was present with her three 
lawyers, Bernier, DeBilly, and Dorion, and the defendant appeared with his counsel.105 However, 
there is no information about what happened during the hearing. In fact, all we know is that a 
judgement was not rendered, and the case was adjourned.106 When the court resumed on August 
5th, Sioui was given a conditional sentence, and the matter was settled.107  
The marital dispute outlined in the plumitif was in sharp contrast to the romantic wedding 
ceremony described two years earlier in an article in Le Soleil on Wednesday August 1st, 1923. 
According to the writer, “la cérémonie eut lieu dans la pittoresque église huronne” with the 
young Irish bride wearing “une jolie robe” while the chiefs wore their “uniformes de gala, ainsi 
que leurs plumes.”108 While neither the plumitif nor the newspaper explain what happened 
between Burke and Sioui between then and now, this article certainly paints a very different 
picture of the couple. When combining the information from this article with what we know 
from the court case, this domestic conflict sheds light on how Wendat women used the judicial 
system to hold their partners accountable while also revealing the complex dynamics of spousal 
disputes. To begin, the court docket does not include Burke’s original statement, however, the 
crime she charged her husband with reveals possible clues about her reasons to file a complaint 
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against him. For instance, according to the plumitif, Burke accused Sioui of failure to provide.109 
Although I was unable to find the version of this law that was applicable at the time, it can be 
inferred that, more often than not, wives were financially dependent on their husbands, in turn, 
rendering them more vulnerable to economic hardships should their spouse refuse to support 
them. Thus, it is highly probable that, similar to Philomène Latulippe, Burke charged her 
husband with failure to provide because she relied on him financially and without his support, 
she was forced to live in poverty. Despite these financial hardships, the plumitif makes it clear 
that Burke was able to afford a lawyer. However, I do not believe that this calls into question the 
severity of her financial situation because although the plumitif does not indicate whether or not 
she lived on the reserve, it is possible that if she did, the lawyers may have been provided by the 
band’s funds. 
Ten years later, Wendat women continued to use the legal system as a way to resolve 
domestic disputes. On July 13th, Dame Valéda Marcotte, residing on the “Reserve Indienne de 
Loretteville”, filed a complaint in front of the Honourable Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick against her 
husband, Eugène-Abraham Sioui, also from the same reserve, accusing him of “refus de 
pourvoir”.110 After accepting her statement, the judge issued a warrant for Sioui’s arrest and 
three days later, he was apprehended and brought to the local courthouse. Accompanied by his 
lawyer, Maître Paul Lesage, Sioui stood before the Honourable Judge Laetare Roy and when 
asked to enter his plea, the accused pled not guilty.111 Following his statement, the presiding 
judge set the trial date for July 21st, and in the meantime, Sioui was granted a conditional release 
on a promise to appear in court.112 According to the plumitif, when court proceedings resumed 
on the 21st, all parties were present, which included Sioui and his lawyer, as well as Marcotte and 
her attorney, Maître Bienvenue.113 This marked the beginning of the trial, which lasted over four 
months. In fact, they reconvened a total of ten times before the Honourable Judge Arthur 
Fitzpatrick found Sioui guilty on September 3rd, 1936.114 For reasons that are not indicated in the 
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file, a sentencing hearing was scheduled two months later, and on November 24th, Judge 
Fitzpatrick issued a “sentence suspendue”.115 
Similar to Latulippe v. Gignac (1923) and Burke v. Sioui (1925), this case reinforces my 
argument that Wendat women engaged with the justice system to ensure their survival, voice 
their grievances, and hold their spouses accountable. First, like Burke, Marcotte’s original 
statement is not included in the plumitif, however, certain inferences can still be made. For 
example, based on the information that is available and the similarities between both cases, it can 
be assumed that Marcotte charged her husband with “refus de pourvoir” because his decision to 
stop providing her placed her in a very difficult financial situation.116 The circumstances that led 
Marcotte to be financially dependent on her partner are worth analyzing. The economic reality 
that Marcotte – and other Wendat women – lived through was significantly different from that of 
their ancestors. In matrilineal societies, people traced their descent through the female line and as 
a result, women were the social hubs of their communities. In fact, older women, or clan 
mothers, held important positions of power, which essentially allowed them to direct life in the 
longhouses they occupied by allocating resources to each family member.117 For example, at the 
end of the community’s seasonal harvest, all goods were given to clan mothers who then 
redistributed these resources to the members of their longhouses.118 Moreover, women’s roles 
were an important part of the community’s subsistence production. For instance, while men 
hunted, fished, and cleared the fields, women were responsible for growing maize, beans, and 
squash and picking fruit.119 As such, their work was valued because it formed an integral part of 
the community’s survival, in turn allowing them to be economically independent from their 
husbands. However, as previously stated, colonial policies coupled with pressure to conform to 
Western gender norms chipped away at Wendat women’s economic independence, thus making 
them dependent on their husbands. Furthermore, this case demonstrates that Wendat women’s 
interaction with the judicial system continued well into the following decade; thus, illustrating a 
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continuity throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This is significant because it sheds light on the role 
of the judicial system in Wendat women’s lives and their ability to access this institution.  
When it came to domestic disputes, my research revealed that the majority of plaintiffs 
were Wendat women. However, I found a court case where a Wendat man brought a complaint 
forward against his wife. On June 14th, 1926, Théophile Groslouis of Loretteville accused his 
wife, Angélina Garneau, also from Loretteville, of vagrancy.120 After accepting Groslouis’ 
statement, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued an arrest warrant for the 
complainant’s wife; the following day, the accused was apprehended and appearing before the 
Honourable Judge Arthur Fitzpatrick alongside her lawyer, Maître Parent, Garneau pled not 
guilty.121 When the case reconvened on July 25th, all parties were present, including the 
defendant and her attorney as well as the plaintiff and his lawyer, Maître Bédard.122 After 
evidence of an unknown nature was presented by Groslouis’ counsel, the case was once again 
adjourned, but in the meantime, the accused was granted “liberté sur parole”.123 After the same 
sequence of events occurred when the court was back in session on July 2nd, the judge set the 
next trial date for one week later. On July 9th, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appeared in 
court, as such, Judge Fitzpatrick ordered the “plainte déboutée”.124 
Like a majority of cases I examine in this thesis, the information is limited and there is a 
significant amount of details we do not know. Nevertheless, inferences can be made based on the 
information that is present in the plumitif. The offence Groslouis charged his wife with provides 
a good starting point for this analysis because it gives us an indication of what may have 
happened. According to the plumitif, Garneau was accused of one count of vagrancy.125 As I 
explained at the beginning of the previous chapter, at the time, there were twelve ways a person 
could be charged with this offence. Thus, although the plumitif does not explicitly state the 
circumstances under which Garneau was charged, her actions were likely to have been included 
in the list of illegal behaviours. In addition, the nature of their relationship could also explain 
why Groslouis decided to charge his wife with vagrancy. For example, perhaps Garneau left him, 
                                                          












or she was engaging in behaviour that he deemed inappropriate such as being a sex worker.126 As 
such, Groslouis was motivated to press charges against his wife in an attempt to bring her back 
home or correct her behaviour. Moreover, unlike the four other domestic dispute cases, this 
complaint was brought forward by a male spouse. Therefore, Groslouis’ decision to charge his 
wife with vagrancy falls in line with the patriarchal principles of Indian policy, which pressured 
the Wendat to conform to Western gender values that placed male heads of households as 
economic, political, and social guardians over their spouses and children.127  
Although the majority of this chapter examines the Wendat’s interactions with the 
criminal justice system in relation to inter se crimes, my research shows that they also engaged 
with this institution to voice their grievances against non-community members. One of these 
individuals was Eugène Sioui from the “village huron Lorette.”128 On February 25th, 1919, Sioui 
filed a complaint against Jules Renaud and Georges Théberge accusing them of vagrancy.129 
According to his statement, “le 23 février 1919 […] Jules Renaud et Georges Théberge, tous 
deux de la paroisse de Lorette, ont ensemble causé du trouble […] près du chemin public en 
criant, jurant, chantant, étant ivres, gênant et incommodant les passants paisibles”.130 In this 
same complaint, Sioui also claimed that “Jules Renaud aux mêmes temps et lieu a illégalement 
assailli l’épouse du susdit plaignant née Valéda Marcotte”.131 After signing off on his statement, 
the Honourable Judge Charles Langelier issued an arrest warrant for the accused men.132 On 
February 26th, Théberge and Renaud were granted a conditional release on a promise to appear in 
court on March 6th, at 10am.133 In the meantime, both men were placed into the former’s father’s 
custody, François Théberge, and the three of them were liable for $100 each should either 
accused break the condition of their release.134 On March 6th, Judge Langelier explained the 
charge to both men and after asking them to enter their plea, Théberge and Renaud pled not 
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guilty. Following their statements, the trial began with all parties present, including Sioui’s 
lawyer, Maître Parent, and the defendants’ counsel, Maître Larue.135 There is no indication about 
what was said during this exchange, however, by the time it was over, Judge Langelier found the 
defendants not guilty, and ordered the case “déboutée avec frais”.136  
This case is significant because it reinforces my argument that the Wendat participated in 
the legal system to voice their grievances against non-community members. More specifically, it 
sheds light on how they navigated a foreign institution and adapted to its expectations. First, 
Sioui followed all the necessary steps in this legal process. For instance, he filed a complaint 
shortly after the incident took place, submitted a sworn statement, hired a lawyer, attended the 
hearing, and paid the fine he was ordered to pay.137 Furthermore, the language Sioui used to 
describe the defendants’ behaviour in his statement reflects his ability to adapt to this colonial 
institution. For example, when recounting the incident that took place on February 23rd, Sioui 
used the similar terminology from section 207 of the 1892 Criminal Code (CC), which defined a 
vagrant as someone who “causes a disturbance in or near any street, road, highway or public 
space, by screaming, swearing or singing, or by being drunk, or by impeding or incommoding 
peaceable passengers”.138 Thus, instead of using his own words to describe the incident from his 
point of view, Sioui used the language from the CC to explicitly make the connection between 
the defendants’ behaviour and the law that was broken. Although it is likely that this was done 
under the advice of his lawyer, the plaintiff’s decision to follow his suggestion demonstrates his 
willingness to adapt to this system. Yet, even though Sioui tried to adapt to this system, his case 
was dismissed. In fact, not only did Judge Langelier dismiss his case, but he also ordered Sioui to 
pay $41.85 in fees.139 Unfortunately, the plumitif does not contain an explanation for the judge’s 
decision, but the breakdown of the fees state that seven witnesses testified at the trial; thus, given 
that he lost his case, the judge may have ordered him to pay for their time.140  
 According to my case study, Eugène Sioui was not the only Wendat to file a complaint 
against a non-community member. On December 2nd, 1922, Dame Moïse Groslouis, née Blanche 
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Larose, filed a complaint against Jimmy Saunders from Québec City accusing him of “voies de 
fait.”141 In her statement, she described that “le vingt-sept novembre dernier […] un nommé 
Jimmy Saunders de la cité de Québec, a assailli Louis Philippe Groslouis, âgé seulement de 
quatorze ans, le fils de la plaignante, l’a frappé, battu et autrement maltraité.”142 After accepting 
her statement, the Honourable Judge Philippe-Auguste Choquette issued a warrant for Saunders’ 
arrest; two days later, he appeared before the judge and when asked to enter his plea, the 
defendant pled not guilty and the trial was set for December 7th.143 The following day, Dame 
Moïse Groslouis withdrew her complaint and the case was dismissed.144 Like Eugène Sioui, 
Dame Groslouis also engaged with the justice system to voice her grievances against a non-
community member. In fact, she also followed similar necessary steps such as filing a complaint 
shortly after the incident took place and providing a signed sworn statement, common practices 
in the Canadian judicial system.145 However, Dame Groslouis chose to drop the charges and 
even though no explanation was given, a number of reasons could explain this decision. First, 
perhaps both parties resolved the conflict prior to the start of Groslouis’ trial. This would not be 
unheard of given that some matters could be settled outside of court. In addition, as the primary 
witness to the incident, it is equally plausible that, perhaps out of fear or intimidation, Groslouis’ 
son chose not to testify, which resulted in his mother formally dropping the charges. While the 
reason shall never be known, this case, like Sioui v. Renaud and Théberge (1919) demonstrate 
that the Wendat did indeed engage with this colonial institution.146  
As numerous scholars such as Hamar Foster, Mark Walters, and Sidney Harring have 
demonstrated, the Canadian government’s decision to extend its criminal jurisdiction to include 
inter se crimes marked an important turning point in nineteenth-century state expansion. In fact, 
even though this act of legal imperialism was initially met with significant geographical and 
institutional challenges, it ensured that a variety of crimes, which were once out of the 
dominion’s reach, were gradually incorporated into its legal framework. As a result, the Wendat 
were integrated into a new colonial order that prioritized an adversarial and punitive process 
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while simultaneously disregarding their legal system. For the Wendat, this disruption chipped 
away at their existing conflict resolution strategies, which were founded on the principles of 
consensus, gift-giving, mediation, and communication. However, similar to other scholars of 
Aboriginal agency, this case study demonstrates that the Wendat were not passive victims of 
colonialism. Rather, they engaged with colonial institutions. Thus, while it is undeniable that the 
implementation of colonial law had a profound impact on the Wendat, they did not cease to 
interact this new system. 
Throughout this chapter, I draw from a total of ten court cases, not including the 
territorial disagreement between Pierre-Albert Picard and Jules Sioui, to argue that the Wendat 
engaged with Canada’s judicial system to mediate internal tensions, resolve intimate disputes 
between spouses, and settle conflicts with non-community members. Among the ten cases that 
were brought before a judge, half of them listed a Wendat woman as the plaintiff and of those 
five, four involved a domestic dispute. This finding is significant because, unlike the preceding 
chapters, Wendat women are equally represented. On the surface, this may give the impression 
that they had equal access to the court system. However, I believe that their increased presence in 
the case file is due to the nature of the crime they charged their partner with. Thus, given that 
women are most likely to be victimized by their spouses and bring their cases to the attention of 
authorities, this could explain why they are equally represented in this case study. Moreover, 
while four of the cases brought forward by Wendat women involved intimate disputes with their 
spouses, their male counterparts were more likely to bring charges against individuals who were 
not part of their immediate family. In fact, four of the five cases initiated by Wendat men listed 
both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people as defendants, accusing them of crimes against the 
person and property such as failing to abide by an injunction, assault, libel, and vagrancy. 
Therefore, although both engaged in the legal system to resolve different types of disputes, this 
case study suggests that while women were more likely to file a complaint against their 
husbands, men mostly filed charges against non-family members. 
In addition, the discrepancy in the conviction rates and judicial outcomes of these cases 
are also worthy of analysis. Out of the five cases Wendat women brought before the court, only 
two resulted in a conviction. Since the vast majority of them dealt with domestic disputes, it is 
possible that the low conviction rate was due to the challenges women faced in proving spousal 







why one of the women, Philomène Latulippe, chose not to follow through with her first 
complaint against her husband. For Wendat men, however, convictions were obtained in three 
out of the five cases; more specifically, the three convictions were related to failing to obey an 
injunction, assault, and libel. That being said, the slightly higher conviction rate could be due to 
the fact some of these crimes were easier to prosecute. If that line of thinking is correct, this 
would explain the different conviction rates for complaints brought forward by Wendat men and 
women. While these court cases demonstrate that the Wendat navigated the criminal justice 
system in multiple ways, it is important to remember that, although Indigenous peoples were 









Conclusion: Reconciling Racialization and Agency 
 
The nineteenth century marked a significant turning point in state expansion. In particular, as 
part of their “nation building project”, the colonial governments of British North America 
implemented a series of economic, social, political, cultural, and ideological initiatives with the 
goal of solidifying their jurisdiction over the lands and peoples residing within the country. To 
this end, first colonial then federal and provincial governments worked together to establish 
various regulatory bodies that would act on behalf of the state in an effort to maintain and 
reinforce their sovereignty. In theory, state laws applied equally to all. However, for Aboriginal 
peoples, the implementation of colonial law occurred alongside the government’s 
conceptualization of First Nations as an “Indian Problem”. As such, the government enacted 
several pieces of legislation to regulate Indigenous peoples before finally consolidating them 
under the 1876 Indian Act. With this act, the state essentially created the “Indian” as a separate 
category, thus establishing two types of legal persons: “Indian” and “non- Indian”. In turn, this 
categorization allowed state actors to implement assimilation measures as part of their official 
policy to transform First Nations into self-sufficient citizens. Given that this racial distinction 
was deeply embedded into the colonial structure, it shaped Aboriginal peoples’ interaction with 
various state institutions, such as the legal system. Therefore, before even entering the 
courtroom, they were identified as separate. Yet, as this case study has shown, racialization did 
not always occur in an overt manner such as through discriminatory, dehumanizing, and 
derogatory language. Instead, in many ways, it was less visible; it became an integral part of the 
discourse of the state and its actors, and it manifested itself in the types of crimes they were 
charged with. In other words, by virtue of being Indigenous, accused persons were treated 
differently by the court system compared to non-Indigenous peoples.  
For the Wendat, the legal ramifications of racialization are seen most clearly in the 
twenty-four court cases I examine throughout the first two chapters of this thesis. More 
specifically, these cases clearly demonstrate that while a racial bias against the Wendat did exist 
– as seen in Dion v. Picard (1919) when the accused was identified as a “sauvage” – the 
inequitable treatment they experienced was embedded into the colonial structure. One way this 







and cultural practices, which contributed to their territorial dispossession. On the surface, the 
offences Wendat men such as Antoine Groslouis and Gérard Sioui, among others, were charged 
with give the impression that they were poachers who illegally harvested natural resources. 
However, these court cases illustrate that the criminalization of these men was a product of 
Québec’s conservation system that failed to take into consideration the Wendat’s usage of the 
land and its resources. For example, by prioritizing sport hunting, Québec’s game laws 
undermined traditional practices while also rendering others illegal.1 Consequently, the Wendat 
were excluded from participating in and benefiting from activities that had sustained the 
community for generations. In addition, Québec’s ideological approach to wildlife conservation 
worked to exclude the Wendat. For instance, the notion that harvesting natural resources were 
not inherent rights but rather privileges that could be granted or denied by the state, was used to 
justify the provincial government’s decision to bring wildlife management under its jurisdiction. 
In turn, this completely ignored the existence of Aboriginal sovereignty and concepts of 
property. Thereby resulting in the criminalization of Wendat men such as Sioui, who believed 
that his right to hunt was protected under state law.2  
Yet, as various scholars, such as historian Darcy Ingram maintain, the exclusion of 
Aboriginal peoples was not an accident. Instead, it fit into the federal government’s 
assimilationist policy that sought to move Indigenous peoples away from “primitive” economic 
practices and have them adopt more “civilized modes of production”.3 Thus, both provincial and 
federal government policies worked together to restrict the Wendat’s economic, subsistence, and 
cultural practices. At the same time, this tactic also benefited the state because it reduced the land 
base of Indigenous peoples by opening up their territories to Canadian settlement. Consequently, 
this resulted in the Wendat’s territorial dispossession by preventing them from engaging in 
traditional economic, subsistence, and cultural practices.  
Moreover, this case study demonstrates that the Wendat’s racialization was deeply 
embedded within the Indian Act (1876) and appeared through a variety of social, moral, and 
legal regulation tactics that sought to monitor Indigenous peoples’ behaviours in the public and 
private spheres. Occurring as part of the federal government’s assimilationist policies, one of the 
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most intrusive regulation strategies was the alcohol ban, which made it illegal for “Indians”, as 
defined by the state, to consume, sell, supply, exchange, give, barter, produce, or be in 
possession of alcoholic substances.4 Therefore, while non-Indigenous adults could consume 
alcohol according to provincial guidelines, Indigenous adults were strictly forbidden from doing 
so. The impact of the alcohol ban on members of the Wendake First Nation is clearly shown in 
this case study. In fact, out of the seventeen court cases I examined throughout this chapter, at 
least nine were related to alcohol infractions.5 In other words, half of all cases brought before the 
court for going against social, moral, and legal regulation laws involved violations to the Indian 
Act’s alcohol ban. In addition, this number does not include the four Loi des Indiens cases that 
did not specify which aspect of the Indian Act Wendat defendants were accused of contravening. 
Thus, it is certainly possible that this number is higher than what the data currently shows. 
As other scholars such as Mariana Valverde and Robert Campbell have pointed out, and 
as this case study demonstrates, the decision to deny Indigenous peoples the ability to consume 
alcohol was racially motivated. For instance, Valverde maintains that alcohol regulation targeted 
Indigenous peoples based on the assumption that, due to their racial inferiority, they lacked self-
control, and as such, it was the government’s responsibility to intervene by regulating their 
consumption.6 Similarly, Campbell, states that, as an identifying marker of citizenship, the 
ability to consume alcohol was used to distinguish between citizens who possessed this right and 
those who did not.7 By enshrining this distinction into the Indian Act, the racialization of 
Indigenous peoples was ingrained into law, which was later upheld by the court through the 
criminalization of the Wendat for alcohol related infractions. Thus, had the alcohol ban not 
existed, Narcisse Picard, Charles Sioui, and Moïse Groslouis would not have encountered the 
Canadian criminal justice system – at least not for alcohol related infractions. 
Evidently, this case study demonstrates that the racialization that was deeply embedded 
into the state discourse and reinforced by the rule of law had a significant impact on the Wendat; 
especially in terms of the types of crimes they were charged with. At the same time, however, 
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this research illustrates that the Wendat were not passive victims of colonialism. Instead, they 
were historical agents who engaged with the justice system in a variety of ways. As historians 
Hamar Foster, Mark D. Walters, and Sidney Harring demonstrate the Canadian government’s 
decision to extend its jurisdiction over inter se crimes resulted in Indigenous peoples’ gradual 
incorporation into the new judicial framework and the subsequent erosion of their traditional 
legal systems. Consequently, it became increasingly difficult for the Wendat to rely on the 
principles of mediation, consensus, gift-giving and communication to resolve conflicts. As a 
result, the Canadian court system became a forum in which the Wendat could voice their 
grievances and find redress for perceived wrongdoings. Framing this analysis within the existing 
literature on Aboriginal agency, the ten cases I examine in the final chapter demonstrate that the 
Wendat interacted with the justice system in three ways: to mediate internal tensions, resolve 
intimate disputes between spouses, and settle conflicts with non-community members. By 
finding a balance between recognizing Indigenous agency and acknowledging the ways in which 
it was limited by colonialism, these findings build off the work of historian Shelley Gavigan who 
emphasizes the importance of resisting the “[…] impulse to portray every act in heroic terms.”8  
In some ways, these two themes – racialization and agency – seem to contradict each 
other. On the one hand, the majority of court cases presented in this case study show that the 
Wendat were indeed acted upon. In particular, the racialization embedded into the colonial 
structure manifested itself through the types of crimes the Wendat were charged with such as 
criminalizing their traditional practices and enforcing social and moral regulation through the 
Indian Act. On the other hand, an important number of cases also demonstrate that the Wendat 
were in fact actors. For instance, the Wendat navigated through the legal system to voice their 
grievances and find justice for the wrongs committed against them. Nevertheless, I believe it is 
possible to reconcile these two themes. First, reconciling both themes could be done by placing 
Aboriginal peoples’ agency within its particular context. In fact, when analyzing specific 
moments or events such as Wendat men and women approaching the court system to file 
complaints against those who have wronged them, it is important to recognize that these actions 
took place in a foreign institution that followed a different set of ideological guidelines. As a 
result, their abilities to act may have been constrained by structural limitations that were beyond 
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their control. When applying this approach to the legal system, researchers should strive to find a 
balance between recognizing the law as a tool of colonial control that was implemented by the 
state and acknowledging that, at the same time, Indigenous peoples saw it as a forum in which 
they could find redress for injustices committed against them or resolve conflicts occurring 
within their own communities. That being said, it is important to remember that although certain 
behaviours may seem like intentional or unintentional acts of resistance, they occurred within a 
particular setting that may have shaped their ability to act and react. Moreover, given the 
flexibility of this approach, it can also be used when examining the power relations between 
Indigenous peoples and other government branches and institutions like healthcare, housing, 
employment, education, and access to other services and programs. 
Another way these two seemingly contradictory themes can be reconciled is by 
incorporating Indigenous voices. Historically, the voices of marginalized individuals such as 
Indigenous peoples were often left out of the narrative, which resulted in important silences that 
failed to include First Nations’ experiences. Over the years, a number of scholars have examined 
this issue by deconstructing the erasure and minimization of Indigenous peoples in the collective 
consciousness and Canadian historiography. For example, historians Kiera Ladner and Michael 
McCrossan examine the pervasiveness of these issues in their analysis of the 2008 speech made 
by then Prime Minister Stephen Harper in which he offered a formal apology to Residential 
School survivors and their families for the role of the government in this system. In particular, 
the authors argue that Harper’s description of Canadian history in which he draws from the 
notion of a “shared history” between Indigenous peoples and Canadians “selectively omits a 
history of genocide, territorial dispossession, cultural destruction, and regime replacement 
[…].”9 In other words, by failing to recognize that Canada was – and still is – a colonial regime, 
the experiences and histories of First Nations continue to be marginalized. The fact that these 
misconceptions about Indigenous peoples are held and perpetuated by individuals in positions of 
power reflects how pervasive these issues are. As such, it is vital to incorporate Indigenous 
voices into the narrative to eliminate the devaluation of their communities. Although 
incorporating Indigenous voices may be difficult when examining certain court cases from the 
past, combining these sources with other types of documents such as official letters, petitions, 
                                                          







requests, personal communications, and defendants’ statements can bring these voices back to 
the forefront.  
Finally, I believe the two themes of racialization and agency can be reconciled by 
acknowledging that colonialism has not ended, and that its legacy continues to impact the lives 
of Indigenous peoples. Although the ripple effects of colonialism extend to various state 
institutions, the overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in the criminal justice system has 
received considerable attention. Over the years, a number of government commissions, inquiries, 
and reports such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in 1996 and the 2015 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) were conducted in order to assess the 
causes of Indigenous overrepresentation and to find possible solutions to this issue. However, 
recent findings suggest that little has changed. Instead, Indigenous peoples continue to be 
disproportionately represented as victims of crimes and accused persons at all levels of the 
judicial system. According to a 2019 report released by the Research and Statistics Division of 
the Department of Justice, Indigenous peoples are overrepresented as victims of both violent and 
non-violent crimes. In fact, even though Indigenous peoples represent approximately 4.9% of the 
total Canadian population, they suffered 24% of all homicides in 2017.10 Indigenous people, in 
other words, make up nearly one quarter of all homicide victims even though they represent less 
than 5% of the total population. This means that, compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts, 
Indigenous peoples are six times more likely to be murdered.11 For Indigenous women, 
racialization coupled with gender-based violence places them at an even higher risk of 
victimization. Based on the same 2019 report, in 2017, there was a 32% increase in homicide 
rates for Indigenous women compared to the previous year.12 Evidently, compared to their non-
Indigenous counterparts, Indigenous men and women are significantly overrepresented as 
victims of crimes and it appears that their victimization continues to increase.13 
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Moreover, Indigenous peoples are also disproportionately represented as accused persons 
and perpetrators of crime. According to a report compiled by researcher Scott Clark for the 
Department of Justice, “Indigenous peoples are both over-policed and under-policed.”14 In other 
words, although Indigenous peoples are often the target of policing, they are simultaneously 
overlooked when in need of assistance.15 Consequently, this has resulted in the gradual increase 
of their overrepresentation in the justice system. For example, between March 2009 and March 
2018, the total number of Indigenous inmates in federal custody grew by 42.8%.16 For 
Indigenous women sentenced to federal custody, their numbers also rose; in fact, during the same 
ten-year time period, it increased by 60%.17 Thus, compared to their non-Indigenous 
counterparts, Indigenous peoples in Canada continue to disproportionately encounter the judicial 
system as both victims of crime and accused person. 
Even with all of the different commissions and reports analyzing the overrepresentation 
of Indigenous peoples in the justice system, the common thread woven throughout each one is 
the cause they attribute this to: systemic racism. According to Clark, both historical and current 
socio-economic factors such as childhood abuse, mental illness, addiction, homelessness, and the 
breakdown of social bonds are the leading risk factors in increasing one’s risk of victimization.18 
Indigenous people, then, are not inherently more likely to commit crime or be victimized because 
they are Indigenous; rather environmental factors stemming from generations of systemic racism 
and colonialism play a significant role in increasing their likelihood of encountering the justice 
system. As such, it is impossible to deny that Indigenous people continue to feel the effects of 
colonialism. On the surface, twentieth-century court cases such as the one involving Albert 
Sioui, the 70-year-old Wendat man charged with stealing wood, may seem irrelevant or even 
outdated in today’s pursuit to find a solution to the overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in 
the legal system. However, as this thesis has shown, they offer important historical insight into 
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the origins of Indigenous overrepresentation. Therefore, while they certainly highlight the deep 
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